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SUMMARY:
This thesis examines aspects of the ‘Irish Question’ and its impact on British politics 
predominantly between 1880 -  1914, with special reference to its implications for the 
character of the British Constitution, and its efficacy when applied to a divided 
society.
It analyses the conceptual ideas of the major political actors and how these were 
formulated and adapted to meet particular circumstances.
It is divided into five Chapters:
1. Outlines the historical background from the beginning of the seventeenth century to 
the granting of Catholic Emancipation in 1828. It sets out the makings of a divided 
society, with particular attention to the plantation of Ulster
2. Examines the arguments for and against the granting of Home Rule during the time 
of the first and second Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893, assessing the strategies 
used by both the Irish Parties to attain what each perceived to be justice for Ireland. It 
looks at how successful Gladstone’s Governments were at accommodating these two 
different perceptions of justice.
3. Discusses the evolutionary changes of the British Constitution, with particular 
attention to the 1911 Parliament Act, examining the Unionists’ claim, that the passing 
of this Act was part of a ‘corrupt parliamentary bargain’ between the Liberal 
Government and the Irish Parliamentary Party.
4. Examines A V Dicey’s argument that the passing of a Home Rule Bill by virtue of 
the 1911 Parliament Act would lack constitutional validity, since there were 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the House of Commons did not represent the 
determined will of the nation. Hence, the Liberals were usurping the Sovereignty of 
the people.
5. Assesses Dicey’s arguments within the context of the ‘Ulster Crisis’ 1912-1914, 
and explores the argument that the passing of Home Rule by virtue of the 1911 
Parliament Act would exceed the bounds of legitimate government authority.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines aspects of the 'Irish Question' and its impact on British politics 
predominantly between 1880 - 1914, with special reference to its implications for the 
character of the British Constitution, the relationship between Ireland and the 
Westminster Parliament and the Constitution's efficacy when applied to a divided society. 
It asks the question, What if any is or at least should be the limitation of Government 
authority within the British Constitution? And crucially, it examines the corollary of this: 
What safeguards does the British Constitution provide for its citizens, and are there 
circumstances when it is justifiable for the people to use active resistance against 
Constitutional Government?
Notes on text:
Whist recognising that Southern Unionists played a significant role in opposing Home 
Rule by constitutional means during the three Home Rule Bills of 1886, 1893 and 1912, 
it is Ulster Unionism that this thesis will concentrate on, since it was from this section 
that the threat of armed resistance was articulated between 1886 - 1914 and became a 
real possibility from 1912 onwards. The term Ulster Unionist will be used when 
referring to those Unionists from the North, Irish Unionists will include both Southern 
and Northern Unionists. The terms Imperial and Westminster Parliament are used inter­
changeably. As is the term Irish Parliamentary Party and Nationalist Party.
The framework of the thesis is chronological but its approach is thematic. This 
methodology allows for an analysis of the conceptual ideas of the major political actors 
at a specific time. It looks at how perceptions were formulated, established and adapted 
to meet the particular circumstances of the time. The decision to include an historical 
chapter outlining the makings of a divided society, and also the constitutional 
relationship between Ireland and the Imperial Parliament was taken because past events 
that occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth century played such a crucial part in
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the demands for and against the granting of Irish Home Rule from 1886 onwards. 
Therefore, chapter one will briefly outline the key events and the decisions taken at this 
time, since it will be argued, that these to a large extent were instrumental in polarising 
Irish society, as well as contributing to the British State's lack of full legitimacy in 
Ireland.
For the remaining three chapters the specific time span of between 1880 and 1914 has 
been chosen because it was a period in which the 'Irish Question' tested the limit of 
Governmental authority to its uttermost. In 1886 the then Prime Minster, W E Gladstone 
introduced the first Home Rule Bill for Ireland; from this time onwards, the British 
Constitution was called upon to find a solution to the differing ideals and demands of two 
groups - The Irish Nationalists and The Ulster Unionists. In this sense the 'Irish Question' 
was very much a 'British' one, since it tested the British theory that all political issues 
could be resolved by Parliament. Chapter two discusses the strategies used by the two 
Irish Parties, to achieve what each perceived was 'justice' for Ireland during the time of 
the first and second Home Rule Bills. As the Irish Parliamentary Party moved at least 
ostensibly towards constitutionalism the Ulster Unionist Party began to articulate its 
determination to resist any measure of Home Rule, even if  this involved the use of force. 
It will be argued however, that at this time, the threat was perhaps more rhetorical than 
real, given that the Ulster Unionist Party had its own built in constitutional safeguard - 
the House of Lords, which virulently opposed Home Rule. But the social and political 
landscape was changing, and the House of Lords was soon to lose its power of veto. 
Chapter three begins by examining the nature of the British Constitution, and how it 
evolved to meet the demands of a changing society. The Reform Act of 1832 established 
the House of Commons as the dominant House within the Constitution. This was given 
statutory recognition following the passing of the Parliament Bill of 1911. Sovereignty 
now effectively resided with the Government of the day, it was no longer, even 
theoretically shared between the two Houses of Parliament. This dominance was made
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possible by the electoral changes that occurred in the nineteenth century such as the 
extension of the franchise, and the redistribution of seats. These changes were 
accompanied by the rise of mass disciplined parties as politicians now had to seek the 
votes of the electorate. It will be argued However, that the Lords themselves were 
instrumental in bringing forward their own demise by their partisanship towards the 
Conservative Party. However, the Irish Parliamentary Party was heavily involved in 
bringing about the curtailment of the Lords power of veto. It once again held the balance 
of power in 1910, and used its political advantage to secure Home Rule for Ireland. The 
Unionist Party argued, that the Liberal Government was involved in a 'corrupt 
parliamentary bargain’ with the Irish Parliamentary Party: claiming that the Irish 
Nationalist Party had offered its support to the Liberal Government on condition that the 
latter introduce a Bill for the curtailment of the Lords' power of veto. From this time 
onwards Unionists became convinced that the Liberal Government was guilty of a 
'corruption of the constitution', this was to result in two of the most bitter constitutional 
crises of the twentieth century, in which the weaknesses of an unwritten British 
constitution were exposed. Its hitherto strengths, its flexibility and its in built-checks and 
balances were revealed to be its weakness.
It could be argued, that the impact of Irish Home Rule brought into focus wider political 
issues than Ireland. ODay has argued, that the crisis surrounding the third Home Rule 
Bill of 1912 was larger than Ireland, 'it concerned the nature of governmental authority 
and legitimacy.' (1) Could, asked O'Day, 'ephemeral political majorities perhaps elected 
to Parliament for entirely different reasons, impose an apparently objectionable minority 
policy on the whole country without resistance?' (2) This thesis explores the argument 
that it should not, even if technically it could do so. By 1912, the dominance o f Party 
government had been confirmed by the passing of the 1911 Parliament Act, no longer 
could the House of Lords use its power of veto to block Government Bills. A Bill would 
become law within the lifetime of a single Parliament, hence under the doctrine of
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Parliamentary Sovereignty there appeared to be no limits to Government Authority. 
Chapter four examines the arguments of A V Dicey, generally regarded as the 
constitutional expert of the day. Dicey was an ardent defender of the Union, and 
abhorred Home Rule in any shape or form, however it will be argued, that Dicey 
provided a sound constitutional argument against the granting of Home Rule by virtue of 
the 1911 Parliament Act. Dicey’s argument was that although Parliament was the 
Supreme Sovereign body from a legal stand-point, politically ultimate Sovereignty 
resided with the electorate. Therefore, the Legislature should, if there was reasonable 
doubt that it does not represent the deliberate will of the people, dissolve Parliament and 
seek the verdict of the Nation. If the Government refused, argued Dicey, the King could 
exercise his powers and dismiss his ministers and appoint new ones, thus forcing a 
General Election. The powers of the Crown were by this time more symbolic than real, 
but were they atrophied by their disuse? No argued Dicey, there were precedents, 
whereby the Crown had used its power to ensure that the Legislature represented the 
deliberate will of the people.
Chapter five examines Dicey’s constitutional arguments within the context of the Ulster 
Crises' between 1912- 14. The Unionists contended, that Home Rule did not represent 
the will of the people, so much as the demands of the Irish Parliamentary Party, therefore, 
the Liberal Government was guilty of violating the spirit of the constitution, by its refusal 
to submit its policy of Home Rule to the verdict of the Nation. The Liberal Government, 
however, maintained that Home Rule had been official Party policy since 1891, 
therefore, it had formed part of its manifesto in the two elections of 1910. Moreover, as 
the duly elected Government it had the right to pass the Bill into law. These differing 
perception of democracy (3) involved the concept of the 'mandate'; a somewhat 
ambiguous doctrine within the British Constitution, but one that, as will be shown was by 
1912 becoming more prevalent. However, there was another more emotive and moral 
dimension to the passing of the third Home Rule Bill, that of the rights of the people.
IV
Did the Liberal Government have the moral right to coerce a section of the United 
Kingdom out of the British Constitution and force them to accept the authority of their 
sworn historical enemies, the Irish Nationalists? Under the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty it has to be conceded that legally it could , but was it morally acceptable that 
a Party should use its Parliamentary majority to effect such a measure? The crisis 
surrounding the third Rule Bill highlighted many of the ambiguities and indeed the 
weaknesses of the British Constitution, the role of the Crown was an ambiguous one, 
symbolically a figure head, but it nevertheless still possessed and continues to possess 
powers that can be used, to curb the powers of a Parliamentary majority. As has been 
mentioned it can dissolve Parliament, or more drastically it has the right to refuse the 
Royal Assent. This holds dangers for the Crown, since it is in effect a veto against the 
democratically elected Representatives of the people and has not been used since 1712. 
But under the British Constitution people are subjects of the Crown as well as citizens of 
the State, therefore, it will be argued, that George V was faced with a dilemma, should he 
give his assent to a Bill which, the Ulster Unionists and the British Unionists argued 
forced a section of his subjects out of the British Constitution? Did not the Crown have a 
responsibility to protect its subjects? It will be argued that the crisis surrounding the 
third Home Rule revealed critical weaknesses in the British system of Government, it 
disclosed above all the danger of the Party system, whereby a Government could pass 
into law any Bill which may or may not be supported by the Nation. In essence, the 
Legislature could give effect to the deliberate will of a faction. These, hitherto, latent 
and unexplored issues were exposed during the Ulster Question' of 1912-14: their 
resonances are still felt today, and not only in Ireland, as the present Government tackles 
yet again the Ulster Question', and the wider issue of constitutional reform.
V
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CHAPTER ONK
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 
PERCEPTIONS FORMED AND TRADITIONS ESTABLISHED
One of the questions this thesis asks, is whether there are circumstances when it is 
justifiable for the people to use active resistance against Constitutional Government? It 
may be argued, that nowhere in the United Kingdom has there been such a sustained 
challenge to the State's authority as in Ireland. Prior to the mid nineteenth century at 
least, the British State frequently met this challenge by a policy of coercion. It was 
hoped that the Act of Union signed by George in in August 1800, which became law on 
the 1st January 1801 when the United Kingdom was established, would secure a peaceful 
settlement between the two countries. It will be suggested however, that the volatile 
relationship that existed between England and Ireland prior to this period, together with 
the fragmented society that existed within Ireland made the securing of a peaceful and 
lasting solution to (what later become known as) 'the Irish question' a bleak one. The 
history of Anglo-Irish relations reveals a tradition of conflict, conquest and confiscation 
followed by rebellion. The Irish, be they referred to as Native Irish, Anglo-Norman 
(Old English) or New English, appeared to have shared a common assumption, that 
loyalty to the State was conditional. Political obligation was seen as contingent on the 
State's ability to protect its subjects. It may however be fair to argue, that all political 
authority is to a certain degree conditional. Even in Hobbes' 'Great Leviathan', where 
the authority of the Sovereign is almost absolute, a person has a right to ultimate 
rebellion; since self protection takes precedence over political obligation: 'The obligation 
o f subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power 
lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. .The end of obedience is protection.' (1) 
John Locke, who sought (in the Two Treaties of Government) to establish William and
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Mary's throne on the will of the people, (whose theory has become the cornerstone of 
Western Liberal Democracy) argued, that ultimate sovereignty resided with the people. 
The State, for Locke, was fiduciary, its authority dependant on the will of the people, the 
latter having a right to withdraw consent if they deem it is no longer acting in their best 
interests. Locke’s theory set limits on the authority of the State. Essentially the State was 
brought into existence to protect a person's private property: 'Political power, then, I take 
to be the right of making laws with the penalties of death, and consequently all less 
penalties, for regulating and preserving of property etc.' (2) These two very different 
conceptions of the State appear to share a common belief, that the State has an obligation 
to protect its citizens. This may be the crux of the 'Irish Question', that the majority of the 
Irish population, whether they be Catholic or Protestant did not believe that the British 
State was able to or indeed interested in protecting or even addressing the rights of its 
citizens. Ireland may have been conquered in the Seventeenth Century, but the majority 
of its population, the Native Irish believed that British rule was unjust, therefore, they did 
not develop a loyalty towards the British State, rather they were forced to submit to it. 
And as Beckett astutely observes: 'men who submit by force retain the will, and may 
acquire the ability to resist.' (3) This propensity to resist, and indeed the will to do so, 
seems to be a central tenet prevalent in Irish history: as is the tradition of direct action 
against the Crown or Parliament. The plantation of Protestant Scottish and English 
settlers during the sixteenth and seventeenth century ensured that the political and 
economic structure in Ireland was transformed to mirror that of England's; whereby, 
hereditary primogeniture replaced the chieftain clan structure, but the majority of the 
population perceived the system as unjust. Moreover, whilst the Reformation was 
successful in the development of a predominantly Protestant society in mainland Britain 
it failed to take root in Ireland, therefore, the seeds of sectarian conflict were firmly 
planted. The failure through either lack.of interest or resources to replace Catholicism 
with Protestantism as the religion of thd majority contributed greatly to the British State's
lack of legitimacy in Ireland. The subsequent policies based on religious discrimination, 
ensured that religious divisions within Irish society would become entrenched, with each 
group growing evermore suspicious and fearful of the other. During the seventeenth 
century a pattern emerged, whereby the results of conflicts between Catholics and 
Protestants were seen as a victory for one necessarily meant the destruction of the other: 
with the British State cast in the role of illegitimate arbiter. There were occasions when 
groups attempted to cross the divide: The United Irishmen, Young Ireland and The Home 
Government Association, tried to unite the Catholic and Protestant population, but past 
atrocities fuelled by a particular interpretation of history (depending on which side of the 
divide one was) ensured their failure. This chapter will examine the historical 
background of Anglo-Irish relations, drawing on the seemingly 'Irish' tradition of direct 
action against the State. As Boyce has argued: 'What made Ireland somehow different to 
other parts of the United Kingdom, was the fact, that contending political groups in 
Ireland did not rule out violence as a means of achieving their aims.' (4)
IRELAND A CONQUERED NATION-BUT AT WHAT COST?
On March 30th 1603, Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone submitted to the Queen's Lieutenant 
Mountjoy: this may have brought to an end open-warfare in Ireland, as the Gaelic Chiefs 
were forced to accept the authority of the British State, but it did not however, introduce 
stability. A letter sent by Mountjoy, the Queen's Lord Lieutenant to Robert Cecil in April 
1603, predicting that Ireland was 'now capable of what form it shall please the king to 
give it', (5) was not an accurate one. The terms of the treaty of Mellifont were generous 
enough: O'Neill was pardoned and all his lands restored, but the power of the Gaelic 
Lords had been severely weakened. The replacement of tanistry, the Irish custom of 
selecting a ruler by that of primogeniture, the English custom, reduced the position of the 
chiefs to that of a landlord, as tenants were now required to seek justice in British Courts. 
(6) This interference by the British State, resulted in the 'flight of the Earls' in 1607,
when O'Neill along with some one hundred chiefs chose exile rather than submit to 
English rule. The Crown reasoned that by their actions, the Earls were guilty of treason, 
therefore, confiscation of their lands was legal. These escheated lands were granted to 
English and Scottish 'undertakers', who under the terms of the scheme were to bring over 
English and Scottish settlers, build castles and towns, and introduce English law, the 
Protestant religion and 'civility'. (7) Land also went to 'servitors' (men who had served 
the Crown in Ireland). Although the latter was subject to the same terms and conditions 
as the 'undertakers', they were permitted to take Irish tenants. The rules of the plantation 
scheme were however, not strictly adhered to, as the new settlers of Ulster found 
themselves caught between the twin roles of'civilizer and profit-maker.' (8) As early as 
1618 there was evidence of letting and sub-letting to the Native Irish on the basis of 
short-term leases and high rents. (9) Therefore instead of forming settler townships the 
settlers were dispersed throughout a predominantly Gaelic population. The English 
Crown adopted the same strategy towards solving the Ulster problem as it did for the 
American colonies - plantation. But, unlike the Native Americans who were driven off 
their lands, in Ulster, 'Catholics remained near the settlers, a standing challenge to the 
property of the new settlers and their regime.' (10) The continued presence of 
swordsmen, ( an estimated 10,000 in 1609) who owed allegiance to the Lords they 
followed (the Catholic Gentry), 'encouraged among the settlers a mentality appropriate to 
a state of siege and they armed themselves accordingly'. (11) Evidently the new 
Protestant settlers felt a continual threat from the Native population, who they regarded 
as uncivilised and brutal. The Catholic population in turn resented the interlopers who 
had, with the aid of the British State stolen their 'lands'. English property laws now 
governed Ireland, and Crown officials in Dublin looked on the New-English-settlers 
favourably. (12) In 1641 the Native (Catholic) population rebelled, but this was not 
merely a revolt by an oppressed people, granted that poor harvests and the quartering of 
Soldiers in Ulster frustrated the Catholic population. (13) However the political situation
in England at the time was also a decisive factor of the insurrection: the fear of the 
increasing power of an anti-Catholic Puritan Parliament and the corresponding 
weakening of the King threatened the Catholic religion. Indeed it was written that 
Parliament intended to send over the 'Scots "with the sword" against the Irish "to supplant 
us and raze the name of Catholicke and Irish out of the whole kingdom" (14) The 
insurgents justified their use of force on 'the invasion of the royal prerogative by the 
'puritan faction' in England and Scotland,' which according to Beckett: 'they not 
unreasonably regarded as a threat to their own religion'. (15) Their objective was a 
Catholic Ireland, loyal to the Stuart Crown. (16) From the outset it was portrayed as a 
'loyal rebellion'. In 1912 Ulster Unionists would put forward the same argument to 
justify their threat of rebellion, claiming that they were defending Ulster in the name of 
the Crown. The 1641 insurrection and the massacre of Protestants by Catholics was to 
have a profound effect on the relationship between the two groups. Although there is 
now a recognition that the atrocities committed have been exaggerated, 'the exaggerated 
versions have been as important as the reality in shaping attitudes within Ireland.' (17) 
These outrages quickly became part of the Protestants anti-Catholic mythology, and 
served to confirm and fuel a 'them and us' mentality. Its historiography ensured that 
Ireland would become two nations - one Protestant one Catholic. History could and has 
been called upon to justify each 'nation's' particular claim for justice. The defeat of the 
1641 uprising by the Cromwellian army was to result in a further confiscation of Catholic 
lands. In March 1642 the Government passed the Adventurers Act: those that lent money 
to the government to defeat the Irish rebellion were to receive a share of the land 
confiscated upon the successful defeat of the rebels. Some 2,5000,000 acres out of the 
expected confiscations were earmarked to meet the Government's liability. (18) Such 
was the scale of these confiscations that whereas, in 1641 Catholics owned some 60% of 
the land, by 1660 they only owned eight to nine per cent, almost all of it in the counties 
of Connaught and Clare. (19) A new landlord class was thus established in Ireland, and
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the Native Irish and the Anglo-Norman Catholic Gentry of Ireland were effectively 
marginalised, as the Cromwellian Army did not attempt to distinguish 'between one kind 
o f Catholic or another, or between those innocent of massacre and those who were 
guilty.' (20) The Protestant new English were now firmly establishing themselves as the 
ne\y landed gentry. However, the succession of the Catholic James II in 1685 and the 
subsequent policies of the Crown was to send alarm bells ringing among the new English 
gentry. All too soon Protestant became convinced that their fears were justified by 
James' Catholicisation of the Army and the Irish Administration: however, it was the 
possibility of an attack on the land settlement that most frightened them. By 1686 an 
exodus had began by those that believed that their capital would be more secure in 
England. (21) In England too there was unease about James' religious beliefs. James' 
decision to send for Irish troops ( now mostly Catholic) to lend him support in England 
frightened and outraged the majority of the population. The events of 1641 were still 
remembered and anti-Catholic feelings were running high. The confrontation between 
Crown and Parliament (in England) was finally resolved when William landed at Torbay 
in November 1688 and James fled the country a month later. But although mainland 
Britain accepted William and Mary as Protestant Constitutional Monarchs, the 
predominantly Catholic Ireland still regarded James as their true King, and the Catholics 
there were prepared to defend their Sovereign by force of arms. However, James was in 
return expected to redress the injustices suffered at the hands of the British State since 
Tudor times. In what has become known as the Patriot Parliament' which met in May 
1689, Catholic grievances were addressed. James was forced reluctantly to repeal the 
Acts of Settlement and Explanation outright. Those that had owned land in 1641 could 
now take the necessary action to recover them, without regard to the claims of 
subsequent purchasers - (22) i.e. the Protestants. An act declaring that 'the English 
Parliament had no right to legislate for Ireland' was also passed. James II appeared to be 
reluctant to pass these measures, however, he [James] was pointedly reminded by
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Parliament that: 'If your Majesty will not fight for our rights, we will not fight for yours.' 
(23) Once again displaying the tradition of conditional loyalty so prevalent in Ireland, 
irrespective of one's political persuasion. James' defeat at the Battle of the Boyne was to 
confirm the supremacy of the Protestant population of Ireland, not only in the question of 
land, but also in their civil and religious liberties. For the Boyne was, as Stewart rightly 
asserts:
the critical moment of a long struggle between the Roman Catholic and Protestant
interests. Its results was to establish securely in Ireland the Protestant
Ascendancy which lasted until recent times. (24)
The Boyne has become revered in Unionists' historiography as the decisive moment when 
Protestantism triumphed over Catholicism. The Protestants believed that their own 
heroic victories of the previous century together with the atrocities committed by the 
Catholics during the same period was justification for the latter's oppression. This 
oppression, although on a lesser scale was extended to Dissenters. The Ulster Scots were 
denounced as stubborn enemies of the 'Tory Monarchy and episcopacy' and the 
Cromwellians were branded as 'republicans and regicides.' (25) Thus the Anglican 
Ascendancy in Ireland could portray themselves as the only loyal citizens, and by so 
doing could claim the right to govern Ireland. In this the Ascendancy was aided by the 
British Parliament, which in 1691 passed a bill requiring an oath of allegiance, which 
included renouncing the spiritual supremacy of the Pope. This Act ensured that the 
Parliament that met in Dublin in 1692 was a Protestant one. Henceforth the Ascendancy 
could and indeed did consolidate their supremacy by the passing of the Penal Laws'. So 
effective were these laws that by the reign of George I, the Irish Lord Chancellor was 
able to boast 'The law does not suppose any such person to exist as an Irish Roman 
Catholic.' (26) Although the laws were not strictly enforced the mere fact that these laws 
could be invoked, as occurred when in 1714, when Louise XTV recognised James II's son
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as James III of England, Scotland and Ireland was enough to ensure that the divide 
between 'loyal' Protestant subjects and 'traitorous' Catholics was firmly established and 
maintained. Moreover, the laws ensured that 'for the most part of the eighteenth century 
the Roman Catholics and Dissenters of Ireland was excluded from any significant part of 
the political process,' (27) It may be suggested, that the discriminatory measures 
experienced by the Roman Catholics (at the hands of the British State) during the 
seventeenth century, and extended against them by the Ascendancy during the eighteenth 
century, convinced the Catholics that justice for them would be unattainable until the 
twin pillars of oppression i.e. the British State and the Protestant Landlords were 
removed from their position of power. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the 
Gaelic Chiefs of Ireland had little in common with the Anglo Norman Lords, but the 
State's tendency to regard all Catholics as traitors and heretics, and treat both as such 
ensured that an alliance was formed. The two groups had little choice but to unite under 
the common banner of religion; hence the Irish Nation became synonymous with that of a 
Catholic one. So complete was this fusion, that Sir Richard Cox in his publication of 
1689-90 Hibernia Anglicana claimed:
if the most ancient Natural Irish-Man be a Protestant, no man takes him for other 
than an Englishman; and if a Cockny be a Papist, he is reckoned in Ireland as 
much an Irish-Man as if he was bom on Slevelogher. (28)
Although the Catholic population were denied their rights to take part in the political 
process, this did not mean that their will to right the wrongs done to them by the British 
State and the Protestant Ascendancy diminished, it was merely that their power of 
resistance was severally curtailed by an all-powerful Protestant Landlord class that 
dominated Irish society. Crucially the people turned to 'secret societies', perceiving these 
as the best form of protection from unjust landlords, whose powers were seen to be 
propped up by the British connection. It was this tradition of'secret societies' that was to
be so advantageous to Parnell in the 1880's, in his quest for Home Rule. However, as the 
eighteenth century progressed, it was from within the Ascendancy class itself that the 
State's authority was challenged, as many of the Ascendancy themselves became 
dissatisfied with Ireland's subordinate position.
'PATRIOTS' USE THE THREAT OF FORCE TO SECURE JUSTICE FOR IRELAND.
The Glorious Revolution had indeed ushered in a new constitution in England. It had 
secured the supremacy of Parliament, whilst the Septennial Act of 1715 fixing the 
duration of a Parliament (in theory at least) set limits on that power. The Habeas Corpus' 
Act protected the rights of subjects from arbitrary imprisonment. However, none of these 
were extended to Ireland. 'Whatever the blessings of the "Glorious Revolution" may have 
been for England they were ingloriously denied to Ireland.' (29) During the second half 
of the Eighteenth Century, a group which became known as the 'patriots' began to 
demand that these Acts were extended to Ireland. In the 1761 Parliament Henry Flood 
established himself as leader of this group, their aims were, according to Beckett:
the limitation of the life of parliament by a septennial act, reduction of the 
pensions list, establishment of a national militia, a habeas corpus act, security of 
tenure for the judges. And behind these detailed proposals lay the less clearly 
defined aim of establishing the position of the rights of Ireland as a distinct 
kingdom. (30)
An Independent legislator was clearly the aim of the 'patriots' who drew on the arguments 
put forward by William Molyneux, in his pamphlet of 1698, entitled, 'The case of 
Ireland's being bound by Acts of Parliament in England stated', in which he argued that, 
Ireland was a separate Kingdom bound by a common crown: and as such, Ireland had a 
right to an independent Parliament. (31) To understand their grievances it is vital to 
outline the relative weakness of the Irish Parliament in its scope to pass legislation. This
9
was due to the constraints imposed by Poyning's Law of 1494, which essentially meant 
that all Parliamentary business had to have the prior approval of the King's deputy and 
his council in Ireland and by the King and his council in England. The Irish Parliament's 
position was made worse by the 1719 Declaratory Act (6 George I), which bound Ireland 
to the Acts of Westminster. (32) Although this Act merely put into statute that which had 
been common practice since 1640, it was a clear indication that Ireland was regarded by 
the Westminster Parliament, not as a sister kingdom, but as a dominion. The oft-quoted 
phrase, England's dilemma is Ireland's opportunity is applicable here, for it was events 
overseas that was to be the crucial factor in achieving the 'patriots' ultimate aim - 
legislative independence, but not self-government. The American War of Independence, 
which began in April 1775 was instrumental in providing both the constitutional 
blueprint and the practical circumstances by which Ireland received some measure of 
autonomy. The latter involved the defence of Ireland, which became a more urgent 
consideration with the removal of troops to fight in the American War. To secure 
Ireland's defences local gentry organised Volunteer corps. By 1780 there was an 
estimated 30.000 to 40.000 volunteers in the country. The opposition 'Patriot' Party was 
quick to recognise the potential of such a force; with Grattan (33) declaring that the 
Volunteers were 'the armed property of the Nation', and Flood (34) declaring that the 
Volunteers should be used to extract 'Ireland's rights from England and remain on foot till 
these were secured.' (35) And secured they were, although a change of ministry from 
Lord North's to the Whigs under Rockingham may have facilitated the granting of an 
Independent Parliament: given that when in opposition the Whigs had supported the 
aspirations of the Protestant Nationalists, they were bound to introduce some measure of 
autonomy for Ireland when they took office. But whatever the reasons behind the 
'Patriots' success it is the role played by the Volunteers that has been most significant in 
Irish history. Grattan's Volunteers, as they have become known, have acted as a blueprint 
for both Irish Nationalists and Unionists. The methods employed, i.e. the threat of
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rebellion against the forces of the State has been emulated by both groups in an attempt 
to secure their own aims and aspirations, but always under the banner of securing 'justice 
for Ireland'. 'Grattan's Parliament' was short-lived and may have been more cosmetic 
than effective, as 'Irish Parliamentary management continued to enable the Castle 
government to get its business done as much as before'. (36) Symbolically however, the 
constitution of 1782 was a watershed in Irish history: it asserted (at least in theory) 
Ireland's position as a sister kingdom of England united by one Crown. Moreover, the 
perception that this Parliament was achieved as a result of the threat of the use of force 
was to have a profound and lasting effect on Anglo-Irish relations. The Irish peoples' 
belief that Ireland could and would procure her rights from the British State only by the 
threat of direct action was largely substantiated at this time.
THE GRATTAN CONSTITUTION-A PROTESTANT ONE.
The constitution of 1782 however, failed to meet or even address the demands of the 
Catholic population. Although the 'penal laws' by this time had largely been suppressed, 
in the political sphere Catholics were still discriminated against: they were still not 
allowed to sit in Parliament or vote at parliamentary elections. Although politicians such 
as Grattan fought for Catholic emancipation, provided of course, that this did not 
impinge on Protestant power, others such as Flood vigorously opposed such measures. In 
1783 he made his position clear when he defended the Penal laws on the basis that:
ninety years ago four-fifths of Ireland were for King James. They were defeated. I 
rejoice in that defeat. The laws that followed were not laws of persecution; they 
were laws of necessity. (37)
Flood believed that the Roman Catholics would use 'political power to undermine the 
constitutional link with Britain.' (38) The dissatisfaction of the Catholic population was 
to prove advantageous to the Society of United Irishmen, who in 1798 attempted to force 
England to grant 'justice' to Ireland. This organisation was founded in October 1791 with
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the objective of'abolishing unnatural distinctions, to unite all Irishmen against the unjust 
influence of Great Britain, and secure their true representation in a national Parliament.' 
(39) Indeed their declared aims were: 'to unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish the 
memory of all past dissensions, and to substitute the common name of Irishman in place 
of the denominations of Protestant, Catholic, Dissenter.'(40) Evidently if each person 
was to be referred to by one title, then each would have equality within the law. Little 
wonder (given the position of Catholics in Ireland at this time) that in 1792, Wolfe Tone 
was appointed Secretary of the Catholic Committee: a body founded in 1756 to promote 
the political interests of the Roman Catholic population. In 1792 a Catholic Convention 
was called, modelled on the Volunteers, and a deputation was sent to London to put their 
case directly before Pitt, the British Prime Minister, thus circumventing the authority of 
Dublin Castle. For as Foster argues, 'the Catholic Committee had in the end by-passed 
the Viceroy and presented a petition directly to London, thus tacitly threatening to 
withhold support from the system of Irish government as established in 1782. (41) The 
British Government, mindful of the international situation especially in France, deemed it 
necessary to grant Catholic concessions.(42) The Catholic Relief Act of 1793, introduced 
by Hobart, the chief secretary (The terms of which had been largely dictated by England) 
(43) granted the franchise to Catholic forty-shilling freeholders, along with lifting other 
restrictions. However, a motion made by George Knox to admit Catholics to Parliament 
was defeated by 163 to 69. Catholics were, therefore, still denied equal citizenship. The 
Ascendancy was fearful that:
Catholics once in control of the State, would soon adopt a more dictatorial tone; 
they were not to be trusted, whatever the British Government in London might 
like to think; the land settlement of the seventeenth century would be endangered 
(44)
There was outrage by some Protestant groups in Ireland at any measures designed to 
bring their perceived 'disloyal popish enemies' within the Protestant constitution. The
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Dublin cooperation was virulently opposed to the parliamentary reforms, proclaiming 
that:
the Protestants of Ireland should not be compelled by any authority whatever to 
abandon that political situation which their forefathers won with their swords and 
which therefore is their right. (45)
Indeed the Morning Post in 1792, told how some Protestants contemplated the use of 
’gunpowder and bayonet' as the only 'specific remedies against Catholic agitation for 
reform.' (46) Catholics however, were partially admitted within the pale of the 
constitution, and their gains ensured that they would not be satisfied until they were 
recognised as equal citizens. It was not henceforth a matter o f 'if  but of'when' Catholics 
would be granted emancipation. The reforms of 1793 in reality did little to alleviate the 
grievances of the masses who resented the unjust landlord and tithe system. Tone and 
the United Irishmen hoped to attract this group to their cause. 'If the men of property will 
not help us they must fall: we will free ourselves by the aid of that large and respectable 
class of the community - the men of no property'. (47) However the agrarian Catholic 
and Protestant secret societies which were endemic in the Irish countryside meant there 
was little hope of achieving The United Irishmen's leitmotif - of substituting the name of 
Protestant, Dissenter and Catholic for that of Irishman. When the United Irishmen 
attempted to attract the 'men of no property' they were confronted by two rival groups, the 
Catholic Defenders, and the Protestant Orange Society. By 1795 Defenderism was a 
national movement, which in the South was directed against landlords, but in Armagh it 
opposed protestants. In September of that year there was a battle between Catholic 
Defenders and Protestant Peep o' day boys. The latter were the unequivocal victors, and 
later that day this group formed the Orange Order. The latter's declared aims were 'to 
maintain the laws and peace of the country and the Protestant Constitution, and to defend 
the King and his heirs as long as they shall maintain the Protestant ascendancy'. (48) 
Such a Society was unlikely to be attracted to the United Irishmen, whose aims were to
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eradicate religious differences, and to substitute the 'common name of Irishman in place 
of the denominations of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter'.(49) Indeed many United 
Irishmen actually enlisted in the Orange Order, (50) the United Irishmen were, therefore, 
left with the Defenders. This organisation soon joined 'their fortunes with the Jacobin- 
inspired United Irishmen’. (51) Moreover according to Senior, 'the emergence of the 
catholic peasantry as a revolutionary force under the leadership of the United Irishmen 
awakened latent fear among protestants of catholic domination.' (52) The Government's 
answer to the volatile state that existed in Ireland, between 1795 and 1798 was 
repression. The passing of the Insurrection Act in 1796 gave the Lord Lieutenant the 
right to declare martial law on any district or districts where he deemed this to be 
necessary; The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended; the death penalty could be imposed 
for administrating an unlawful oath and transportation for life for taking such an oath. 
Coercion was once again the preferred method of Government. Although Grattan and 
other Patriots in 1797 called for the repeal of the Insurrection Act and parliamentary 
reforms to ebb the growing tide of rebellion, their pleas went unheeded, and when their 
proposals were defeated by 170 to 30 votes on May 15th, Grattan, Ponsonby and their 
followers left Parliament and constitutional reform was completely abandoned. As 
always Ireland was dependant on the political situation in London, and although Fox 
argued for reforms, his party was in the minority, and the majority was against granting 
any such measures. In the wake the United Irishmen's failed rebellion in 1798, the Union 
was imposed on Ireland. It was virulently opposed by the Protestant Ascendancy, who 
believed that it would reduce Ireland once again to the status of colony. The British State 
however, was able through bribery and corruption to secure the Union. The Protestant 
Ascendancy soon revised their opposition to the Union, quickly realising that their 
interests would be best as part of the majority within the protestant constitution of the 
United Kingdom, rather than as minority in a future Catholic Ireland. Thus the Union 
became almost sacrosanct, a bulwark against being subsumed into a future Catholic
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nation as democracy challenged the rule of Oligarchy during the nineteenth century. It 
may be suggested that by the time of the Union the Protestant Ascendancy had learnt a 
valuable lesson, in as much as they had experienced what Aughey refers to as 
'constitutional insecurity'. (53) They were British citizens yes, and the Union confirmed 
their de-jure right as such, but their citizenship and indeed their security was dependant 
on the dictates of the Imperial Parliament, (following the abolition of the Irish one). The 
danger was that in Ireland there was a growing threat from the Catholic majority who 
might force the Imperial Parliament to review Ireland's constitutional position, or more 
immediately to grant emancipation to their [the Protestants] historical enemies - the 
Catholics. This was the fear of Ireland's 'loyal' subjects, who rapidly forgot the claim of 
the Protestant Nationalists of Grattan's Parliament, that Ireland was an ancient Kingdom, 
it (Ireland) was an integral part of the United Kingdom, confirmed as such by the Act of 
Union 1801. But could they be sure that British politicians would not impose their 
authority once again, this time to the detriment of the Protestant minority in Ireland? 
Although Aughey argues from a Unionist (Protestant) perspective, it can be suggested 
that Catholic population in Ireland also experienced this insecurity, as they continued 
their struggle to gain admittance to the Protestant constitution. This 'constitutional 
insecurity' without doubt contributed to the British State's lack of full legitimacy in 
Ireland. The conditional loyalty displayed (at various times)- by all groups in Ireland 
towards the British State's legitimate authority has been a symptom of that insecurity. 
Whereas in mainland Britain there developed a reciprocal loyalty between the State and 
its subjects, in Ireland, historical circumstances prevented the development of such 
loyalty.
THE CATHOLIC POPULATION AND THEIR POSITION WITHIN THE UNION
The majority of Roman Catholics, or at least of their leaders, initially welcomed the 
Union as the best means of securing emancipation, sadly they were once again denied
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citizenship, due in part to pressure from the Ascendancy, which both Fitzgibbon and 
Portland succumbed to, (54) But, it may have been the King's objections that were most 
influential, as George III voiced his objections, declaring that the granting of Catholic 
emancipation would be a violation of his coronation oath:
I would rather give up my throne and beg my bread from door to door throughout 
Europe than consent to such a measure. (55)
Pitt, the British Prime Minister was in favour of such a measure, having given his word 
that he would press for emancipation, but was reluctant to press the King on the matter, 
and consequently, did what he believed to be the honourable thing, and resigned. 
However, as Curtis argues, Pitt might have best served the interests of Ireland by 
countering George Ill's argument that his coronation oath would be violated by the 
admittance of Catholics to Parliament, by reminding the King that it was Parliament, that 
imposed this oath on the King in 1689, therefore, it could also relieve him of it in 1800. 
(56) Or as Beckett suggests:
used his immense influence in parliament and in the county to full he might even 
at this stage, have compelled the King to give way: but in view of the European 
situation he shrank from such extreme measures; and having satisfied his 
conscience by resigning office, he felt free to support the new government. (57)
Hence the aspirations of Ireland's majority were unfulfilled, and the Union was weakened 
from the beginning. For the Union was not between two countries but between Britain 
and the Protestant Ascendancy who continued to dominate Irish society, whilst the 
Roman Catholics were left outside the pale of the constitution. Little wonder then, that 
the aims of the Union to secure a peaceful and lasting settlement to Anglo-Irish relations 
were not realised. Had Pitt been able to carry emancipation and accommodate the 
Catholic population within the Protestant Constitution, then perhaps the two traditions of 
Irish Nationalism that emerged in the nineteenth century - that of Constitutionalism and 
Revolutionary Nationalism would not have flourished. But the failure of the British State
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to accommodate the Irish Catholics within the British Protestant Constitution allowed a 
new force to take root in Ireland - this was O'Connellism. Daniel O'Connell was a firm 
anti-Unionist. At his first public speech in January 1800, O'Connell declared that he 
would prefer:
the re-enactment of the Penal Code in all of its pristine horrors to the Union...I 
know that although exclusive advantages may be ambiguously held forth to the 
Irish Catholics to seduce him from the sacred duty which he owes his country, I 
know that the Catholics of Ireland still remember that they have a country, and 
that they will never accept any advantages as a sect which would debase and 
destroy them as a people. (58)
O'Connell's comment to his ’Boswell' O'Neill Daunt that: 'all the principles of my 
subsequent political life are contained in my first speech', (59) gives some indication of 
O'Connell's convictions. His oratory in 1813 was no less passionate, when he asserted:
I have seen Ireland a Kingdom - 1 reproach myself having lived to behold her a 
Province...I have an ulterior object; it is the Repeal of the Union, and the 
restoration to Old Ireland of her independence..(60)
O'Connell's primary objective was that Ireland should have self-government. (61) 
However, the French Revolution had convinced him change should be brought about by 
constitutional rather than revolutionary means (62) Indeed O'Connell criticised the 
Rebellion of 1798 and the Rebellion of Robert Emmet in 1803: of the first he wrote:
"May every virtuous revolutionist remember the horrors of Wexford' Of Emmet 
he was even more scornful: 'A man who could coolly prepare so much bloodshed, 
so many murders - and such horrors of every kind has ceased to be an object of 
compassion.' (63)
Crucially however, whilst accepting that O'Connell believed in the principles of non­
violent agitation carried out by constitutional means, implicit in his rhetoric was the 
threat of revolutionary insurgency if Ireland was not granted her rights. O'Connell was 
adept at stressing the potential physical power of the masses who gathered at his mass 
meeting, these he argued, were held in check by his leadership. Should Ireland and the
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Irish (Catholic) people not be granted their rights then ’the dark forces of violence' could 
and would surely be unleashed against the State. (64) This ambiguous language with its 
implicit threat of direct action was adopted by future Nationalist and Unionist leaders 
alike. O'Connell without doubt shaped the political future of modem Ireland and 
established the base on which a democratic tradition could evolve. The vehicle he used 
was the Catholic Association, which in 1823 O'Connell transcended from an elite 
organisation to a mass movement. The Association was closely associated with the 
Catholic Church, with the local priest collecting the 'Catholic Rent'. This ensured that 
O'Connell's movement was perceived as a sectarian one. The Association was successful 
because it based its claim on 'British liberal theory, on the idea of contractual 
government, whereby the crown had the right to a Catholic's allegiance but must in turn 
observe and respect the liberties of the subject'. (65) The aforementioned passage could 
just as easily be attributed to Ulster Unionists who based their claim to remain under the 
jurisdiction of the Imperial Parliament on these very principles. O'Connell's victory at 
the Clare election of 1828 was a triumph for the advancement of democratic government, 
as tenants for the first time voted against the wishes of the Landlords: but the 
sectarianism of O'Connell's election campaign confirmed that he was essentially a 
'Catholic leader playing the Catholic card.' (66) The role of the Catholic Church, when 
priests declared that a vote against O'Connell was a vote against the Catholic religion, 
(67) ensured that Irish democracy was christened with the mark of sectarianism. The 
alliance between the Nationalist movement and the Catholic Church was formalised 
under the leadership of C S Parnell, by that time Irish politics unequivocally polarised 
along denominational lines: with the majority Protestants opposing any form of Home 
Rule, and Catholics overwhelmingly supporting the policy. Once again the authority of 
the British State would be challenged, as militant Nationalism and Ulster Unionism 
attempted to force the Imperial Parliament to act in accordance with their own particular 
perception of what constituted justice for Ireland. Again Westminster was cast in the
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role of arbiter between rival groups: a role it was ill-equipped for, as will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
NATIONALISM V UNIONISM:
TWO PERCEPTIONS OF HOME RULE
This Chapter will examine how the two Irish political parties, the Irish Parliamentary 
Party and the Ulster Unionists Party attempted to attain what each perceived was justice 
for Ireland during the time of the first and second Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893. It 
begins by looking at the rise of the Irish Parliamentary party, and traces how this initially 
conservative movement, became a more militant one under the leadership of Charles 
Stewart Parnell. This Party ostensibly did not sanction the use of violence as a legitimate 
means of securing its aims, but as will be shown, behind its commitment to the 
democratic process, was the veiled threat of force, if the Westminster Parliament did not 
agree to its demands i.e. Home Rule for Ireland. However, as this Party, at least 
outwardly, moved towards constitutionalism, the Ulster Uhionist Party became more 
militant its determination to resist any attempt by the Westminster Parliament to impose 
a Dublin Parliament on Ireland. The Ulster Unionists claimed that they represented 
'loyal' Ireland, but, if there was an attempt to force them out of the jurisdiction of the 
Westminster Parliament, and under the authority of a Dublin one, then they would resist, 
even if that meant taking violent action. This challenged the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty which underpins the British Constitution. How successful was the 
Westminster Parliament in its attempts to find a peaceful solution to the ’Irish Question' 
during this time?
THE LAUNCHING OF THE HOME RULE PARTY AND THE MAKING OF PARNELLISM.
Isaac Butt founded the Home Government Association in 1870. Butt was initially a 
defender of the Union, but came to believe that Ireland's interests could best be served
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under a federal form of government. This Association like The United Irishmen and 
Young Ireland sought to unite Protestants, Dissenters and Catholics. It initially appeared 
to appeal to Protestants concerned at what they regarded as the British Government's 
concessions to the Catholic population in Ireland. The disestablishment of the Church of 
Ireland in 1869 alienated many leading Protestants. Gladstone's determination to tackle 
the injustice of Landlordism with a Land Act forbidding the eviction of tenants who paid 
their rents, together with their right, at the end of a lease to seek compensation for any 
improvements to the property during their tenancy was regarded in Ireland as in Britain 
as an attack on property itself. More crucially however, was the need of Protestants to 
carve out a role for themselves in a future Catholic Ireland. The 1861 census revealed 
that three quarters of the population were Catholic, hence demography if nothing else 
spurred some Protestants to seek a solution to their minority position: no longer could 
they depend on the British Government now led by the 'Godless' Gladstone to act as a 
bulwark against rising Catholic and populist opposition. The Home Government 
Association originally seemed to offer a possibility of establishing a leading role for 
protestants in a future devolved Catholic dominated Parliament. Sixty members made 
up the first committee of the Association which met in Dublin in 1870, of these thirty 
five were Protestants. However, as early as October of that year, Butt was conceding that 
Catholics now held a small majority on the committee. (1) The Dublin Daily Express, 
which had initially reported favourably on the new movement, citing it as evidence that 
the power of the priest was declining, now revised its judgement and called for the 
'formation of an anti-ultramontane Irish Party.' (2). The Association attracted 
constitutional Nationalists and some Revolutionary ones, the latter was represented by 
The Irish Republican Brotherhood, popularly known as The Fenians. The IRB since its 
inception on St. Patrick's Day 1858 had advocated Rebellion to achieve its aim, which 
was articulated in its secret oath: 'to make Ireland an Independent and democratic 
republic'. (3) Fenianism was without doubt a physical-force movement, which 'from the
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beginning repudiated constitutional action.' (4) Its leaders firmly believed that England, 
'would never concede self-government to the force of argument, but only to the argument 
of force.' (5) However, the attempted insurrection of 1867 and its subsequent failure 
convinced some of its members of the merits of Constitutional Nationalism. From the 
beginning therefore, the organisation which eventually became the Irish Parliamentary 
Party was linked to those that advocated separatism and did not rule out violence as a 
means of achieving it. In April 1875 Charles Stewart Parnell was elected as the Home 
Rule Member of Parliament for Meath. He was to transform Butt's largely conservative 
Parliamentary Party to a militant Nationalist one. Parnell, a Protestant Anglo-Irish 
Landlord, firmly believed that the obstacle to Ireland achieving independence was that 
since the Act of Union 1801, Irish Landlords had looked to the British State to protect 
their interests, and maintain their privileged position in Ireland. Their reliance on the 
British State essentially prevented Irish Landlords from supporting Nationalism, indeed, 
it was their main reason for opposing it. (6) To quote Parnell:
Deprive this class (the landlords) of their privileges, show them that they must
cast themselves in with the rest of their countrymen...(and) the last knell of
English power in Ireland has been sounded. (7)
Parnell's vision was not that of land nationalisation as advocated by more radical 
members of the Land League, rather it was a partnership between '"reformed" landlords 
and a "satiated" class of peasants. This pan-solidarity would increase the potential of 
nationalism.'. (8) To achieve this it was necessary to tackle the system of Landlordism, 
and Parnell was to find an effective partner in Michael Davitt. Davitt was released from 
prison in 1877 after serving seven years of his fifteen year sentence. His crime had been 
the collection of arms for the Irish Republican Brotherhood, of which he was a member. 
At the age of five Davitt had witnessed the eviction of his family from their Mayo home. 
They moved to Lancashire, where at the age of eleven, whilst working in a Cotton Mill,
26
he lost an ami. Davitt's aim was to form an alliance between the 'open' and 'secret' 
Nationalist organisations. At Brooklyn, New York on October 26th 1878, (whilst on a 
lecture tour) Davitt gave a speech criticizing the Home Rule Party: declaring that he 
regarded it, 'as being what a prominent gentleman, in conversation with him in London, 
said it was, viz., an organised hypocrisy.' Its leader Isaac Butt, was accused of being 
incompetent, and he [Davitt] had 'no faith in Parliamentary representation through the 
Home Rule party, the repeal party, or the disruption party.' However, Davitt declared that 
upon checking the record of the Home Rulers at Westminster, he believed Pamell to be 
the best Irish representative in the British Parliament, and acknowledged him as 
leader. (9) In 1879 Davitt proceeded to agitate for Land Reform: his belief was that the 
Irish land system and English rule were aspects of each other, therefore: 'The man who 
struck at one struck the other'. (10) In some respects Davitt was like Wolfe Tone, who 
looked to the men of no-property to free the Irish Nation from the injustice of British 
rule. Thus on October 21st 1879 Davitt founded the National Land-League in Dublin 
with Pamell as its president. The timing of the League's launch was cmcial. The relative 
prosperity of the 1850's and 60's was replaced by agricultural depression following the 
bad harvests of 1877, 78 and 79, coupled with the import of cheap grain from Russia and 
North America. (11) As recession took a grip on Irish society, evictions of tenants 
rocketed, and 'outrages' (the preferred word of the Victorians for acts of violence 
involving the Irish) escalated. Agrarian violence and secret societies were endemic in 
Rural Ireland. What made the Land-League different from previous tenant-right 
organizations was that now there was a political leadership who could mobilise the 
masses and coordinate a mass national movement. Indeed, it has been argued that the 
organisation at its most powerful:
could aspire to form a kind of alternative government, at least in the sense of 
creating and maintaining a large body of farmers who could defy the law with 
impunity, draw up a plan for their campaign against landlordism, and operate it 
effectively. (12)
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Officially the Land League did not sanction the use of violence, however, coercion, 
intimidation and violence there was. Those people that did not conform to the dictates of 
the League were coerced to do so through a range of sanctions varying from ostracism 
which Pamell publicly endorsed:
When a man takes a farm from which another has been evicted, you must show 
him on the roadside when you meet him, you must show him in the streets of the 
town, you must show him at the shop-counter, you must show him at the fair and 
at the market-place and even in the house of worship, by leaving him severely 
alone, by putting him into a sort of moral Coventry, by isolating him from the rest 
of his kind, as if he were a leper of old, you must show him your detestation of 
the crime he has committed. (13)
to the use of violence, which he (Pamell) did not. But violence and lawlessness there 
was, as League members 'resorted to lawlessness in the old Whiteboy and Ribbonmen 
traditions', of burning hayricks and maiming cattle. (14) Parnell's association with what 
was perceived as a violent organisation did little to endear him or his Party to Irish 
Landlords, British politicians, or indeed to public opinion in Britain. Moreover, the 
alliance of Pamell with American Fenians at this time was to further heighten suspicions 
that Separatism was the ultimate aim of the Home Rule Party, and that the use of 
violence although not overtly condoned was tacitly defended. John Devoy a leading 
member of the American Fenian movement, Clan-na-Gael offered support to Pamell on 
condition that federalism be dropped in favour of self-government; there would be 
vigorous agitation for peasant proprietorship; purely Catholic issues would be dropped, 
and the Home Rule Party would act as a disciplined Party in Westminster. (15) The 
supreme council of the IRB however, rejected a formal alliance of Constitutional and 
physical-force Nationalism, but it compromised by agreeing that individual Fenians could 
participate in parliamentary politics. (16) This opened the way for an informal alliance 
between constitutional and 'physical- force' Nationalism. The controversy surrounding
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the extent of the alliance between Pamell and Devoy remains an unanswered question. 
Devoy claimed, that at a conference in June 1879, Pamell agreed to putting what has 
become known as the New Departure' into effect, i.e., 'in an agreement to push on both 
Home Rule and the land movements, but to regard them as means to the greater end of 
freedom to be won, if necessary by armed revolution.' (17) However, both Pamell and 
Davitt strenuously denied that any such formal alliance had been agreed , and historians 
generally appear to support the latter's claim. But the fact that whilst on a visit to 
America in 1880 Pamell collected $200,000 (18) appears to confirm that there was a 
strong link between Revolutionary and Constitutional Nationalism. Indeed at a speech in 
Cincinnati, Pamell himself sounded more like a Fenian than a Home Ruler when he 
affirmed that he wanted to: 'cut the last link which keeps Ireland bound to England.' (19) 
Moreover, Davitt's description of Parnell's attitude as: 'one of friendly neutrality to the 
revolutionary movement', (20) would not have engendered a sense of confidence that 
Pamell did not espouse separatism as the ultimate aim or ruled out or even condemned 
the threat of violence as a means of achieving this. Pamell was the master of equivocal 
speech, he managed to defend the use of force without actually supporting its use. In a 
speech at Dublin in 1877, Pamell declared:
If they care for retaliation upon those who have never hesitated to exercise every 
means of coercion and cruelty in their power, I can say this - that the Irish 
members can help the Irish people to punish the Englishmen who have shown 
themselves utterly unable to govern this country. Do you conciliate the house­
breaker who has broken into your house in the depth of night to rob you of your 
possessions and cut your throat into the bargain? Do you conciliate the 
highwayman who stops you on the high road and puts a pistol to your head saying 
Your money or your life. (21)
As Clayton points out, the above speech could be taken to refer to vigorous parliamentary 
action, but contained within it was a veiled justification for the use of violence: a 
justification based on the despotism of government. (22) Pamell was a liberal
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parliamentarian, and as such could draw on the right of resistance by citizens, if a 
Government was perceived to be tyrannical. (23) By portraying England as a tyrannical 
regime that ruled Ireland through coercion, Pamell could appeal to and justify the 
extremist elements within the Nationalist Party, whilst still avowing to work within the 
constitution. In 1880 Pamell succeeded to the leadership of the Irish Parliamentary 
Party: having already replaced Butt as leader of the more militant Home Rule 
Confederation of Great Britain in 1877. Henceforth, constitutional, agrarian and physical 
force nationalism joined together to develop Pamellism. (24) In April 1880 Gladstone 
became Prime Minister for the second time. Having disestablished the Church of Ireland, 
and introduced the first Land Bill during his first premiership, he had still not succeeded 
in his own appointed mission - To pacify Ireland'. (25) Hammond makes the point that 
Gladstone's Government was faced with an immediate problem of 'governing a society in 
which violence and justice were on one side, and law and power on the other.' (26) 
Gladstone initially proceeded to try and solve the dilemma with the use of both 
conciliation and coercion. The latter involved the passing of a Coercion Bill in March 
1881, which gave the Viceroy almost unlimited arbitrary powers. Indeed Morley 
summarised it as 'a Bill that enabled the Viceroy to lock up anybody he pleased and 
detain him for as long as he likes while the Act was in force.' (27) This was followed a 
month later by the 1881 Land Act which gave tenants in Ireland the three T's - fair rents 
fixed by arbitration, free sale and fixed tenancies, which the Land-League had been 
agitating for. (The Act did not apply to leaseholders or those in rent arrears), Pamell, 
careful to appeal to both wings of his Party - the moderate and the militants, did not 
denounce the Act outright, but called for some modification to assist tenants in arrears, 
and for test cases to be tried in the land Courts to allow the league to test the integrity and 
true value of Act. Gladstone in 1881 showed his contempt of Parnell's reaction to the 
Land-Act, when at Leeds he declared:
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He (Pamell) desires to arrest the operation of the Land Act, to stand as Moses 
stood between the living and the dead; to stand there, not as Moses stood, to 
arrest, but to spread the plague...If it shall appear that there is still to be fought a 
final conflict in Ireland between law on one side and sheer lawlessness upon the 
other, if  the law purged from defect and from taint of injustice is still to be 
repelled and refused, and the first conditions of political society to remain 
unfulfilled, than I say, without hesitation, the resources of civilisation are not 
exhausted. (28)
A week later, Pamell gave an inflammatory reply at Wexford, referring to the 
"perfidious English Enemy" with Gladstone as 'this masquerading knight errant, this 
pretending champion of the rights of every nation except the Irish nation' and appealed 
to the fighting traditions of '98 and '67' (29) (Both insurrections advocated Separatism). 
On October 13th Pamell was arrested and jailed without trial under the terms of the 
Coercion Act. However, Parnell's prediction that if he were arrested, 'Captain Moonlight' 
(a pseudonym for the organisers of agrarian crime) would take his place was soon to 
prove an accurate one. (30) The incidents of 'outrages' soared, as secret, societies 
increased their coercive and violent activities. (31) Crucially however, these outrages 
were confined to the South, whilst in the North, Forster, the Chief Secretary enjoyed 'the 
sympathy of all the loyal population whether Liberal or Conservative.' (32) Forster a 
proponent for the use of coercion, believed that the arrest of Pamell and other agitators 
would bring an end to the crisis in Ireland. However by March 1882, it was evident that 
'outrages' were still prevalent. Gladstone now become convinced that the imprisonment 
of Pamell and other members of the league was not the solution to Ireland's and by 
implication England's problems. In opposition to Forster, Gladstone declared he did not 
believe the long term solution to be the:
the imprisonment of a handful of agitators, but large scale land and local 
government reform...Until we have, seriously responsible bodies to deal with us 
in Ireland, every plan we frame comes to Irishmen...as an English plan...As such it 
is probably condemned... It is liberty alone which fits men for liberty. (33)
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Excellent sentiments indeed, and ones that are identifiable in a liberal democracy, but a 
more critical analysis could be, that coercion clearly was not working, therefore, the 
other favoured policy of British politicians - conciliation had to be attempted once more. 
This was short lived however, as coercion again was imposed following the Phoenix Park 
murders; when Gladstone introduced such a draconian crimes Bill, that Ireland was 
effectively under martial law for the next three years. (34) Gladstone may not have 
shared Forster's preference for coercion as a means of maintaining law and order in 
Ireland, but whilst Parnell's imprisonment was at the recommendation of Forster, it did 
have Gladstone's full approval. (35) An illustration perhaps that Ireland's problems tested 
the tolerance and wisdom of many eminent statesmen who tried to find a solution to 'The 
Irish Question', only to be forced back on the policy of coercion to maintain law and 
order. Parnell's release from Kilmainham Prison was secured by an informal agreement; 
the Government would deal with the question of arrears and tacitly agree to end coercion, 
and in return Pamell would lend his support to the rectified Act. The latter concluding 
that if the Act was so amended it would be regarded by the country as 'a practical 
settlement of the land question and would enable the Irish Party to co-operate cordially 
for the future with the Liberal Party in forwarding Liberal principles and measures of 
general reform.' (36) Thus on May 2nd 1882 Pamell, Dillon and other members of the 
League were released from prison. Many of the more radical members of the League 
believed that Pamell had betrayed its principles, but to all intent the Land War was over. 
The failure of the TSfo Rent Manifesto' (37) to catch fire was proof that essentially the 
Land-Law Act was working in favour of the two-thirds of tenants that were not in arrears 
with their rent or leaseholders. (38) In the first three years of operation, Land Courts 
fixed over 150,000 'fair rents', (39) as 'tenants voted with their feet'. (40) Parnell's stay in 
prison did much to increase his standing in Ireland, and he was now undisputed leader of 
the Nationalist movement. Consequently the question of Land reform became 
subordinate to that of Home Rule as the Irish Parliamentary Party moved towards
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constructive constitutional politics. This was marked by the establishment of the Irish 
National League in 1882 to replace the defunct Land-League. The former’s primary 
objective was National Self-Government, with Land reform relegated to second place. 
Emphasis was placed on the National League's constitutional and legal character. This 
reconstituted organisation was intended to integrate the whole population rather than the 
sectional interest of farmers. The move towards constitutional politics also allowed 
Pamell to enlist the support of the Catholic Church. Pamell, like O'Connell before him 
recognised the importance of the Church as an influential institution to educate and 
attract the Irish 'Catholic' people to the cause of Nationalism. Pamell largely won the 
support of the Church's hierarchy when he accepted Catholic claims on education i.e. 
coming out against the Queeen's colleges. Following the Irish Party's alliance with the 
Catholic Church in 1884 the movement came more and more under clerical influence as 
Catholic clergy were granted the right to attend Nationalist conventions, and were 
influential in the selection of candidates. (41) Indeed the number of local Nationalist 
League meeting presided over by priests rose from thirteen and a half per cent in 1883 to 
fifty per cent in 1886, (42) and in February 1886 the Church publicly pronounced its 
support for Home Rule. Walker, quoting Professor Larkin suggests that the link between 
the Catholic Church and the Irish Parliamentary Party 'had democratic benefits in that it 
prevented the emergence of an all powerful central party but it did give Irish Nationalism 
a strong denominational character.' (43) Therefore,whilst Pamell succeeded in
establishing an united Nationalist Party in Westminster and Ireland, he did this by 
excluding most of the protestant population of Ireland. (44) As the Nationalist Party 
moved towards the right after 1882, with Home Rule replacing Land Reform as the 
Party's leitmotif, and becoming the panacea for all of Ireland's ills, the Protestant 
population became increasingly alarmed at the prospect of a future Nationalist/Catholic 
Government. It did not help that Home Rule was not clearly defined, rather it was 'an 
abstract concept, portrayed as the fulfilment of centuries of struggle.' (45) The problem
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was that the historical struggle was essentially perceived as that between Protestant and 
Catholic, with one group's success being the other's destruction. Hence for Nationalists 
the granting of Home Rule may have been the means of righting past wrongs and ending 
the injustice of British Rule and oppression, but for the majority of the Protestant 
population it was seen as handing power to their sworn enemies, whose first loyalty was 
to Rome. The Nationalists were ambiguous as to what exactly Home Rule meant, the 
minimum demand was an 'Irish Parliament, whatever the powers of that might be', (46) 
referring to it to most often as simply 'legislative independence'. (47) This very 
abstraction, however, appeared to add to the Nationalists success: for it allowed for one's 
own interpretation, thus it could appeal to moderates and militants alike:
There was a transfiguring vagueness about the phase which enabled the most 
extreme nationalists, as well as the most moderate, to accept it. To moderate men 
'Home Rule' meant nothing more than an Irish parliament for the management of 
Irish affairs in subordination to England. Fenians...saw in Home Rule the 
beginning of a movement which might possibly end in the establishment of an 
Irish republic. (48)
The fact that Home Rule was ill-defined and open to interpretation may have been 
beneficial to the Nationalists success, but this ambiguity did not appeal to Irish Unionists, 
who believed that Home Rule was the first step to separatism. Moreover under such a 
Parliament dominated by men of violence and under the influence of the Catholic priests, 
Ireland would face economic chaos and their [the Protestants] civil and religious freedom 
would be curtailed. There was a fundamental difference between Irish Unionists and 
Nationalists on the question of Home Rule, ironically both believed in 'justice' for 
Ireland, but each had their own interpretation of what was just. What Irish Unionists and 
Nationalists did have in common however, was that loyalty was contingent on the British 
State acting in their 'own' particular best interest. As Pamell declared at Wicklow, in 
October 1885:
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that under 85 years of parliamentary connexion with England Ireland has become 
intensely disloyal and intensely disaffected...Am I not to assume that one of the 
roots of this disaffection - this feeling of disloyalty - is the assumption by England 
of the management of our affairs? Give with a full and open hand, give our 
people the power to legislate upon all domestic concerns, and you may depend 
upon one thing, that the desire for separation the means of winning separation at 
least - will not be increased or intensified...It is impossible for us to give 
guarantees, but we can point to the past; we can show that the record of English 
rule is a constant series of steps from bad to worse - that the condition of English 
power is more insecure and more unstable at the present moment than it has ever 
been. (49)
Pamell concluded the speech by saying that the English statesman 'who grants Ireland 
full legislative liberty, full power to manage her own domestic concerns, will be regarded 
in the future by his country men as one who has removed the greatest peril to the English 
Empire.' (50) It may be suggested that in this speech, Pamell indicates that loyalty is 
contingent on Ireland receiving an independent legislator. Even if this is granted, 
however, no guarantees can be given that the people will not at some point in the future 
desire ultimate separation. Implicit too is the threat that should Parnell's preferred 
option, that of constitutional means fail to achieve legislative independence, then force is 
always an option. But perhaps force would not be needed after all? The election of 1885 
gave Pamell a sweeping majority in Ireland, which in turn gave him political leverage in 
the Westminster Parliament. The results of the election were Liberals 335, Conservatives 
249, and the Irish Parliamentary Party 86. The Home Rulers crucially held the balance of 
power in the House of Commons. Moreover, Ireland was about to have a new champion, 
the 'masquerading knight errant of 1881' was soon be hailed as the Great English 
Statesman, Pamell spoke of at Wicklow in October of that year, the person that would be 
strong enough to save the Empire from the peril of a disaffected Ireland.
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THE NATIONALIST AND LIBERAL ALLIANCE
Much has been written about Gladstone’s conversion to Home Rule. To his critics he was 
an 'old man in a hurry' anxious to gain office: to his supporters he wanted justice for a 
small nation, which would also bring stability to the United Kingdom. The view taken 
here is that he came to the conclusion that ultimately it was not possible to 'govern a 
hostile population by constitutional means,'(51) without at least attempting to meet their 
demands, which was for the majority of Irish people Home Rule. Less effective still had 
been the mixture of coercion and consolidation which had been tried in various degrees 
during the time of O'Connell and Pamell. This had resulted in an increase in the 
authority and the popularity of the Nationalist Party in Ireland. The results of the 1885 
Election finally convinced Gladstone that Ireland would not settle for less than Home 
Rule. On the introduction of the Home Rule Bill, Gladstone stated:
I cannot conceal the conviction that the voice of Ireland, as a whole, is at this 
moment clearly and Constitutionally spoken. I cannot say it is otherwise when 
five-sixths of its lawfully -chosen Representatives are of one mind in this matter. 
(52)
Writing in 1886 Gladstone reiterated that it was the election result of the 1985 Election 
that convinced him of the justice of Home Rule for Ireland, since prior to this time:
It had not become the unequivocal demand of Ireland... (53)
Gladstone found the idea of using coercion to govern Ireland abhorrent, and moreover, 
believed that the British people found it so too. At Westminster the Irish Party’s policy of 
obstructionism had forced the introduction of the closure and the guillotine, procedures 
Gladstone disliked immensely. Essentially he came to believe that 'Irish violence and 
English reaction to it was corrupting the whole polity'. (54) Arguing in 1887 Gladstone 
contended that historically, Ireland had not been justly treated by the English Parliament, 
despite perhaps the latter's good intentions. Citing various wrongs, such as the failure to
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introduce Catholic emancipation following the Act of Union, and drawing attention to 
the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in 1880 as a cure for the agrarian disorders in 
Ireland. The results of these and other wrongs, were according to Gladstone, that the 
majority of the Irish population had little faith or felt loyalty towards the law of the land, 
therefore, they did not feel obliged to obey it. Ireland held a position that was different 
from that of Scotland and Wales, as regards local concerns: (55)
On this side of the Channel, public authority administers the law in sympathy 
with the people. On the other side it does not: law wears in Irish eyes a foreign 
garb; and restraints upon liberty had so late as 1885 become almost habitual. (56)
Gladstone therefore, firmly believed that only an Irish Legislature would satisfy the
majority of the Irish people, and encourage them to obey the law. Home Rule would
instil a sense of loyalty, since a Dublin Parliament would be governed by the Irish
themselves, hence the law would no longer be viewed as foreign. One of Home Rule's
most ardent opponents, the constitutional expert A V Dicey, appeared to share
Gladstone's perception as to the difficulty of governing a country, where the law did not
have the support of the people. As early as 1883 Dicey wrote that:
The strength of the law lies in the support of the mass of persons who live under 
the protection of the law. In Ireland law has not that support because large 
classes who never break the law themselves feel no loyalty towards the power by 
which the law is enforced...Among large classes of Irishmen hatred to the rule of 
England has become a passion which, like the hatred of a Lombard for an 
Austrian, of a Pole for a Russian, of a Greek for a Turk, of a French Republican 
for the Empire, influences the whole judgment of the persons subject for such a 
sentiment...If a system of government has led to the misery of the governed, and 
has filled them with ill-will to the sovereign power, there is little wisdom in 
arguing that the subjects who are filled with discontent ought to be full of 
happiness and loyalty. The duty of statesmen is patiently to search for the causes 
and, if possible, discover the remedies for a state of feeling which is of itself a 
national calamity and peril. (57)
It may be suggested that both Gladstone and Dicey shared the same the goal, a peaceful 
and 'loyal' Ireland: which in turn would benefit the United Kingdom as a whole; their
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fundamental difference was in the best means of achieving this end. Dicey argued that 
with the exception of trial by jury, Ireland should be governed by the rule of law as 
applied in other parts of the United Kingdom:
The system of ruling Ireland, like other parts of the United Kingdom, according to 
the rules of law enforced in the ordinary legal methods, was and is the only 
satisfactory system. (58)
Dicey's presumption was that Irish grievances would be eradicate or at the least
diminished under a good system of Government. But it may be suggested that by the
1880's, Gladstone's perception was the more astute one, since the majority of the Catholic
population, or at least their leaders no longer thought in terms of good or bad laws, the
law was English law, and therefore, foreign and alien in its composition. It was no
longer a question of good versus bad government, it was a question of self government.
Gladstone, it may be argued understood this, and maintained that an Irish Parliament,
subordinate to Westminster was the best way of securing Irish loyalty and eradicating
reversionary Nationalism. If however, England denied Ireland justice, which was for the
majority Home Rule, there was a possibility that Nationalist Ireland might be tempted to
once again fall back on its tradition of direct action to attain its 'just' demands, either
through the threat or use of violence, or by withdrawing from Westminster, and setting
up their own Parliament in Dublin, as Sinn Fein subsequently did in 1918. Ireland
according to Gladstone, was making: 'a thoroughly constitutional demand - demanding
what is, in her own language, a subordinate Parliament, acknowledging in fullest terms
the supremacy the of the Parliament of Westminster'. (59) It was better to accommodate
this demand by peaceful constitutional means, rather than to once again start the spiral of
Irish violence followed by English coercion. However, Gladstone like the majority of
British politicians failed to grasp that within Ireland there was another group with very
different demands: to a large extend he failed to comprehend the real fears of the Ulster
Protestants. Gladstone did not wholly ignore their demands, as is evident by his address
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to them when he introduced the first Home Rule Bill:
There is a counter voice; and I wish to know what is the claim of those by whom 
that counter voice is spoken, and how much is the scope and allowance we can 
give them. Certainly Sir, I cannot allow it to be said that a Protestant minority in 
Ulster, or elsewhere, is to rule the question large for Ireland. I am aware of no 
constitutional doctrine tolerable on which such a conclusion could be adopted or 
justified. But I think the Protestant minority should have its wishes considered to 
the utmost practicable extent in any form which they can assume. (60)
Gladstone invited them to make proposals, but this the Ulster Unionists could not do, 
where would this leave the Southern Protestants? But perhaps more importantly was the 
fact that by submitting any proposal, they were at least tacitly accepting the principle of 
Irish Home Rule. This was not possible, since the Ulster Unionist argument was based 
on their rights to remain within the one ’British Nation'. Home Rule, Gladstone argued 
was a constitutional demand by the 'Irish Nation', therefore, any acceptance of it, in 
whatever form, would be a tacit recognition that such a Nation existed, this the Ulster 
Unionists would not countenance.
IRELAND’S RESPONSE TO THE FIRST HOME RULE BILL
The conversion of Gladstone to the policy of Home Rule and his subsequent introduction 
of the first Home Rule Bill in 1886 acted as a catalyst for Irish Unionism. The elections 
of 1885 - 86, witnessed the polarisation of Irish politics along denominational lines, and 
Religion was confirmed as the determining factor of political affiliation. (61) Class and 
regional differences were set aside as the vast majority of Protestants identified with and 
supported Unionism, whilst Catholics overwhelmingly supported Nationalism. Unionism 
as an ideology was a counter one to that of Nationalism. It was formulated in response to 
the growth of Pamellism and the Gladstonian policy of Irish Home Rule, which together 
threatened to establish a Catholic dominated Parliament in Dublin. (62) Whereas Irish 
Nationalists blamed Ireland’s past and present ills on British Rule or rather misrule, Irish
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Unionists claimed that the Union had served Ireland very well. As was discussed in 
Chapter one, at the time of the Union 1801; the Protestant ruling class together with the 
Orange Order had virulently opposed the passing of the Act: claiming that the abolition 
of the Irish Parliament would (once again) reduce Ireland to the status of colony. 
However, Irish Unionists had subsequently revised their opinion, and now perceived the 
Union as almost sacrosanct. In all of Ireland the vast majority of Unionists opposed 
Home Rule, but Southern Unionists were a scattered (although an influential) minority, 
making up approximately ten per cent of the population. Unlike their Northern co­
religionists they did not, indeed they could not contemplate the use of force as a means 
of defeat Home Rule. In 1913, Sir Edward Carson, the leader of the Ulster Unionists, 
informed Bonar Law , that he had consulted with leading Southern Unionist and that:
they had indicated that they were not prepared to agitate strongly against Home
Rule as they were afraid of intimidation and damage to their financial interests.
(63)
Therefore, whilst recognising that Southern Unionists played a significant role in 
opposing Home Rule by constitutional means, through their association with the 
Conservative Party, and their propaganda work in mainland Britain, it is Ulster 
Unionism which will be explored in this section; since it is from this quarter that the 
threat of armed resistance against the State was articulated, and indeed became a 
possibility from 1912 onwards. Unionists objections to Home Rule were three fold: 
Economic, Religious and Constitutional. Unionists could point to the prosperity of the 
North-East, where there was a thriving shipping and linen industry, largely as a result of 
the British connexion. Belfast in terms of custom revenue, lagged only behind Liverpool 
and London. Crucially Ulster was more connected with export markets in Great Britain 
and elsewhere in the world, than with the internal economy of Ireland. There was 
therefore, a fear that the dismemberment of the Union would affect the economic gains
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made since its inception. The underlying fear was that under a Dublin Parliament, the 
industrious and prosperous North would be taxed to subsidise the 'backward' South. 
British Conservative and Unionist Politicians reinforced such beliefs. Arthur Balfour 
being an example when at Belfast in 1893 he gave a speech stating what Home Rule 
would mean to Ulster Protestants:
Home Rule means to you that your are to be put under the heel of a majority 
which, if greater than you in numbers, is most undoubtedly inferior to you in 
political knowledge and experience. It means that the whole patronage of Ulster 
is to be handed over to a hostile majority in Dublin. You, the wealthy, the 
orderly, the industrious, the enterprising portion of Ireland are to supply the 
money for than part of Ireland which is less orderly, less industrious, less 
enterprising and less law-abiding. (64)
Rhetoric such as this did little to allay the fears of the Ulster Unionists, indeed it 
intensified them. But British Unionists were less concerned with the plight of the Ulster 
Unionists as with safeguarding the integrity of the United Kingdom and the Empire. 
Ulster was seen as the best means to defeat Home Rule for all Ireland. Ulster Unionists, 
more than their Southern counter-parts stressed the religious threat of Home Rule, 
equating it with Rome Rule by another name. They invoked images of past Catholic 
atrocities, declaring that there would be a repeat of the 1641 massacres. (65) They 
highlighted the injustice of abandoning 'loyal' protestants to a Catholic dominated Dublin 
Parliament: believing that this would strike a chord with Protestants in Britain, especially 
Scotland, 'if we can stir up religious feeling in Scotland we have won the 
battle... Scotland... is the stronghold of Mr Gladstone; and if  we excite this feeling among 
the Scotch, that they ought not to leave us be destroyed, it will be one of the most 
important points in our favour.' (66) However, it would be unfair to create the 
impression that Ulster Unionists used the religious threat merely as means of defeating 
Home Rule, for there was a very real fear of Catholicism amongst them. The Irish 
Parliamentary Party's alliance with the Catholic Church was viewed with deep suspicion,
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especially since the Church's open support for Home Rule, and its active involvement in 
the Party. Constitutionally, Unionists' opposition to a Dublin Parliament rested on the 
belief that their rights as citizens would be violated under a Catholic/Nationalist Irish 
Government. Unionists maintained that their birthright granted them indivisible rights to 
remain British citizens. In this they were steadfastly supported by the British 
Conservative Party. Indeed Lord Salisbury, (the leader of British Unionist Party) 
declared in 1892, that whilst 'Parliament had a right to govern the people of Ulster, it had 
no right to sell them into slavery.' (67) For slavery it would be under a 
Catholic/Nationalist Government dominated by Rome: its leaders were perceived by both 
British and Irish Unionists, as being disloyal revolutionary traitors, whose sole reason for 
attending the Westminster Parliament was to secede from it. A Dublin Parliament would 
be dominated by Fenians, priests and the National League. 'Supported by the votes of an 
ignorant peasantry and subsidised from America by avowed enemies of the British 
Empire'. (68) The Nationalists Party's association with the Land League during the land 
war of 1879-82, was held us as evidence of its lawless and revolutionary nature. In 
1888, the Unionist Government of Lord Salisbury attempted to expose Parnell and his 
Party as revolutionaries and criminals, by appointing a 'Special Commission' to 
investigate Parnell, his colleagues and New Departure'. The commission was made up of 
three 'English' Judges, even some Unionists expressed their misgivings at the choice of 
Judges. Whilst the constitutional expert A V Dicey initially disapproved of the 
'Commission', believing that 'every man had the right to a trial in the ordinary courts of 
the land, having no right to demand any other sort of trial. (69) However Dicey along 
with other Unionists quickly revised their opinion, believing that the findings of the 
'Special Commission', (published February 13th 1890 which cleared Parnell of any 
involvement in the Phoenix Park Murders) offered proof that Unionists were correct in 
their mistrust of Parnell and his Party. As Dicey wrote to Selbome:
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Everything alleged by Unionists, except the direct personal charges against 
Parnell, seems to me in substance made out. I do not see how any man can now 
honestly deny that Boycotting is a totally different thing from exclusive dealing, 
or that the Irish party are collectively responsible for an attempt to carry through a 
change of law by intimidation & violence. We now know for certain that they are 
revolutionaries & not constitutional reformers. (70)
The report stated that leading Pamellites were guilty of associating with 'boycotters',
'moonlighters’, and inciting to intimidation and to non-payment of rents. 'These acts of
incitement had in turn led to outrages'. (71) This offered confirmation (at least in
Unionist eyes) as to the true nature of the Irish Parliamentary Party, it was at base,
'lawless' and 'revolutionary'. The Unionists basic argument between the 1880's and 1912
was that Ireland was divided between "loyal'' and "disloyal" Ireland. (72) Irish Unionists
were the 'loyal' citizens of the Empire, whose only desire was to remain so, they should
not therefore be abandoned to the dictates of traitors and conspirators. However, the
Liberal Party's support of Home Rule was an indication that Irish Unionists could not rely
wholly on the democratic process to protect their rights and freedom. Ulster Unionists,
therefore, began to argue that if the British Government legislated to deprive them of
their birthright, then as 'loyal' citizens they reserved the right to resist by all means
possible. David Miller in 'The Queen's Rebels' explores the apparent 'conditional loyalty'
of Ulster Unionism. Miller's contention is that Ulster Unionism is rooted in the Western
political tradition of the social contract of the seventeenth century. Political obligation is
perceived as a two-way process, whereby loyalty to the Monarch is dependant on the
Monarch being loyal to his/her subjects. Miller makes the point that it resembles the
Scottish variant of contractors thought and practice:
the proper course for subjects whose king violates his bargain (or refuses to 
undertake it in the first place) is not to repudiate his regime, but to refuse 
compliance with his laws and try and coerce him into keeping (or making) the 
bargain. (73)
For Ulster Unionists therefore, according to Miller, withdrawal of consent to a particular
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ruler does not constitute disloyalty to the regime: rather compliance is withheld and 
coercion is used in order to try to make the ruler act in accordance with the wishes of the 
people. It may be argued, that if this is the basis of 'conditional loyalty', then far from 
being unique to Ulster Unionism and 'anomalous in our own day' (74) it shares many of 
its principles with Nationalism, and has a strong base in political theory generally. 
Parnell's speech at Wicklow in 1885, which is discussed above, gives a very clear 
indication that loyalty can be secured, or rather disloyalty can only be avoided if the 
British State grants Ireland Home Rule. Implicit is the threat to the future of the Empire, 
if the State does not submit to the wishes of the 'Irish' people. Both Unionism and 
Nationalism displayed and indeed continue to display 'conditional loyalty' to the British 
State. But is not all loyalty conditional? Aughey argues that it has to be so, for 
unconditional loyalty 'would presuppose a people so devoid of self-consciousness and 
self-interest as to be no longer citizens but mere serfs. Even serfs had recourse to 
tyrannicide.' (75) It may be suggested that conditional loyalty is not even restricted to 
either Nationalism or Unionism, but has been displayed at some point by particular 
groups in almost all societies. As Richard Rose states:
No Government is permanently immune from a challenge to its authority, even 
though it may come from groups that are small in number among millions of 
subjects. (76)
Ulster Unionists believed that the British State was acting in a way that was contrary to 
the well-being and wishes of its citizens during the three Home Rule Bills, and therefore, 
they, as 'loyal citizens', had a right indeed a duty to resist the authority of the State. On 
the question of the democratic will of the people, the Nationalists could indeed claim a 
moral authority to represent the people of Ireland (as discussed above). Eighty six out of 
a total of one hundred and three seats in the 1885 election appears pretty decisive. 
However, this was only a decisive majority if one considered Ireland to be a separate
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Nation distinct from Britain as the Nationalists did. Unionists claimed that historically 
Ireland had never been a separate Nation, and that under the Union it was an integral part 
of the United Kingdom. The Irish Unionists, (supported by the British Conservatives and 
Liberal Unionists) claimed that the Liberals' defeat in the 1886 and 1895 elections was 
proof that the majority of the population of the United Kingdom rejected the policy of 
Home Rule, and confirmed that there was overwhelming condemnation of Home Rule by 
the majority of the British electorate. By this premise, the Liberal Party had acted against 
the wishes of the majority of the country by introducing Home Rule. Under these 
circumstances, it was the British State that was acting unconstitutionally by its intention 
to force "loyal" citizens to accept a policy that had been rejected by the majority of its 
people. Moreover, the British State had no right to deprive subjects of their British 
citizenship, and force them under the authority of what they (the Ulster Unionists) 
perceived to be a hostile and alien power. Ulster Unionists once again began to articulate 
their intention to resist the authority of the State. This was not a new phenomenon, as 
early as 1882 Edward Saunderson, (77) was urging members of the Orange Order to:
drill, arm and don uniforms.' They were told to 'stand by our colours "The orange 
and the blue", with the good old union jack, and let us drive popery and 
radicalism before us, as we have done many a time before, and hope to do many a 
time again.' (78)
Following Gladstone's conversion to Home Rule and his determination to introduce a 
Home Rule Bill the rhetoric of Ulster Unionists became even more inflammatory. At a 
meeting of the newly founded Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union, the fifth Earl of 
Ranfurly declared:
Let me recommend a change of treatment. Let her [England] drop for a time the 
remedial plan, and try instead a good thrashing. It will have a surprising effect. 
The unruly child will become quiet, peaceful and industrious. (79)
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If England was prepared to pander to the rebellious child, Ulster Unionists would not 
stand by and be coerced into relinquishing their British citizenship. In this they were 
joined by the Conservative, Sir Randolph Churchill, whose famous phrase, Ulster will 
fight and Ulster will be right', became one of the watchwords of Ulster Unionists who 
were convinced of the justifications of their actions. On the 22nd of February 1886 at 
Ulster Hall, Sir Randolph urged Unionists to 'wait and watch, organise and prepare, so 
that the catastrophe of home rule might not come on them "as a thief in the night" or find 
them unready.' Pledging that 'in that dark hour there will not be wanting to you those of 
position and influence in England who are willing to cast in their lot with you - whatever 
it be, and who will share your fortune and fate.' (80) Concluding his speech with the 
words of a poem, set to ignite the passion and the fighting spirit of the Ulster Protestant 
population:
The combat deepens: on ye brave,
Who rush to glory or the grave.
Wave, Ulster - all thy banners wave,
And charge with all thy chivalry, (81)
He played the 'Orange Card' (82) with determination and what some would describe as 
recklessness. His overtures to the Irish Party in the spring and summer of 1885 led many 
to be believe he was sympathetic to the concept of Irish Home Rule. Indeed according to 
Loughlin, it was the belief that Lord Randolph was 'about to 'betray' Ulster Protestants 
over Home Rule that moved Colonel Saunderson to re-enter politics in 1885. (83) 
However, Lord Randolph was fundamentally opposed to the repeal of the Union, he may 
have been sincere in his belief that reforms were needed in Ireland, but the Union was 
indivisible. In his electoral address on the 20th June 1886, he vilified Gladstone, 
claiming that his motive for introducing Home Rule was to gain office, that he 
[Gladstone] had:
46
reserved for his closing days a conspiracy against the honour of Britain and the 
welfare of Ireland more startlingly base and nefarious than any of those other 
numerous designs and plots which, during the last quarter of a century, have 
occupied his imagination...This design for the separation of Ireland from Britain, 
this insane recurrence to heptarchical arrangements, this trafficking with treason, 
this condonation of crime, this exaltation of the disloyal, this abasement of the 
legal, this desertion of our Protestant co-religionists, this monstrous mixture of 
imbecility, extravagance and hysterics... And why? For this reason and this 
reason and no other: to gratify the ambition of an old man in a hurry! (84)
The words were extreme, and were not representative of the general view of the British 
Conservative Party at this time. British Conservatives generally deplored the use of force 
or the threat of it, Lord Randolph Churchill being the exception that demonstrated the 
rule. (85) But his rhetoric was a portent of what was to come, when a future Liberal 
Government under the premiership of Asquith introduced a third Home Rule Bill in 
1912, then his majesty's loyal opposition accused the Government of selling the 
constitution to remain in office, claiming that the Liberal Government had destroyed the 
Constitution by removing the Lords veto: the die-hards going further and declaring that 
the Government's action had left them no recourse other than the threat of the use of 
force to defend Ireland and the British Constitution from a 'corrupt parliamentary 
bargain'. However it may be fair to argue, that during the time of the first and second 
Home Rule Bills the threat of use of force was generally more rhetorical than real even in 
Ulster. Although there was talk of resistance to Home Rule, Unionists responded only 
when they felt threatened. Following the defeat of the first Home Rule, resistance ebbed 
away, only to re-emerge in 1892, when it became likely that the Liberals would be 
returned to office and Gladstone would resume his mission, and introduce a second 
Home Rule Bill. Ulster Unionists, encouraged by British Unionists met the challenge by 
holding a massive Convention to let the British public:
Publicly and formally know that though loyal to the throne, Ulster unionists 
protested against any measure that would separate them from their inheritance in 
the imperial legislature. (86)
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On the 17th of June 1892, some 11,000 delegates attended the Convention: where leading 
Unionist voiced their objections and their intentions to ignore the authority of a future 
Dublin Parliament. Thomas Sinclair, a Liberal Ulster Unionist spoke of passive 
resistance:
Fellow countrymen, Mr Gladstone’s threat is a serious one, but, nevertheless, we 
can never falter in our resolve. We are children of the revolution of 1688, and 
cost what it may, we will have nothing to do with a Dublin Parliament. If it be 
ever set up we shall simply ignore its existence. Its acts will be but as waste 
paper; the police will find our barracks preoccupied with our own constabulary; 
its judges will sit in empty court-houses. The early efforts of its executive will be 
spent in devising means to deal with a passive resistance to taxation co-extensive 
with loyalist Ulster. (87)
In March 1893 The Ulster Defence Union was founded with Sinclair as Chairman: its 
purpose was to organise resistance to Home Rule. Organisations such as this reinforced 
the development of an integrated party machine, in evidence since the mid 1880's. (88) 
Although there was talk of arming and drilling, it was to Westminster, or rather to the 
Conservatives that Ulster Unionists like their Southern co-religionists looked to defend 
them against Home Rule from 1886 to at least 1910. The Commons might have 
sacrificed them at the time of the second Home Rule Bill of 1893, when the Bill was 
passed by a majority of 41, but the House of Lords rejected it by a massive 419-41, the 
largest majority in its history. The Conservatives were back in power in 1895, and once 
again the immediate threat (for Irish Unionists) passed, and with it the threat of armed 
resistance subsided, however, this threat would re-emerge, and indeed become a 
physical- force, with the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force in 1913. Ulster 
Unionists were suspicious of British Politicians, they could not be sure that even the 
Conservatives would always be their sympathetic allies. It was therefore, essential to 
build up a coherent and sustainable argument against the policy of Home Rule. In this 
they were successful, aided, somewhat by the fall of Parnell which caused a split in the
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Home Rule Party, but perhaps more significantly by the conduct of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party during the time of the Boer War, when Home Rulers at Westminster 
cheered British defeats. Once more the Irish Unionists could point to themselves as 
representative of 'loyal' Ireland, and to the injustice of forcing 'loyal citizens' who only 
wished to be left alone to, to submit to a hostile alien power. As already mentioned 
Ulster Unionists based their rights on being British Citizens, a right codified in the Act of 
Union. Aughey puts their case succinctly:
it is not in the gift of a government to alter the condition of the Union, for it is not 
fully theirs to so. It must be willed by those whom a change of the conditions will 
directly affect. (89)
In other words, the belief that Sovereignty rests with the people, or at least with the 
majority. But this challenges the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty which underpins 
the British Constitution. Under this doctrine the State has the right to pass any 
legislation, even if it affects the rights of citizenship. British citizens have no right under 
this doctrine to resist the will of Parliament. But as will be argued, in chapter four, when 
Dicey's concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty is discussed, Parliament has an obligation 
to give effect to the will of the people. Therefore, it could be argued that the Ulster 
Unionists, who firmly believed, that they were part of 'One British Nation', had a valid 
point, when they claimed that Home Rule was not supported by the majority of that 'One 
Nation'. Therefore, Gladstone did not have the right to introduce a policy which the 
majority of the electors did not support. Irish Nationalist claimed that Ireland was 
historically a separate nation, therefore, the majority had indeed given Parnell a mandate 
to speak for Ireland in 1885. This to a large extent is a circular argument, it very much 
depends on one's perception of what constitutes a nation. It may be suggested that both 
the Irish parties gave a valid argument in favour of and against the granting of Home 
Rule, but each argument was dependant on one's particular perception of Nationhood. 
This argument is still very much a live issue today, as Ulster Unionists and Irish
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Nationalists still debate the issue of Ulster's Nationhood. However, as to the 
constitutional argument, it is contended that the Ulster Unionists put forward a stronger 
case: whether Ireland was morally or historically a separate nation, was not the 
fundamental issue, at least since the Act of Union, she had been constitutionally part of 
the United Kingdom. Therefore, whilst recognising the 'moral' case for granting Home 
Rule to Ireland, constitutionally, the Government should not have attempted to impose 
this policy without the support of the majority. Moreover, if Gladstone recognised the 
moral imperative of granting Home Rule to Ireland, firmly believing that the election of 
86 Nationalist MP's in the 1885 election was proof positive that Ireland had spoken. 
Then by the same principle, he should have recognised the moral imperative of 
addressing the fears of the minority population in Ulster, who were equally as committed 
to remaining citizens of the United Kingdom. As Boyce has argued:
Gladstone was right in 1885 when he identifies the Irish democracy, as it was then 
constituted, as having spoken clearly and unequivocally for Home Rule; but he 
ignored the claims of another democracy now on the march, which would resist 
those claims to democracy. (90)
It may be suggested that Gladstone's failure to adequately address the minority question 
not only weakened the case against Home Rule, but brought the United Kingdom to the 
brink of civil war in 1914, as Asquith, the then Liberal leader attempted to carry out the 
Gladstonian policy of Irish Home Rule, using the same principle of ignoring Ireland's (far 
from silent) minority. However democracy through practical necessity shares many of 
the tenets of Utilitarianism: 'The greatest good for the greatest number principle'. Ideally, 
The State is seen in a liberal democracy as able to assume the role of impartial arbiter 
between conflicting groups. Although it can not satisfy the demands of all its citizens, 
there is in a stable political system enough consensus as to allow the majority of citizens 
to obey the laws of the State whilst disagreeing with a particular policy. But it may be 
argued, that in Ireland no such consensus existed. The deep sectarian divisions that
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separated Protestants and Catholics was reflected in Ireland's political structure. The 
zero-sum game of winner takes all, epitomised by the battles of 1601,1641 and 1691, 
whereby victory for one group gained them (but deprived the other) of rights, privilege, 
and land was still referred to by all Irish people as though it happened yesterday. All 
history was regarded as recent history, and the advancement or levelling of one 
community was perceived as being detrimental to the other. Home Rule although a 
modest measure, which allowed for an Executive in Dublin responsible to an Irish 
Parliament, but subordinate to Westminster, which retained direct control of all imperial 
matters, was viewed by Protestants as the first step towards losing their British 
citizenship, and all the security that went with it, gained by the toil and even lives of their 
forefathers. Home Rule for Catholics was regaining their rights as an 'Irish' Nation 
filched from them by an usurper power and its 'colonial garrison'. British politicians in 
the main failed to grasp that in Ireland there was a lack of social consensus both between 
the Irish communities, and indeed between the governors and the governed. The 
similarity between Unionism and Nationalism is apparent. Both Nationalists and 
Unionists claimed justice for Ireland, and neither ruled out the use of force as a means of 
achieving this. However, their perception of what constituted justice was fundamentally 
different. For Nationalists it was the granting of Home Rule, whilst for Unionists it was 
the maintenance of the Union: however, a victory for one was seen as disaster for the 
other. Both were dependant on Westminster to administer justice, although Nationalists 
might not, at least theoretically, accept the British Parliament's right to legislate for 
Ireland, they were forced to argue or plead their case in the Imperial Parliament. As has 
been shown both appeared to display conditional loyalty towards the British State, or was 
it that the British State was perceived by both groups as being conditional in its loyalty to 
them? During the second decade of the twentieth century The 'Irish Question' would 
once more test the British Constitution, when following the 1911 Parliament Act (which 
abolished the Lords veto), Ulster Unionists claimed that their only recourse from a
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tyrannical Government was armed resistance. Their last constitutional refuge gone, and 
now under the more militant leadership of Carson and Craig, Ulster Unionists began to 
embark on a course of action that was to rock the foundations of the British Constitution. 
From 1910 onwards, the conflict would be more bitter, and ultimately the use of force 
could on longer be dismissed as bluff and bluster'. The Imperial Parliament was forced 
to address the demands of:
Two bodies of Irishmen, who pursed, 'two different ideals'. These were, 'the ideal 
of a separate Irish Nationality, and the ideal of an Ireland prosperous and ruled 
with fairness by a Parliament of one United Kingdom. (91)
This was not an easy task for a British Parliament whose:
whole political machinery pre-supposes a people so fundamentally at one that 
they can safely afford to bicker; and so sure of their moderation that they are not 
dangerously disturbed by the never -ending din of conflict. (92)
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CHAPTER THREE
THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION: FROM 
OLIGARCHY TO PARTY DOMINANCE
To its supporters the 1911 Parliament Act was a triumph for democracy. It curtailed the 
Veto of the hereditary House of Lords, and established the elected House of Commons as 
the dominant one. However, to its critics, the Act removed the checks and balances 
which were an inherent part of the British Constitution. A Second Chamber was seen, by 
critics, as essential to check the power of the executive, especially given the political 
changes that had occurred during the nineteenth century. The Reforms heralded in by the 
1832 Act, and subsequent Acts of 1867 and 1884, had resulted in a more democratic 
franchise, but this was accompanied by the emergence of mass organised parties. One 
upshot of this was, that by the early twentieth century a Cabinet system of government 
was able to exert pressure and influence on its members in the House of Commons. The 
rise of the party system, weakened both Houses of Parliament whilst strengthening the 
Executive. Thus, it was with some justification that critics of the Act could point to the 
dangers inherent in the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty', (1) which following the 
1911 Parliament Act could perhaps be described as 'Cabinet Sovereignty'. Essentially 
this Act meant that the Government of the day could, provided it had a majority in the 
House of Commons, pass legislation without an effective check on its power. Critics of 
the Act argued that Britain now could be classed as an 'elected dictatorship'. However, 
was the House of Lords justified in portraying itself as the guardian of the constitution? 
The Lords since the 1860's onwards had almost constantly legitimatized their right to 
reject Government Bills on the basis that they withheld consent until the judgement of 
the Nation had been sought on that particular issue, arguing that their rejection allowed 
the opportunity for a particular issue to be submitted to the electorate. Once the Nation 
had voted, the Lords (in theory) would accept the will of the people as expressed in the
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polls. They appeared to accept (with some exceptions which will be discussed below) 
that the Nation was Sovereign. When the Conservatives were in power there was little 
conflict between the two Houses, but when the Liberals held office this was not the case. 
It is evident that during the Gladstonian premierships there was significantly more 
rejection of Government Bills. It was however, from 1906 onwards, under the leadership 
of Lord Lansdowne in the Lords, and under the direction of Arthur Balfour, the leader of 
the Unionists in the Commons, that the Lords became clearly partisan, by blocking 
Liberal Government legislation which had formed a major part of the latter’s election 
manifesto. The rejection of major Government Bills effectively circumvented the 
authority of the Government, despite the fact that the Liberal Government had won a 
landslide victory in 1906 on a platform of social reforms, and a sustained attack on the 
Conservative Government's South African policy; that of using Chinese mine-workers, 
and herding them into compounds. The Lords by their rejection of the 1909 Finance Bill 
disregarded a precedent of some 250 years, that the Commons should have sole right to 
grant and refuse supplies. It may be argued that by their intransigence the Lords forced a 
dissolution of Parliament. Thus, the Liberal Government could justifiably claim, that the 
Lords could at any time in the future, if their powers were not curtailed, bring down the 
democratically elected Government of the day, and force a General Election, thus 
usurping the Sovereignty of the people. The Liberals were therefore, able to fight the 
General Election of 1910 on the slogan: Who Governs Britain -Peers or People’? The 
result of the two elections of 1910 were close, with only two seats separating the two 
major parties, however, the Liberal Government of the time could expect the support of 
the Irish Parliamentary Party, and the Socialists, to remain in office. Following the 
January election, The Unionists alleged that in exchange for the support of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party in passing the budget of 1909-10, the Liberal Government had 
agreed to the abolition of the Lords power of veto, which the Irish Parliamentary Party 
regarded as a prerequisite if a Home Rule was going to be passed. Indeed Redmond, the
leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, made clear that his Party’s support was 
conditional on the Liberal Government introducing a Bill abolishing the House of Lords 
power of Veto. As Redmond Stated in the House of Commons, the Irish Party: 'regarded 
the abolition of the Veto of the House of Lords as tantamount to the granting of Home 
Rule.' (2) But was the Asquith Government guilty of a 'corrupt bargain' with the Irish 
Nationalists, as Unionists maintained? Or were the Unionists themselves either partly or 
wholly responsible for the introduction of the Veto by their determination to use their 
majority in the Upper Chamber to block Government legislation. Before examining 
these issues, it is vital to understand the nature and evolution of the British Constitution.
THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE REFORM BILL OF 1832 
Cable defines the British Constitution as:
a set of constantly changing assumptions about the nature of the state, the balance
of powers within the State and the scope for permissible change. (3)
The British Constitution, therefore, is a flexible one, it is, theoretically, able to adapt to 
meet particular needs at a given time. One example being the Bill of Rights passed in 
1689, which established a protestant constitution, and set limits on the Crown's power, 
when the raising of money without Parliamentary consent, and the maintenance of a 
standing army in peacetime were made illegal. These limits were deemed necessary by 
the Whig politicians of the day following their removal of James n, and the 
establishment of William and Mary as Constitutional Monarchs. However, the personal 
powers of the monarch were still considerable. The Crown still had the right to choose 
ministers and influence opinion in parliament by means of placemen and patronage. (4) 
The eighteenth century constitution was often praised as being a perfectly balanced 
system between a royal executive and a parliamentary legislature. The powers of the
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Monarch were, however, slowly diminished by conventions and precedents , which form 
a large part of the Constitution and by 1830, according to Smith:
the influence of the Crown in the form of patronage controlled by the monarch 
had almost disappeared as a political force. The radicals and reformers of the 
time were well aware that the real obstacle to their objectives lay in the Upper 
Chamber. (5)
The weakening of the Crown was perhaps inevitable given the nature of the British 
political structure since the Glorious Revolution, which established a balance between 
the monarch and parliament but subject to the supremacy of parliament. The flexibility 
of the British Constitution allowed for this transfer of power to occur without the threat 
of further conflict between the Crown and Parliament. The 1832 Reform Bill was viewed 
a watershed in British politics - it displayed that Parliamentary reform was indeed 
possible: essentially the 'system of nomination was replaced by the principle of the 
election.' (6) The Reform Act of 1832 by today's standards were extremely moderate. (7) 
But crucially as Allyn states:
It appealed to the unfranchised as an excellent first instalment, it impressed the 
Whigs as being so radical in character that they were able to persuade themselves 
- though they failed to persuade their opponents - that it ensured a permanent 
settlement of representation. (8)
The Tories however, appeared to realise the long term implications of granting reforms, 
that once a single concession was made, then more and more would be demanded. (9) 
But the changing social and economic structure of the nineteenth century meant that 
reforms were both necessary and inevitable. (10) The 'massacre' of British citizens by 
Yeomanry troops at Peterloo in 1819, perhaps an early indication that Parliamentary 
reform was crucial, if force and coercion was to be avoided against the growth of postwar 
radicalism. Both the Whigs and the Tories feared the dangers of democracy, but the
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Whigs recognised that the demands of the new towns to be represented had to be 
addressed. They hoped to wipe out the worse examples of the rotten boroughs, without 
destroying aristocratic government. (11) The Tories were [in this instance] more far­
sighted. Grey and Russell may have spoken of the reforms as a final settlement, but once 
began more and more would be demanded. Yet was there an alternative given the 
economic and social changes which had occurred since the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution? As Professor Gash put it: 'What the Tories said was true; but what the 
Whigs did was necessary.' (12) The passing of the Reform Bill caused conflict between 
the House of Lords and House of Commons and involved the question of political 
authority: Was the elected Government of the day free to pass legislation or was the final 
decision to be taken by the unelected Upper House? At this time the connection 
between the Lords and Commons was close, the peers for the most part having served an 
apprenticeship in the commons; and both Lords and Commons were recruited from much 
the same class of people, and included 'spokesmen of almost every shade of Whig and 
Tory opinion.' (13) The House of Lords had great influence over the Commons - the 
Peers through patronage controlled a large number of Commons seats. Indeed Croker 
estimated, that in 1827:
22 peers returned 150 MPs by 'direct nomination'...(\A)
In essence political power was inter-linked to the landed aristocracy; the predominance 
of the landed gentry in Society was reflected in the political system. This was viewed as 
a positive reflection, since it lessened the possibility of conflict between the two houses, 
and also guarded against the possibility of other interests gaining influence in the lower 
house. (15) But, according to Hanham, the general election of 1831 and the ensuing 
reform crises 'isolated the Lords alike from the monarch, the ministry, the Commons and 
public opinion.' (16) The House of Lords rejected the Reform Bill on the 8th October
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1831 by a majority of forty one, despite the fact that the Government had secured a 
majority at the recent General Election. Essentially they [The Lords] 'challenged the 
country to a fight'. (17) The Lords decision outraged the people, 'The Times', on the 10th 
October, spoke of the 'just indignation of the people.' and a placard in Bond Street stated 
'199 versus 22,000,000!', whilst Macaulay declared, that 'the contest was now between 
an insolent oligarchy on the one side and infuriated people on the other.' (18) However, 
Lord Grey the Liberal Prime Minister, was adamant that the Reform Bill would be put on 
the statute book, and sought to make the Upper House accept the peoples' decision 
through the creation of peers. This involved an appeal to the King to create as many new 
peers as was required to ensure that the Bill passed the Upper House. In essence this 
would weaken the position of the Lords, since this precedent could in theory be 
introduced by future governments of whichever political persuasion. The Conservatives 
argued, that this was unconstitutional, but the Whigs could counter this argument, by 
referring to the precedent which occurred during the reign of Queen Anne, when twelve 
Tory peers were created to pass the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. (19) King William IV, 
however, was reluctant to acquiesce and initially refused, consequently Grey's 
Government resigned, and Wellington was called to form a new administration, but 
failed due to the hostility of the country and the House of Commons. (20) The King then 
sent for Grey on May 15th 1832, and consented to create sufficient new peers as to allow 
the Reform Bill to pass the House of Lords. In order to avoid this measure, the King used 
his influence with leading Tory peers, and the Bill was passed on the 3rd June 1832, 
when Wellington and a hundred peers absented themselves or walked out of the Upper 
Chamber without voting. (21) The peers and Tories claimed that the Government had 
acted unconstitutionally by threatening to 'swamp' the Upper House. However, it is worth 
noting Lord Grey's answer to Wellington's claim that he had acted unconstitutionally by 
forcing the King to create peers:
one of the uses of vesting the prerogative of creating new Peers in the Crown is, 
to prevent the possibility of recurrence of those evils which must otherwise result 
from a permanent collision between the two Houses of Parliament; and this 
danger was rendered imminent by the opposition made to the Reform Bill by the 
noble Lords on the other side of the House. And, I ask what would be the 
consequences if we were to suppose that such a prerogative did not exist, or could 
not be constitutionally exercised? The Commons have control over the power of 
the Crown by the privilege, in extreme cases, of refusing the supplies; and the 
Crown has, by means of its power to dissolve the House of Commons, a control 
upon any violent and rash proceedings on the part of the Commons; but if a 
majority of this House is to have the power, whenever they please, of opposing 
the declared and decided wishes of both the Crown and the people, without any 
means of modifying that power, then this country is placed entirely under the 
influence of an uncontrollable oligarchy. I say that if a majority of this House 
should adversely to the Crown and Commons, and was determined to exercise 
that power without being liable to check or control, the Constitution is completely 
altered and the government of this country is not a limited monarchy; it is no 
longer my Lords, the Crown, the Lords, and Commons, but a House of Lords - a 
separate oligarchy - governing absolutely the others. (22)
These words appear to anticipate the conflict that arose between the two Houses 
following the Liberals landslide victory in 1906, when the House of Lords, either in 
partnership or at the instruction of the Unionist opposition attempted once again to over­
rule the wishes of the electorate - eventually resulting in Asquith adopting the same 
tactics as Grey to defeat the intransigence of the Lords. Although the First Reform Act 
did not significantly alter the composition of either of the Houses of Parliament, in as 
much, that the landed gentry continued to be the most strongly represented in both 
houses, it did highlight the limits of the Lords, and brought into question, 'how far they 
could go in defying the claim of the reformed House of Commons to speak for the 
nation.'(23) The House of Lords was still influential, but its position had been altered by 
the Reform Act. As Bagehot in 1867 indicated:
Since the Reform Act the House of Lords has become a revising and suspending 
House. It can alter Bills; it can reject Bills on which the House of Commons is 
not thoroughly in eamest-upon which the nation is not yet determined. Their veto 
is a sort of hypothetical veto. They say, we reject your Bill for this once, or these 
twice, or even these thrice; but if you keep on sending it up, at last we won't reject
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it. The House has ceased to be one of latent directors, and has become one of 
temporary rejectors and palpable alterers. (24)
The Lords had became in effect a deliberating and revising chamber, what Bagehot 
describes as a 'chamber (with in most cases) a veto of delay, (with in most cases) a power 
of revision, but with no other rights or power.' (25) Bagehot firmly believed that the 
House of Lords should take its direction from the House of Commons as the nation's 
spokesman. However, when Bagehot wrote The English Constitution in 1867, he could 
not have envisaged the Constitutional crisis that lay ahead in the twentieth century, when 
the Lords' rejected the Liberal Government's 1909 finance Bill, which challenged the 
Commons sole right to grant and refuse supplies. The Lords at this time were not 
prepared to accept the role ascribed to them by Bagehot, that together with the Monarchy 
the Upper Chamber formed the 'dignified' part of the Constitution.
Whether the Reform Bill set a precedent of consulting the people on specific political 
issues is difficult to determine. Some politicians, and the King virulently opposed an 
appeal to whom they referred to as an 'excited' people. Indeed, King William IV himself, 
refused a dissolution in 1831 on the grounds that if:
'what is called an appeal to the people' were made 'when a spirit of agitation 
which has long been in progress has been much increased by the introduction of 
the Bill and the discussion upon it, this country would be thrown into convulsion 
from Land's End to John O'Groats House.' (26)
Macaulay put the case thus:
Half the logic of misgovemment lies in this one sophisticated dilemma: If the 
people are turbulent, they are unfit for liberty; if  they are quiet, they do not want 
liberty. I allow that there are great objections to legislating in troubled times. But 
reformers are compelled to legislate in times of excitement, because bigots will 
not legislate in times of tranquilly. (27)
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However, influential politicians such as Sir Robert Peel were firm critics of such 
appeals. Whilst debating the question of Catholic emancipation, Peel argued that against 
such appeals he:
should always set his face; believing, as he did, that the deliberate wisdom of 
Parliament was better calculated to weigh maturely the important bearings of any 
great question, than the general opinion of parties everywhere. (28)
Peel made his position clear when he warned the Reformed House of Commons of the 
danger of setting a precedent of bowing to popular demand, it would, he reasoned:
form a fatal precedent, one to which his Majesty's Government might again and 
again recur for the purpose of procuring assent to other measures, which, in 
obedience to popular clamour, they might bring forwards. (29)
However, in 1834, Peel himself drafted an address to the people, under the title of the 
Tamworth Manifesto: declaring that he was prepared to accept the Reform Act of 1832. 
The Reform Bill had, according to Peel:
constituted a new era; and it was the duty of a Minister to declare explicitly, first 
whether he would maintain the Bill itself, and, secondly , whether, he would act 
upon the spirit in which it was conceived. Peel declared that he was prepared to 
maintain the Bill as a final and irrevocable settlement of a great constitutional 
question; and if willingness to adopt the spirit of the Bill did not involve more 
than a fair review of existing institutions and redress the abuses and grievances 
without infringing on established rights, he and his colleagues were prepared to 
subscribe to those principles. (30)
By his address to the people Peel appeared to recognised that Grey's Reform Act had 
indeed ushered in a new era, Peel, although finding it distasteful conceded that the 
Reform Bill had necessitated an address to the People. Thus, it could be argued, that the 
1834 election was a marked advance towards perhaps not democracy; but certainly 
towards an era of popular politics, which necessitated an appeal to the people to secure
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their votes. Nomination and patronage were still prevalent, but crucially the electorate 
was also beginning to be seen as significant, as Politicians at least began to recognise the 
need to address them. Edward Lytton Bulwer put the point succinctly, when he stated: 
'Remember that you are now voting for things, not men for the real consequences of your 
reform.' (31) However, as will be argued, during the nineteenth century politicians in 
general did not hold the view that a party should set out its intended policies and commit 
itself to implementing them once elected.
THE DOCTRINE OF THE 'MANDATE' IN BRITISH POLITICS
The question of the 'moral competence' of Parliament to pass legislation that would 
fundamentally alter the fabric of the British Constitution without having submitted the 
proposal to the electorate was raised by Disraeli in response to Gladstone's proposals for 
the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1868. Disraeli argued, that whilst he had 
no doubt Parliament had the power to do so, but morally it should not:
Sir, there is a moral exercise of power as well as a technical, and when you touch 
the principles on which the most ancient and influential institutions are founded, 
it is most wise that you should hold your hand unless you have assured yourselves 
of such an amount of popular sympathy and support as will make your legislation 
permanent and beneficial. (32)
In this he was supported by Lord Salisbury who advised the House of Lords to reject 
Gladstone's Bill, stating that his 'fellow peers should disregard the majorities in the house 
of commons and reject this crude and violent measure.' (33) Salisbury argued that whilst 
it was the Lords' duty to yield to the sustained convictions of the country, this 
differentiated from supporting the majority in the House of Commons. Moreover, he 
reasoned that on some past occasions, the Lords had been more representative of the 
Nation's opinion than the elected lower house. It was therefore, necessary to ascertain 
the opinion of the electorate before the Bill could and should be passed. (34) Hence, The
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Lords rejected the Suspensory Bill with a pledge to accept the election results. The 
newly enfranchised electorate subsequently returned Gladstone's ministry with a majority 
of 112, consequently Disraeli resigned and Gladstone took office, and proceeded to 
introduce The Irish Church Bill (based on the Suspensory Bill) thus fulfilling his election 
promise. This according to Erskine May, was: 'the first acknowledgement of the truth 
that a ministry in reality derives its commission from the electorate.'(35) However, it was 
not without difficulty that the Lords stuck to their pledge to abide by the decision of the 
people, as expressed in the general election. But advising acceptance of the Bill , 
Salisbury argued, that whilst:
there is a class small in number, and varying in kind, in which the nation must be 
called into council and must decide the policy of the Government. It may be that 
the House of Commons in determinating the opinion of the nation is wrong; and 
if there are grounds for entertaining that belief, it is always open to this House, 
and indeed it is the duty of this House, to insist that the nation shall be consulted. 
(36)
When however, the Nation had been consulted, as it had been on the Irish Church Bill, it 
was the duty of the Lords to accept the verdict of the people:
Now, I am jealous of any language which may seem to trench on the prerogative 
of this House, and I have tried to guard my words against any interpretation which 
should seem to imply that, in the ordinary course of legislation, there is any 
inferiority between one House of Parliament and the other. But one of the rare 
occasions to which I referred has now occurred. The opinion of Scotland and 
Ireland, and may I say Wales is passionately in favour of this measure of 
disestablishment. England, though more doubtfully and languidly, is also in 
favour of the same measure...I can conscientiously come to no other conclusion 
than that the nation has decided against Protestant ascendancy in Ireland, and that 
this House would not be doing its duty if it opposed itself further against the will 
of the nation. (37)
Salisbury after a fierce debate, eventually led thirty six Conservative peers into the 
government lobby, and the second reading passed 179 to 146, only the second time in a
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generation that the Conservative leadership in the Lords had been defeated in a division. 
Salisbury therefore, conceded that when the House of Commons clearly represented the 
will of the electorate, the House of Lords was obliged to give way. This gave the Lords 
the moral and the constitutional justification for rejecting a Government Bill, that it [The 
Lords] did not believe represented the determined will of the electorate. By this premise, 
once the people had been consulted, the Lords' were morally obliged to give way. But 
what if after submitting a policy (which the Lords virulently disapproved of) the 
Government held a majority in the House of Commons, would the Lords bow to the will 
of the electorate? Apparently not: in 1893 the Upper Chamber rejected Gladstone's 
Second Home Rule Bill despite the fact that the Liberals had won a General Election the 
previous year, on the specific issue of Irish Home Rule. As Stead has written:
For sixty years it had come to be regarded as part of the unwritten law of the 
constitution that the house of lords should bow to the will on the nation upon any 
measure after that will had been ascertained by an appeal to the country. In 1893 
the house of commons, fresh from a general election which turned upon the 
question of home rule, sent up a home rule bill to the house of lords, which 
promptly threw it out by a majority of 419 -41. (38)
However, Salisbury did not accept that Gladstone had received a mandate from every 
part of the country on the question of Home Rule for Ireland. In an article in 1892 he 
argued that:
If it were to be argued that the election had indeed turned on home rule, it would 
have to be recognized that England and Scotland had voted against the project. 
Without their consent no project of constitutional revision of this scope should 
take place. The lords must ensure that no such fundamental change shall be 
introduced into our ancient polity unless England and Scotland are assenting 
parties to it. (39)
This involved the concept of a 'predominant partner' among England, Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales. And although in the above mentioned article Salisbury was referring to the
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need to acquire the support of both England and Scotland before Home Rule should be 
granted, Weston makes the point that by 1894, Salisbury was referring to England alone 
as being the 'predominant partner'. (40) Lord Rosebery took up Salisbury's rhetoric on 
the matter, when he succeeded Gladstone as leader in March 1894. In his first speech as 
Prime Minister, he stated much to the chagrin of many Liberals, and the anger of Irish 
Nationalists, that:
Before Irish home Rule is conceded by the imperial parliament, England as the 
predominant member of the partnership of the three kingdoms will have to be 
convinced of its justice and equity. (41)
This interpretation suggests, that English votes should be regarded as superior to that of 
the Celtic electorate: if there was only one 'British Nation', then each vote should have 
counted equally in an unitary state. In 1895 Salisbury introduced another argument, 
which involved the actual majority of a Government. Gladstone only had a majority of 
forty in the House of Commons, and was dependant on the support of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party in the House of Commons, therefore, Salisbury wrote, that whilst 
Gladstone had:
on more than one occasion proposed measures of vast scope affecting the organic 
integrity of the empire and the interest of great classes, not until 1893 did he do so 
without an enormous majority at his back. (42)
By this premise the House of Lords could not only reject Government Bills that, it 
believed did not have the support of the Country, it could also justify rejecting a Bill that 
had been put before the electorate, if  there was not an overwhelming majority in favour 
of the policy. This gave the Lords arbitrary powers to decide what exactly would be a 
reasonable majority. Moreover, it ensured that England as the 'predominant partner' in 
terms of demography alone would most certainly have an advantage over the Celtic
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fringe. That being said, the election results of 1895, when the Liberals were defeated, 
appeared, at least from the perspective of the Unionists, to vindicate the Lords decision 
to reject the Second Home Rule Bill of 1893; it certainly confirmed Salisbury's belief, 
that on certain issues the Lords were more in tune with the peoples' wishes than the 
elected lower chamber. Indeed, following the Unionists' second election victory in 1900, 
an anonymous writer in the 'Quarterly Review1, stated:
the last two general elections had revealed conclusively how deeply the public 
mind was impressed by Salisbury's defence of the house of lords as 'a democratic 
necessity' .and as 'the only alternative to triennial or even annual parliaments' and 
by 'his practical demonstration of this proposition when, at his instance the house 
[of lords] saved Great Britain from Irish dictation by rejecting the home rule bill. 
(43)
Evidently there was a need for a second chamber to check the powers of an increasingly 
powerful Executive, however, the House of Lords at times, and as will be argued, 
increasingly after 1906, disregarded the will of the people, in favour of protecting the 
interests of the Conservative Party. By so doing it seriously jeopardised its own defined 
role, as the guardian of the Nation. In the nineteenth century, the doctrine of a 'peoples 
mandate' was a relatively new one, and the House of Lords was not alone in ignoring the 
principle, indeed politicians who sought office often disregarded it. Gladstone whilst 
campaigning in 1885, may have spoken in terms of securing the peoples mandate: 'The 
work is ready, the workmen are ready, and only await the mandate of the constituencies 
to proceed with it,' (44) but Home Rule as a policy was not submitted to the electors. 
During the election campaign of 1885 Gladstone, according to Emden, used 'non­
committal phraseology', (45) contending that Ireland should have as much self 
government as was consistent with the integrity of the 'United Kingdom', but the main 
theme of his election speeches were on domestic issues, such as local self government 
and registration. (46) Thus the electorate, and indeed the majority of the Liberal Party,
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were unaware of Gladstone's intention to introduce a Home Rule Bill, therefore, 
Gladstone could in no way claim to have secured a mandate for his Irish policy. It was 
on this matter of principle that Lord Hartington refused to join the Cabinet, and charged 
Gladstone with fighting the general election under false pretences. His contention was 
that Gladstone had misled the electorate, hence the Liberals did not have the moral 
authority to introduce self-government for Ireland. Lord Hartington in a speech to the 
House of Commons made his position clear:
I am perfectly aware that there exists in our Constitution no principle of the 
mandate. I know that the mandate of the constituencies is as unknown to our 
Constitution as the distinction between fundamental laws and laws which are of 
inferior sanction. But, although no principle of a mandate may exist, I maintain 
that there are certain limits which Parliament is morally bound to observe, and 
beyond which Parliament has morally not got the right to go in relations with the 
constituents. The constituencies of Great Britain are the source of power, at all 
events in this branch of Parliament; and I maintain that, in the presence of an 
emergency which could not have been foreseen, the House of Commons has no 
more right to initiate legislation, especially immediately upon its first meeting, of 
which the constituencies were not informed, and of which the constituencies 
might have been informed, and as to which, if they had been so informed, there is, 
at all events, the very greatest doubt as what their decision might be. (47)
Hartington went on to argue that had Home Rule been put before the electorate, the 
Liberal Government may not have been in a position to form a Government:
Well, Sir, it is not possible for any Member of this House to say that, if it had 
been known at the time of the last General Election that the first work and task of 
the present Parliament was going to be the entire resettlement of the relations 
between Great Britain and Ireland - the creation of a statutory power, with the 
sole legislative power in Irish affairs, and with complete control over the Irish 
Administration and Executive - it would not be possible for any of us to maintain 
that the result in numberless elections in this country might not have been very 
different from what it was; and that, instead of being placed in the minority in 
which they find themselves now, right hon. Gentlemen sitting on the other side of 
the House might not have found that they commanded a large majority. Well, 
then, Sir, I say that I must protest at the outset against the competence - the moral 
competence, for I do not deny the Constitutional competence - of this Parliament, 
in the presence of no adequate emergency, to initiate legislation such as that
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which is involved in the proposal unfolded to us last night by my right hon. 
Friend... (48)
Gladstone reply was that this was an 'extraordinary doctrine':
My noble Friend complains that this is a question which has not been referred to 
the people. I should like to know what is the upshot of that observation? What 
does it mean? I think it can hardly mean anything else than this - that the 
Government had committed a fault in bringing forward this question at the 
present time, because it had not brought the matter under public consideration at 
the General Election. It seems to me that is an extraordinary doctrine. I want to 
know where it is to be found laid down by any Constitutional expert? (49)
Theoretically Gladstone was right in his interpretation, but Hartington had already 
conceded the point that within the Constitution there was no legal requirement for a 
mandate, crucially, Hartington raised a more fundamental issue, that of the obligation of 
a Government to consult the electorate on an issue, in which there was a reasonable 
doubt as to whether the House of Commons represented the will of the Nation, (this very 
important principle will be discussed in chapter 4, when Dicey's concept of political 
sovereignty will be examined.) Although it may be conceded that during Gladstone's 
time, the doctrine of the 'mandate' was still relatively new, when the third Home Rule Bill 
was introduced in 1912, the Liberals had fought the election of 1910 on the specific 
principle of who governs - Peoples or Peers'. Therefore, as will be argued in chapter 
five, it is difficult to understand or defend Asquith's decision not to submit the Home 
Rule issue to the Nation. However by that time, the Executive was in such a strong 
position, that it could not be compelled to put its policies before the electorate. This was 
due in no small part to the rise of mass disciplined parties, from the 1880's onwards, 
which ensured that the British system of Government would, henceforth, be a Party 
dominated one.
THE RISE OF THE PARTY IN BRITISH POLITICS
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The rise of disciplined mass parties from the 1880’s onwards strengthened the executive 
and weakened the legislature. The Reforms in the electoral system that occurred during 
the nineteenth century resulted in a dilution of the power of the aristocracy, this is not to 
say that their influence was completely or even significantly eroded, but the extension of 
the franchise, the redistribution of seats together with the introduction of the secret 
ballot, meant that increasingly members of parliament depended on the support of the 
electorate rather than the patronage of the landed aristocracy. Following the 1832 
Reform Bill party structures in the House of Commons were relatively weak, indeed, 
between the 1830's and the 1880's party cohesion was very low, and Governments had 
difficulty controlling the Commons. On less than 30 per cent of all issues did 90 per cent 
of either party vote together. (50) With the rise of organised mass parties however, the 
executive was able to exert greater control over the legislature. As Lenman has argued:
Acting on an electoral mandate, parties became the autonomous institutions
within the constitution, rather than Parliament itself. (51)
The 1880 saw a significant shift in the way Liberal and Conservative candidates were 
chosen. 'Liberal local associations chose candidates on condition that they adopt the 
party programme', prior to this time, 'there had been no arrangement by which candidates 
had become pledged to a uniform party programme.' (52) The Conservatives soon 
realised that this disciplinary measure was effective, and adopted much the same 
strategy. (53) The introduction of a pledge for Pamellite parliamentary candidates in 
1884 is illustrative of how important a disciplined parliamentary party was regarded by 
politicians at that time. According to Bew, this pledge, allowed candidates 'no 
conscientious reservations of any kind.' (54) Thus, in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century disciplined mass parties emerged. Party organisations essentially allowed the 
executive to dominate the House of Commons. It would however, be misleading to 
suggest that individual Members of Parliament did not exercise some autonomy, and vote
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according to their principles from the 1880's onwards. The defeat of the first Home Rule 
bears witness to this; in all ninety three Liberals voted against the Government, and the 
Bill was defeated by thirty votes. Parliament was subsequently dissolved and the issue 
was submitted to the electorate. Yet Party discipline in parliamentary voting was 
significantly greater, and generally the party leadership had control over its back­
benchers. Indeed Lenman argues that the emergence of mass parties in the later 
nineteenth century allowed:
their leaders to tame both the electorate and the Commons. Executive power, 
working through a whipped majority, could dominate the lower house of the 
legislature. Such checking power as survived in the House of Lords was 
undermined by the increasingly archaic and indefensible nature of its 
membership, and then broken for ever by a hostile majority in the Commons in 
1911 which forced through a statute removing the ability of the Lords seriously to 
block legislation. (55)
The emergence of disciplined parties together with the introduction of the 'closure' in 
1882, without doubt allowed a concentration of power in the hands of the executive. The 
'closure' was first used following the obstructive tactics of the Irish members of the 
House, involving a vote on a coercion bill The Irish members kept the House in session 
for 41 consecutive hours. The speaker, after consultation with the Leader of the House 
and the Leader of the Opposition, brought the debate to a close. In 1883, the Speaker 
was given formal powers to close a debate, from 1887 this became an integral part of 
Commons procedure. 'Governments could at last draw up a timetable for legislation, 
with a reasonable expectation that they would be followed.'(56) The Parliamentary 
Reforms that occurred during the nineteenth century resulted in a strong executive and a 
weakened legislature. The Cabinet had immense influence over its party members. The 
changes in the procedure of the House of Commons such as the introduction of the 
closure, and the establishment of standing committees, especially after 1907 further
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facilitated the executive, but weakened the autonomy of the lower house. Critics could 
with some justification point to the need for an effective second chamber to curb or at 
least check an increasingly powerful executive. However, was the House of Lords by this 
time, a chamber that guarded the rights of the Nation or did it protect the interests of the 
Conservative Party?
1906-1911 - DEMOCRACY OR A CORRUPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION?
The Liberals were returned to power in 1906, winning a landslide victory, with a majority 
of 129 over all other parties but Balfour, the leader of the defeated Unionist Party made 
his position clear; he intended that the Unionists should continue to effectively rule the 
country through the predominantly conservative Upper House. In a speech at 
Nottingham on January 15th 1906 Balfour unequivocally outlined what his policy was 
going to be, even though his Party, and he himself had been voted out of office, it was , 
he said:
the bounded duty of each one whom he addressed, to do his best to see that the 
great Unionist Party should control, whether in power or whether in Opposition, 
the destines of this great Empire. (57)
Asquith later wrote that, he believed that this was in effect:
a claim that a Party which had just been almost contemptuously repudiated by the 
electorate should still, through the only agency at its disposal, the House of Lords, 
reassert and retain its political prominence. (58)
The ensuing conflict between the two houses was to prove Asquith right. Campbell- 
Bannerman's administration might enjoy a decisive majority in the House of Commons, 
but in the House of Lords the Unionists had a substantial one. Of the 602 peers, only 28 
described themselves as Liberals, and according to Jenkins, 'this number included a few 
who were uncertain in their support of the Government as was Lord Rosebery.' (59) In
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reality the Upper Chamber was a Tory bastion. Their ascendancy had been assured since 
the time of Pitt's Premiership, when over a period of seventeen years 140 peers were 
created. The Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 had further alienated Liberal peers. 
Lord Rosebery himself stated that Home Rule 'threw the great mass of Liberal Peers into 
the arms of the Conservative Party.' (60) The period of Conservative rule between 1895 
and 1905 saw little conflict between the two houses, however, when the Liberals resumed 
office the conflict between the Lords and Commons reached new heights, culminating in 
the former's rejection of the 1909 Finance Bill. That the Unionist Party in the Commons 
played a significant part in fuelling this conflict is evident. According to Dutton, 
throughout the years of opposition after 1906:
The Unionist party came close to breaching and at times almost certainly did
breach accepted conventions of constitutional propriety. (61)
The correspondence between Balfour, and Lord Lansdowne makes it clear that the 
Unionists intended to use the Conservative dominated Upper House to veto Liberal 
legislation. Lansdowne, (the Conservative leader in the Lords) in a memorandum 
proposed a closer relationship between the leaders of the Opposition in both Houses:
'The opposition is lamentably weak in the House of Commons and enormously 
powerful in the House of Lords. It is essential that the two wings of the army 
should work together, and that neither House should take up a line of its own 
without carefully considering the effects which the adoption of such a line might 
have upon the other House.' Lansdowne concluded the memo, 'I should myself be 
inclined to propose that he (Balfour) should institute a not too numerous 
Committee, including, say, four or five members of each House, who might meet 
in his room at the House of Commons, once a week at least, for an exchange of 
ideas....As a House of Lords' delegation I would suggest Lord Halsbuiy, Lord 
Cawdor, Lord Salisbury, and myself. (62)
In a reply to Lansdowne on April 13th Balfour put the case:
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I conjecture that the Government methods of carrying on their legislative work 
will be this; they will bring in Bills in a much more extreme form than moderate 
members of the Cabinet probably approve: the moderate members will trust to the 
House of Lords cutting out or modifying the most outrageous provisions : the left 
wing of the Cabinet...will be consoled for the anticipated mutilation of their 
measures by the reflection that they will be gradually accumulating a case against 
the Upper House, that they will be able to appeal at the next election for a 
mandate to modify its constitution. The scheme is an ingenious one, and it will 
be our business to defeat it as far as we can. I do not think the House of Lords 
will be able to escape the duty of making serious modifications in important 
Government measures, but, if  this is done with caution and tact, I do not believe 
that they will do themselves any harm. (63)
Balfour recognised the danger of this course of action, as is evident by his reference to 
the fact, that the Liberals would at the next election seek a mandate for modifying the 
powers of the House of Lords, but so convinced was he, of the Liberals ineptitude to 
Govern, he was prepared to follow this drastic course of action. Henceforth, the Lords 
were no longer the guardians of the nation, so much as the guardians of the Opposition, 
and that Party's determination to control the destinies of the Empire, even when out of 
office. This set the trend for the years to come, as Jenkins states:
Occasionally Balfour and Lansdowne instructed the peers to make a tactical show 
of restraint. More frequently they suppressed their delicate susceptibilities and 
encouraged a slaughter of Liberal bills on a scale from which their more robust 
predecessors, the Duke of Wellington or Sir Robert Peel would have recoiled.(64)
One example of their Lordships' belligerence - the amendment and subsequent rejection
of the Education Bill, prompted Campbell-Bannerman to utter the words:
the resources of the House of Commons are not exhausted, and I say with 
conviction that a way must be found, a way will be found, by which the will of 
the people expressed through their elected representatives in this house will be 
made to prevail. (65)
Hence, the reform of the House of Lords was once again on the political agenda. The 
concept of reforming the Lords was not a new one, indeed during the debates concerning
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the Reform Bill of 1884, Joseph Chamberlain had described the peers as the 
representatives of a class: 'who toil not, neither do they spin1, whilst Morley declared, the 
Lords must be 'ended or mended'. (66) Lord Rosebery, when Prime Minster, declared, 
'Nearly if not quite half of the Cabinet is in favour of a Single Chamber. The more 
prominent people in the Liberal Party appear to be of the same opinion.' (67) The case 
for reform became more urgent after 1906, when the Lords continually blocked 
Government Bills that had formed part of their election programme, and which therefore, 
crucially had received the peoples' mandate. In a speech to the House of Commons on 
24th June 1907,Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minster, introduced a resolution, that the 
power of the House of Lords should be restricted:
in order to give effect to the will of the people as expressed by their elected 
representatives, it is necessary that the power of the other House should be so 
restricted by law as to secure that within the limits of a single Parliament the final 
decision of the Commons shall prevail. (68)
The C-B veto plan, as it came to be called, involved the introduction of a suspensory 
veto. Prior to the announcement of the C-B veto plan in the Commons, Asquith and 
other Cabinet colleagues formulated a more moderate plan, known as the Ripon plan; 
whereby, disputes between the two houses would be settled by a joint sitting, in which all 
the members of the Commons, but only 100 members of the House of Lords would be 
allowed to vote. (69) Campbell-Bannerman rejected this plan, arguing:
'The representation of the peers to 100 would be hard to justify... The scheme 
suggests a return, with modifications, to the old plan, of formal Conferences 
between the two Houses, but an assembly of 770 persons was too big for a 
Conference.' Moreover, 'It will be a multitude, a mob. Unless the Government 
can count on a working majority of about 70 the scheme will break down.' (70)
Campbell -Bannerman, according to Berstein feared that:
80
the party would not accept a proposal which did not assure the ultimate 
supremacy of the Commons when the two Houses came into conflict whatever the 
size of the Liberal majority. (71)
Added to this must be Campbell-Bannerman's conviction, that ultimately if Liberalism 
was to survive, then a veto must be introduced. Jenkins quotes Spender, who claimed 
that in 1907:
'the Prime Minister saw only two courses before the Government, either to accept 
these conditions ( veto on all major aspects of Liberal policy) and be content with 
the minor legislation and administrative changes which were within the 
boundaries imposed by the House of Lords, or to go boldly forward and challenge 
that House.' According to Spender, Campbell Bannerman, 'was never in doubt 
about the choice between those alternatives. Submission, he believed would be 
death to Liberalism; and a long term of inglorious office on the sufferance of the 
House of Lords was the last thing that he contemplated either for himself or his 
Government.' (72)
However neither scheme was immediately pursued, but the two alternative plans were 
resurrected in 1910, when there was deadlock between the two Houses. Weston has 
argued, that Asquith was the main author of the Ripon plan, and might have favoured this 
scheme rather than the more extreme C B veto plan which the Liberal Government 
ultimately adopted in 1910, but the: 'project had to be discarded in the emergency created 
by the lords' rejection of the Finance Bill'. (73) Asquith succeeded Campbell-Bannerman 
as leader in 1908, and Lloyd George became Chancellor of the Exchequer, henceforth, 
the Liberals embarked on a more radical programme of social reform, known as "new 
Liberalism". To pay for these reforms, together with an increase in military expenditure, 
Lloyd George proposed to introduce innovative tax measures. On April 29th 1909 Lloyd 
George introduced the Peoples Budget' to the House of Commons. In essence the Budget 
was to tax the rich to pay for social reforms and national defence. Lloyd George 
proposed to raise income tax and introduce a super tax on incomes of £5000 per annum,
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an increase in death duties, liquor licenses were to be heavily taxed, together with new 
land taxes. Lloyd George stressed that:
This [Mr Emmott] is a war Budget. It is for raising money to wage implacable 
warfare against poverty and squalidness. I cannot help hoping and believing that 
before this generation has passed away we shall have advanced a great step 
towards that good time when poverty, and the wretchedness and human 
degradation which always follow in its camp, will be as remote to the people of 
this country as the wolves which once infested its forests. (74)
The Liberals saw the Budget as fair, 'it forced the two great monopolies - the liquor trade 
and the landlords - to contribute something to the nation in return for the privileges it had 
conferred on them.' (75) Redmond for the Irish Nationalists strongly objected to it, 
claiming that it was very unjust to Ireland. Serving notice, that his Party would oppose it 
on every possible opportunity:
so far as this Budget is concerned, the Government must expect to meet the 
vigorous opposition of the Irish Party. (76)
And when the Finance Bill was given its Second Reading in June 1909, the Irish 
Nationalists voted against the Bill, but the Government still had a majority of 366 - 209. 
This was not a crucial vote, as the Government enjoyed an overwhelming majority at that 
time, however, it could be argued, that this was a timely reminder for Asquith and the 
Liberal Government, that the Irish Nationalists were prepared to vote against their 
informal allies should they deem it advantageous to their cause - that of securing Home 
Rule for Ireland. The majority of peers abhorred the Budget proposals: there were angry 
denunciations made, claiming that the measures amounted to confiscation and robbery. 
The Duke of Beaufort at a function in Cirencester publicly declared his wish 'to see 
Winston Churchill and Lloyd George in the middle of twenty couple of dog hounds.' (77) 
Although Dutton argues that
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the general consensus of recent historiography is that the Chancellor had no 
devious plan in introducing his budget to goad the Unionist peers into rejection 
and thus towards constitutional and electoral suicide. (78)
A contemporary analysis by Spender, written in 1920, of the Chancellor's views would 
indicate that Lloyd George was happy to do battle with the Upper Chamber:
The Liberal Cabinet as a whole, refused to believe that the Lords would throw out 
the Budget, and it was steadily set about through the summer of 1909 that Mr. 
Balfour and Lord Lansdowne, were in favour of passing it. But Mr Lloyd George 
persisted in believing the contrary. "They will throw it out all right!” he would 
always say cheerfully enough; and the only shadow that would pass over his face 
would come when some one would half convince him to the contrary. (79)
It may be suggested, therefore, that whilst perhaps, Lloyd George, did envisage the 
intransigent attitude of the Lords towards the Budget proposals, but his rhetoric toward 
the landed classes would indicate that he revelled in the conflict. Lloyd George did little 
to alleviate or allay the fears of the Peers; who judged the Budget as introducing socialist 
measures, regarding it as an 'attack' on property. Lloyd George's famous speeches at 
Newcastle-on-Tyne in October inflamed the anger of the Peers, with passages such as:
Should 500 men, ordinary men chosen accidentally from among the unemployed, 
override the judgement -the deliberate judgement - of people who are engaged in 
industry which makes the wealth of the country. (80)
Jenkins puts the point well:
however fanciful may be the theory that Lloyd George had originally framed his 
Budget with the principal object of exciting the peers, there can be no doubt that 
he and Mr Churchill and some others were now extremely anxious that rejection 
should take place. (81)
Whilst it may be too simplistic to suggest that the Liberal Government deliberately
goaded the peers to reject a Finance Bill, given that the Liberal Government could not be
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sure that they would win. However, Asquith's Birmingham speech in September would 
indicate that he was not prepared to compromise on the issue, and was aware of the 
consequences:
Amendment by the House of Lords, is out of the question. Rejection by the 
House of Lords is equally out of the question...Is this issue going to be raised? If 
it is, it carries with it in its train consequences which he would be a bold man to 
forecast or foresee. That way revolution lies. (82)
The simmering conflict between the Upper Chamber and the Liberals when in
Government was about to erupt into open hostilities, as the Lords prepared for the first
time in 250 years to reject a Finance Bill. The Unionists and Peers claimed that the Bill
was not strictly a Money Bill', as it included licensing and land valuation provisions
which were not strictly financial, and which had been submitted to the Lords as ordinary
legislation and had subsequently been rejected by the Upper House in 1907 and 1908.
Lansdowne argued that 'tacked' on to the Finance Bill were a number of extraneous
matters; the House of Commons had become increasingly guilty the practice of 'tacking'
and this fully justified the House of Lords in reviving the right to reject a money bill
which had been expressly conceded in the Commons arguments of 1689. Moreover, the
Bill contained many novel features that had not received the sanction of the voters,
therefore, Lansdowne declared: 'this House is not justified in giving its consent to this
Bill until it has been submitted to the judgment of the country.' (83) However, there was
dissension among the Conservative Peers, with Balfour of Burleigh, accurately predicting
the consequences of rejection:
If you are to establish a system whereby this House or any other authority has the 
right to establish a referendum as it is called - a reference to the people in matters 
of finance - you would spoil and destroy the control of the other House of 
Parliament over the Government, and would make, I venture to say, perhaps the 
most momentous change in the Constitution, as it has grown up, which has been 
made in the whole history of that Constitution...My Lords, if  you win, the victory
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can be at most be a temporary one. If you lose you have altered and prejudiced 
the position, the power, the prestige, the usefulness of this House. (84)
This warning went unheeded, and on November 30th 1909 the Lords rejected the Bill by 
350 to 75. The Government on the 2nd December successfully passed a resolution in the 
Commons:
That the action of the House of Lords in refusing to pass into law the financial 
provision made by this House for the service of the year is a breach of the 
Constitution and a usurpation of the rights of the Commons.(85)
The resolution passed by 349 - 134. By refusing Supply, Jenkins argues, the Lords had 
forced the Government to dissolve Parliament, the Upper Chamber had:
taken it upon themselves the right of deciding when a Government could carry on 
and when it could not, when a Parliament should end and when it should not. It 
was a claim which, if allowed, would have made the Government as much the 
creature of the hereditary assembly as of the elective assembly. (86)
Interestingly however, the first speaker of the House Sir James Lowther, (Later Viscount 
Ullswater) who subsequently under the Parliament Act had the duty of deciding which 
acts constituted money bills claimed that the Finance Bill was not a money bill. Writing 
in 1925, he stated:
The celebrated Finance Bill of 1909 which was the immediate cause of the 
Parliament Act, would not have come under the provision of Clause I, Sec 2 of 
the Parliament Act, as a Money Bill,’ for it contained a number of provisions 
which were not within the definition of that clause and section. (87)
However, the ambiguity of defining a Money Bill together with the right of rejection by 
the Upper Chamber was sufficient to allow the Liberals to claim that the Peers had acted 
unconstitutionally, by usurping the rights of the Commons. Their Lordships decision to
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reject the Finance Bill, given the Liberal Government's majority in the Commons, 
ensured that a General Election would be called, its result ensured that Lord Reay’s 
prediction would come true, when he urged the Lords not to 'forget the lesson of history, 
that 'oligarchies are seldom destroyed and more frequently commit suicide.' (88) Their 
rejection of the 1909 Finance Bill paved the way for their Lordships power of Veto to be 
limited by statute. Within eighteen months Bagehot's definition of the Lords as a 
chamber with (in most cases) a veto of delay was assured when the 1911 Parliament Bill 
abolishing their Lordships power of Veto was passed.
THE PASSING OF THE 1911 PARLIAMENT ACT - A CORRUPT PARLIAMENTARY BARGAIN?
The first election of 1910 resulted in the Liberals losing over 100 seats. The Liberals 
now held 275 seats whilst the Unionists held 273, crucially the balance of power was 
held by the Irish Parliamentary Party (71 under Redmond's leadership) and the Labour 
Party, which had 40 seats. The controversy surrounding the passage of the 1911 
Parliamentary Bill appears to be as important as the actual Bill itself. The Unionists 
charged the Liberal Government with entering into a 'corrupt parliamentary bargain' with 
the Irish Parliamentary Party. Redmond had made his Party's position clear, that in return 
for his Party's support in the election of January 1910, the Liberal Government was 
expected to introduce a Suspensory veto, which he regarded as a prerequisite for the 
passing of a Home Rule Bill. Indeed Asquith, at the Albert Hall on December 10th 1909 
stated:
We shall not resume office and we shall not hold office unless we can secure the 
safeguards which experience shows us to be necessary for the legislative utility 
and honour of the party of progress...We are not proposing the abolition of the 
House of Lords or the setting up of a single Chamber, but we do ask, and we are 
going to ask, the electors to say that the House of Lords shall be confined to the
86
proper functions of a second Chamber. The absolute veto which it at present 
possesses must go... (89)
Moreover, as Spender has written, the Election was to be fought on three main issues:
the absolute control of the Commons over finance, and the maintenance of Free 
Trade, and the effective limitation and curtailment of the legislative powers of the 
House of Lords. (90)
The 'mandate' for which Asquith asked in this, and other speeches in the campaign 
covered all issues and sought authority for the curtailment of the legislative as well as the 
financial powers of the House of Lords' (91) There was a general belief that Asquith had 
secured a promise from the King, that should the Liberals win the forthcoming election, 
the King would exercise his royal prerogative and create sufficient peers as to allow the 
passage of a veto bill through the Upper Chamber. It transpired that no such undertaking 
had been given. Indeed, Lord Knollys, the King's private secretary, had informed 
Asquith's private secretary five days after Asquith's Albert Hall speech, that:
the King had come to the conclusion that he would not be justified in creating 
new peers (say 300) until after a second general election...The King regards the 
policy of the Government as tantamount to the destruction of the House of Lords 
and he thinks that before a large creation of peers is embarked upon or threatened 
the country should be acquainted with the particular project for accomplishing 
such destruction as well as with the general line of action as to which the country 
will be consulted at the forthcoming election. (92)
When Asquith informed the House of Commons on February 21st 1910, that he had not
sought or been given any guarantees:
I am supposed to have intended to convey, what I certainly never said, that a 
Liberal Ministry ought not to meet in a House of Commons unless it had secured 
in advance some kind of guarantee for the contingent exercise of the Royal 
Perogative...I tell this House quite frankly that I have received no such guarantee, 
and that I have asked for no such guarantee. (93)
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Redmond reminded him unequivocally that the Irish Nationalists had supported the 
Liberals at the last Election because of their promise to curtail the House of Lords power 
of Veto.
'we supported the Government heart and soul at the last election. We supported 
the Government because the pledge on Home Rule was supplemented by a pledge 
on which we regarded from our point of view as more important still — namely, 
the pledge which was given with reference to the veto of the House of Lords. We 
regarded the abolition or limitation of the veto of the House of Lords as 
tantamount to the granting of Home Rule to Ireland.' Mr Balfour: Hear hear.(94)
Quoting from the Prime Minster's Albert Hall Speech, (see above) and also from a speech 
made by Lloyd George, in which the Chancellor declared:
For my part, I would not remain a member of a Liberal Cabinet one hour unless I 
knew that Cabinet had determined not to hold office after the next General 
Election unless full powers are accorded to them which would enable them to 
place on the statute Book of the realm a measure to ensure the limitation of the 
Veto. (95)
Redmond maintained that these pledges were taken to mean that if necessary the Prime 
Minister might rely on the Royal Prerogative to enable him to pass a Veto Bill through 
Parliament this year Redmond informed Asquith that:
if  the Prime Minster is not in a position to say that he has such guarantees as are 
necessary to enable him to pass a Veto Bill this year, and if in spite of that he 
intends to remain in office and proposes to pass the Budget into law and then to 
adjourn - 1 do not care for how long or how short - the consideration of the Bill 
dealing with the veto of the House of Lords, that is a policy which Ireland cannot 
and will not uphold. (96)
In the first months of 1910, the Liberal Cabinet was deeply between vetoists and 
reformers, and in early February, 'the suspensory veto plan, ostensibly party policy on the 
House of Lords question, seemed in danger of being discarded in favour of some reform 
scheme, never sanctioned by the party'. (97) Moderates advised reform, arguing that the
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implementation of the C B plan (see above) curtailing the Lords, power of Veto would 
result in a single chamber government, and argued that this would be opposed by the 
majority of moderate electors. However, radicals urged the introduction of a suspensory 
veto, it would appear that the latter proposal was supported by the rank and file of the 
Party. The Veto was also supported by the Labour Party, with Keir Hardie declaring that:
Ministers were returned not to reconstitute but to destroy the House of Lords. (98)
The Cabinet ultimately decided to introduce a Suspensory Veto, and on February 28th, 
Asquith announced in the Commons that he would ask the House:
to declare that in the sphere of legislation the power of veto, at present possessed 
by the House of Lords, shall be so limited in its exercise as to secure the 
predominance of the deliberate and considered will of this House within the 
lifetime of a single Parliament...His Majesty's Govemment-regard the placing 
with all possible promptitude upon the Statute Book of provisions which will set 
this House free of the veto of the of the House of Lords, not only as the first 
condition of the legislative dignity and utility of the House of Commons, but as 
our own primary and paramount duty. (99)
And on March 29th, Asquith declared that the Government as a first and urgent step 
would have:
to deal with things as they are, and in particular, to deal with the House of Lords 
as it is, and to prevent a repetition of the unconstitutional raid of last year into the 
domain of finance...to secure as against the House of Lords, that the wish of the 
people, as expressed by the mature and reiterated decisions of their elected 
representatives, shall in all legislation be predominant. We I have I think at the 
same time, to provide by adequate safeguards that the elected House shall not 
outstay its authority and purport to act as the exponent of a public opinion which 
it no longer represents. (100)
Asquith later summarised the three resolutions that were proposed:
1. To disable the House of Lords from rejecting or amending Money Bills.
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2. To provide that any Bill which had passed the House Commons and been 
rejected by the Lords in three successive Sessions should become law, provided 
(a) that the Bill was sent up from the Commons at least one month before the end 
of each Session, and (b) that at least two years should have elapsed between the 
first introduction of the Bill and its being passed by the House of Commons for 
the third time.
3. To limit the duration of Parliament to five years. (101)
In committee Unionists raised objections to the resolutions. The first could be open to 
'tacking' as had occurred in the 1909 Finance Bill. Amendments were suggested for the 
second resolution, to exclude such Bills as those, affecting the Parliamentary franchise, 
affecting the prerogative rights and power of the Crown and for the delegation of 
administrative and legislative power to subordinate parliaments with the United 
Kingdom. The latter was evidently an attempt to prevent the passing of a Home Rule 
Bill. The Liberal Government's resolutions were introduced in the Commons on April 
14th 1910, with Asquith declaring the Government's intentions should the House of Lords 
reject the Bill:
If the Lords fail to accept our policy, or decline to consider it as it is formally 
presented to the House, we shall feel it our duty immediately to tender advice to 
the Crown as to the steps which will have to be taken if  that policy is to receive 
statutory effect in this Parliament. What the precise terms of that advice will be- 
(an Hon member: 'Ask Redmond')-1 think one might expect courtesy when I am 
anxious, as the head of the Government, to make a serious statement of public 
policy-what the precise terms of that advice will be it will, of course, not be right 
for me to say now; but if we do not find ourselves in a position to ensure that 
statutory effect shall be given to that policy in this Parliament, we shall then 
either resign our offices or recommend the dissolution of Parliament. Let me add 
this, that in no case will we recommend a dissolution except under such 
conditions as will secure that in the new Parliament the judgement of the people 
as expressed at the elections will be carried into law. (102)
The Unionist were outraged, Balfour responded by claiming that Asquith would in affect 
destroy the Constitution:
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I am not going to dogmatize on the Constitution, and say that no circumstances 
can within the imagination of man arise in which it might not be the duty of the 
Prime Minister to go to the Sovereign, and ask for what are euphemistically 
called guarantees, which I believe translated into plain English means the 
nomination of five hundred unfit gentlemen for the honour of seats in the House 
of Lords. (Several Hon. Members: Why unfit?') But while I do not dogmatize as 
to the conditions under which it might be right for a Prime Minister in extreme 
circumstances to destroy the Constitution, of which he ought to be guardian, I say 
quite clearly that the idea of anticipating such advice by months, by clearly 
announcing to the House of Commons and the country that in certain unknown 
and undefined contingencies he is going to suggest that which is nothing short of 
the destruction of the Constitution, is I think beyond the idea of duty, which any 
predecessor of the right Hon. Gentleman has held. He has bought the Irish vote 
for his Budget, and has bought it successfully. The price he has paid is the price 
of the dignity of his office, and of the great traditions which he, of all men, ought 
to uphold. (103)
In a letter to 'The Times' newspaper, Asquith defended the charges made against him by 
Balfour, arguing that there had been no meeting between Redmond and himself during 
the period between the Government's decision and his statement in the Commons. 
Moreover, the Government's decision was 'as welcomed by the majority of their 
followers as it was to the Nationalists, and if a decision so taken brings in its train a 
substantial block of support in the division lobby there is nothing inimical to the best 
traditions of parliamentary practice in that.'(104) The fact that the Liberals in 1907 under 
the leadership of Campbell-Bannerman proposed the introduction of a Veto, fearing more 
moderate reforms would not be accepted by the Party would appear to substantiate 
Asquith's argument as to the popularity of the Veto proposal. It is evident however, that 
the Liberal Cabinet was divided, as whether to proceed with the Veto or Reform of the 
Upper Chamber, but had little room for manoeuvre, if it was to secure the support of the 
Irish Party. As Weston argues:
in the first months of the any idea of replacing the C - B plan with the Ripon plan 
had to be abandoned when the Liberals became dependant on Irish support as a 
result of the January election. (105)
Although Roy Jenkins puts up a credible counter argument, stating that:
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Minority Governments usually have to compromise with their principles to a far 
greater extent than did Asquith in the early months of 1910. (106)
The Irish Parliamentary Party's insistence that the Government introduce the veto in 
exchange for the latter's support in passing the Budget was without doubt a major factor 
in the Cabinet's decision to introduce the veto proposal. Granted that it was unlikely that 
the Irish Party would have voted against the Liberal Government, given the Unionists 
hostility to Home Rule, but this was a possibility, as Asquith himself realised, this is 
confirmed by his correspondence to the King on February 10th 1910, in which he 
informed His Majesty that, T P O'Conner had written to Morley stating:
as a certain fact that the Irish party led by Mr Redmond would vote against the 
Budget unless they were assured that the passing of a Bill dealing with the Veto 
of the House of Lords during the present year'. 'The Cabinet' Asquith stated 'were 
of course agreed that no such assurance could or would be given. It is quite 
possible, therefore, that on the enactment of last years Budget, the Government 
may be defeated in the House of Commons by the combined votes of the Unionist 
and Nationalist parties.' (107)
Evidently, if the Liberals wished to avoid a General Election and the possibility of losing 
office, then a 'bargain' had to be struck. Whether, this was a 'corrupt bargain', as 
Unionists claimed is not so clear? The Liberals were committed to a programme of 
Social Reforms as set out in their election programme of 1906, which had received an 
overwhelming mandate from the electorate. However, a number of these Bills had been 
blocked by the Upper Chamber; it was, therefore, in the Liberal Government's interest to 
introduce legislation which would curtail the veto of the Lords. Moreover, the mandate 
which Asquith had sought in the January election was the curtailment of the Lords power 
of veto. The indecisiveness of the Liberal Cabinet in the first months of 1910, as to 
whether to introduce the veto, lent weight to the Unionists' arguments, that the Liberals 
had ultimately opted for the veto proposal as a means of securing Redmond's support for
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the passing of the Budget. It was apparent that the Irish Party had to justify its support of 
an unpopular budget in Ireland, it could only do this on the basis that sacrifices had to be 
made in order to reach ’the promised land' (Home Rule), indeed land was at long last in 
sight, following the Liberal Government's introduction of the veto proposal. Hence, 
when Asquith reintroduced the Budget on April 18th 1910, it passed the House of 
Commons, (under guillotine closure) on the 28th April, the Irish members, with the 
exception of the Dillon faction, voting with the Government. The Lords subsequently 
passed it, accepting the doctrine of the 'mandate'. (108) The Government was still very 
much committed to restricting the Lords Veto, but, the death of King Edward VII on May 
7th, however, led to a desire to spare the new King from a constitutional crisis, and a 
constitutional conference was suggested, and subsequently held. The Government was 
represented by: Asquith, Birrell, Lloyd George, and Lord Crewe, and the Unionists by 
Balfour, Austin Chamberlain, Lords Lansdowne and Cawdor. The Conference lasted 
throughout the Summer and Autumn but no settlement was reached. Newton, 
Lansdowne's biographer has written that the conference broke down on the question of 
Home Rule:
'On October 16, the Conference broke off on the difficulty of Home Rule. Mr 
Balfour proposed that if a Home Rule Bill was twice rejected by the House of 
Lords, it should go to a plebiscite, Mr Lloyd George, whilst admitting the 
reasonableness of this, said it was impossible for the Government to assent.' The 
Government offered a counter proposal that 'a general election should intervene 
on the next occasion on which a Home Rule Bill, having passed the House of 
Commons, was rejected by the House of Lords - but only on this one occasion: 
and that Home Rule Bills if  introduced afterwards should be treated like ordinary 
Bills.’ (109)
This of course the Unionists could not agree to, and Asquith announced the breakdown of 
the Conference to the Commons on November 18th, and his intention to dissolve 
Parliament and call a General Election. Asquith reiterated that the Government would 
accept no amendments:
93
It is not, as I have said, in the stage which matters have now reached, a question 
of amendment or transformation. It is a question of acceptance or rejection as a 
whole...The time has come for this controversy which obstructs the whole path of 
progressive legislation to be sent for a decisive arbitrament to the national 
tribunal. (110)
Dissolution was deferred for ten days to allow the Government Bill together with the 
alternative reforms proposed by Lord Lansdowne, to be submitted to the Lords. The 
Lords were not about to acquiesce in curtailing their own powers, and Parliament was 
dissolved on the 28th November. However, the result of the December Election was 
almost identical to that of the January one, therefore, the Liberal Government proceeded 
with the veto Bill, which eventually passed the House of Lords on August 10th 1911. But 
not before an embittered battle, which was not confined to the Liberal Coalition versus 
the Unionists and Lords, but revolved around divisions among Unionist themselves. The 
majority for the passing of the Bill was only 17 (131 to 114). (112) The "die hards" (111) 
as they became known were virulently opposed to the passing of the Bill, believing it 
would remove the last constitutional safeguard against an increasingly powerful 
executive, and would without doubt lead to Irish Home Rule. Indeed some of the more 
militant right wished to resist its passing, and 'damn the consequences.' As J L Garvin, 
editor of 'The Observer', put it: ' Pass the Veto Bill and all constitutional security 
disappears'. (113) However, as has been argued, the House of Lords was not an effective 
check against the powers of the House of Commons, rather it ensured that the 
Conservative Party remained the dominant Party even out of office. A crucial factor, 
which may have persuaded the Unionist leadership to allow the Bill to pass, was the 
disclosure that the King had (the previous November) secretly agreed to Asquith's 
request, to use his Royal prerogative and create sufficient peers to allow the Bill to pass 
the Lords, should the Liberals win the next election. The King's agreement had been 
attained in November 1910, but kept secret until the following summer. Asquith had
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advised the King on November 15th (prior to his announcement in the Commons on the 
18th November, that Parliament was to be dissolved) that:
His Majesty's Ministers cannot take the responsibility of advising a Dissolution 
unless they may understand that, in the event of the policy of the Government 
being approved by an adequate majority in the new House of Commons, His 
Majesty will be ready to exercise his Constitutional powers, which may involve 
the Prerogative of creating Peers, if  needed, to secure that effect shall be given to 
the decision of the Country. (114)
The King informed Asquith on 16th November, that:
he felt he had no alternative but to assent to the advice of the Cabinet. (115)
The King's agreement was revealed to Balfour and Lansdowne on the 20th July 1911, 
when Asquith drafted Balfour a letter indicating that the King had indeed consented to 
exercise his Prerogative to create sufficient peers as to allow the Parliament Bill to pass.
(116) A similar letter was sent to Lord Lansdowne, the effect on the latter was 
particularity devastating, and he advised Unionist Peers at a meeting in Lansdowne 
House on 21st July that the House of Lords could no longer offer 'effectual resistance'.
(117) It was as with Grey some eighty years earlier, the Royal Prerogative was used as an 
effective threat to ensure the supremacy of the Commons. Even Dicey who along with 
the 'die-hards', virulently opposed the passing of the 1911 Parliament Bill, arguing in 
1910 that the:
'resolutions accepted by the House of Commons are intended to paralyse, and, 
should they pass into law, will paralyse the legislative authority of the House of 
Lords.' They would 'confer uncontrolled authority on the House of Commons.' 
Moreover, 'The absolutism of the House of Commons means the limitless power 
of the party which possesses a parliamentary majority.' (118)
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ultimately urged its passing as the lesser of two evils. In a letter to The Times', in July 
1911, he wrote Sir,
The advocates of "resistance" are in truth, as things now stand, the advocates of 
complete surrender. To give the Coalition an excuse ardently desired by 
Ministers for packing the House of Lords with a majority of Home Rulers, 
radicals, and Socialists is madness. (119)
Hence, as had occurred some eighty years earlier in 1832, the conflict between the two 
Houses resulted in a defeat for the Upper chamber. Balfour, claimed that the 
Government had acted unconstitutionally by advising the King as regards the creation of 
peers, and moved a Vote of Censure against the Government on August 7th 1911. 
Asquith however, could draw on a relatively recent precedent, that of Grey's during the 
first Reform Bill, indeed it was Grey that Asquith cited, when replying to Balfour's 
charge:
If a majority of this House - that is the House of Lords - is to have the power 
whenever they please of opposing the declared and decided wishes both of the 
Crown and the people without any means of modifying that power, then this 
country is placed entirely under the influence of an uncontrolled oligarchy. (120)
Crucially Asquith argued that the Bill had twice been before the people, in January 1910 
and again in December 1910, it therefore, in his (Asquith's) assumption had been 
deliberately approved by the electors. Citing perhaps one of the Bill's most ardent 
opponents, A V Dicey, Asquith quoted:
The point at which the Lords must yield or the Crown must intervene is properly 
determined by anything which conclusively shows that the House of Commons 
represents on the matter in dispute the deliberate decision of the nation. (121)
These words became significant a short time later, when their author, A V Dicey would 
argue, that Home Rule as a policy did not represent the deliberate will of the Nation, and
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as such the Crown had a duty to intervene to force the Commons to ascertain the verdict 
of the Nation. Dicey maintained that the 1911 Parliament Act had destroyed what he 
termed, 'our last effective constitutional safeguard', (122) as prior to this Act the Lords 
had the legislative right, and the obligation to reject Bills they felt did not have the 
support of the Nation, until the peoples' wishes had been sought. The 1911 Parliament 
Act effectively removed that power, thus conferring on the present and all future House 
Commons the power of what Dicey called an absolute legislative dictatorship. (123) 
Although there appears to be a general consensus that the 1911 Act did not 
fundamentally alter the position of the Lords, it merely put into statue law the convention 
which the Lords had tacitly accepted since 1832: 'that if the House of Commons 
supported by the people, was determined on a measure the Lords would accept it.' (124) 
But it could be argued that the 1911 Bill did indeed revolutionise the Constitution. 
Although Smith argues in the above passage that the position of the Lords was not 
changed, in the same paragraph he goes on to argue that:
the Act removed the basis of the doctrine of the 'mandate' by not requiring that 
contentious measures should be submitted to the people, but it contained certain 
safeguards for the Lords which ensured that the House of Commons would not 
rule unchecked. Thus, the veto remained in effect for a period of two years, 
during which time the Commons had to debate and pass the bill three times.(125)
However, as a result of this Act, the balance of the British Constitution was 
fundamentally changed. A Government now had the power to pass into law any 
legislation provided it enjoyed a majority in the lower house. The rise of the Party 
system enabled a Government (which had a majority) to effectively dominate the 
Commons and push through legislation which perhaps did not have the support of the 
nation. As a result of the 1911 Parliament Act the Liberal Government was given the 
power to pass the Welsh Disestablishment Act and the Home Rule Act in 1914, within 
the lifetime of a single parliament. The controversy surrounding the latter, perhaps not
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only drawing attention to the importance of the Act, but also to the .risks involved in the 
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, which makes all political institutions subordinate 
to Westminster. Under this doctrine, Parliament is supreme - it can in theory make new 
laws or repeal any existing laws which it deems necessary. However, following the 1911 
Parliament Act, power was now no longer, even theoretically, shared by the two Houses 
of Parliament, or even resided with House of Commons, but de facto lay with the 
Executive. What this effectively meant was, that the Government of the day could if had 
a majority in the House of Commons, introduce Bills which involved major 
constitutional changes without any check on its power. Dicey again made the position 
clear:
Every Statute, past, present or to come, and every law, whether contained in the 
Statute Book or not, is now rendered subject to the sole and despotic authority of 
the present coalition or of any faction which may attain a majority by whatever 
means in the House of Commons. (126)
Arguing from a contemporary position, Dicey evidently did not have the benefit of 
hindsight, that Smith possessed when claiming that the Act did not alter the position of 
the Lords and Commons. Dicey gave an argument of the potential of the Commons, or 
more appropriately the majority within it to act as an elected dictatorship. The Act 
lowered the duration of Parliament from seven to five years, to counteract claims that the 
House of Commons might no longer represent the will of the people. However, under the 
terms of Parliament Act, a Bill could become law within the lifetime of a single 
parliament, hence, it is suggested, that the lowering of the duration of parliament was not 
as significant as it appeared. Dicey's contention that in essence the Government could act 
in whatever manner it wished, to amend or repeal laws was shown to be justified in 1949, 
when a new Parliament Act further restricted the Lords Veto to a period of one year, 
thereby once again strengthening the power of the executive even further. The real 
significance of the Parliament Act became apparent a short time after its passage, when a
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minority of loyal British citizens' - the Ulster Unionists claimed that their only recourse 
against an unsympathetic government was active resistance. That His Majesty's 
Opposition, or at least a faction of it, including its leader, Andrew Bonar Law, supported 
them in this cause furthers the argument that the Act itself was somehow flawed. It did 
remove certain safeguards for the people, in that it removed the necessity to submit major 
constitutional changes to the electorate. Sir Edward Carson put it succinctly when at a 
Unionist meeting at Craigavon on 23th September 1911 he affirmed :
Mr Asquith, the Prime Minister, says that we are not to be allowed to put our case 
before the British electorate. Very well. By that determination he drives you in 
the ultimate result to rely upon your own strength, and we must follow all that out 
to its logical conclusion. (127)
The 1911 Parliament Bill allowed the Liberal Government to force the third Home Rule 
through parliament without referring the matter to the Nation, despite the fact that it had 
clearly not formed a major part of its manifesto in the two elections of 1910. In a 
Country that sets no limit on Parliamentary authority, there is a need for some effective 
check on Government authority. But as Lenman has argued, the ' sole surviving check 
on executive power was one which was indefensible both in its composition and latterly 
in the use it made of its power. The House of Lords was Tory-dominated and hereditary 
by definition'.(128) Reform of the Upper Chamber was therefore crucial, but the Liberal 
Government's decision to proceed with the suspensory veto rather than a more modest 
proposal, ensured that the dominance of Party would prevail. Thus the issues 
surrounding the third Home Rule Bill of 1912, were as OT)ay has argued, 'much larger 
than Ireland: it concerned the nature of governmental authority and legitimacy. The fight 
over Irish Home Rule symbolised a more fundamental crisis. Could ephemeral political 
majorities, perhaps elected to Parliament for entirely different reasons, impose an 
apparently objectionable minority policy on the whole country without resistance.' (129) 
Ultimately the 1911 Parliament Act allowed this possibility to become a reality. Unionist
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such as Dicey argued, that the passing of a Home Rule by virtue of this Act was devoid of 
moral authority, since it would be attained without the assent of the Nation. (130) This 
brought into focus what was or at least what should be the limitation of Government 
authority under the British Constitution? These issues will be discussed in the next two 
chapters.
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The Sovereignty of Parliament is (from a legal point of view) the 
dominant characteristic of our political institutions..The principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than 
this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English 
constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever; and, 
further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as 
having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.
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CHAPTER FOTJR
THE PEOPLES V PARLIAMENT:
THE DICEYAN PERSPECTIVE
The controversy surrounding the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill in April 1912 
involved wider political issues than the granting of a devolved Parliament to one part of 
the United Kingdom; it raised questions as to what was, or at least should be the 
limitation of Government authority and whether the British Constitution offered 
sufficient safeguards to its citizens. This was a moral constitutional crisis, which it will 
be argued, involved two fundamental issues. The first issue concerned what Bogdanor 
has described as 'Conflicting Conceptions of Democracy'. (1) Did the Liberal 
Government of the day have the right to introduce a Home Rule Bill, which Unionists 
argued, involved an organic change of the British constitution without ascertaining the 
verdict of the people? Unionists argued, it did not, since there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that this policy did not have the approval of the majority of the people. Home 
Rule, they (the Unionists) argued, had not formed a major part of the Liberal Party's 
manifesto in the two elections of 1910, therefore, it had not been submitted to the people, 
who were the ultimate Sovereign. Unionists therefore, argued, that if Home Rule was 
passed by virtue of the 1911 Parliament Act it would be a breach of the Constitution. 
The Liberal Government's argument was that as the elected Representative of the people, 
it had the right to implement this policy which had formed part of their political 
programme since 1891. Home Rule therefore, they argued, had formed a plank in the 
two of elections of 1910, and as such had received the sanction of the people. Under the 
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, the Liberal Government certainly had the power 
to pass the Act, but was this a corruption of the spirit of the Constitution? The second 
issue involved the question of political morality; Did the Liberal Government o f the day 
have the moral right to deprive a section of the United Kingdom, the Ulster Unionists of
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their British Citizenship? It is accepted that under the terms of Home Rule all the people 
of Ireland would still be classed as ’British Citizens' and Subjects of the Crown, but it is 
suggested that the lack of discourse regarding the concept of citizenship itself essentially 
meant that this fact was largely ignored at the time of the crisis. Moreover, it will be 
argued, that citizenship entails wider issues than merely being classed as British 
Subjects'; it involves Parliament's obligation to protect a subject's civil, economic and 
religious freedoms. The Ulster Unionists believed that under a Dublin Parliament these 
rights would be infringed or endangered, therefore, they argued that the Liberal 
Government did not have right to force them out of the Westminster Parliament and 
under the jurisdiction of their historical enemies, the Irish Nationalists? It is hoped, that 
by separating these two issues, which at the time of the crisis became intrinsically linked 
a clearer understanding of the Constitutional arguments for and against the granting of 
Home Rule by virtue of the 1911 Parliament Act can be ascertained, and this will, 
hopefully, shed some light as to what is or at least should be the legitimate authority of 
Parliament, not only constitutionally but morally as well. This chapter outlines A V 
Dicey's, argument that a Home Rule Bill passed by virtue of the 1911 Parliament Bill 
would lack constitutional authority, since it would be done without the sanction of the 
Nation. It further looks at the recommendations made by Dicey to persuade or force the 
Liberal Government to dissolve Parliament and appeal to the people. The next chapter 
examines how these ideas fared in the party battle over Home Rule.
Dicey without doubt helped legitimatize Unionists arguments between 1912-14: that the 
passing of a Home Rule Bill by virtue of the 1911 Parliament Act was devoid of political 
morality because it did not have the consent of the electorate and it would lack 
constitutional authority since the Act would:
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violate the principle that no Bill which changes the foundations of the 
Constitution should pass into law until it has obtained, directly or indirectly, the 
assent of the electors. (2)
However, in what is generally regarded as one of the most influential books on the 
British Constitution, written by Dicey in 1886, he stated that Parliament had that right, 
arguing:
'A Bill reforming the House of Commons, a Bill for abolishing the House of 
Lords, a Bill to give London a municipality...are each equally within the 
competence of Parliament...’ Once passed each will be 'An Act of Parliament, and 
cannot be annulled by any other power.' (3)
This would appear to contradict Dicey's argument that Parliament did not have the right 
to pass into law a Bill, any Bill, whether it involved an organic change to the Constitution 
or not, for the Constitution made no distinction. Therefore, any Bill that Parliament 
passes, however, it is passed can not be deemed unconstitutional:
Parliament is, from a merely legal point of view, the absolute sovereign of the 
British Empire, since every Act of Parliament is binding on every court 
throughout the British dominions, and no rule, whether of morality or law, which 
contravenes an Act of Parliament, binds any court throughout the realm. (4)
Dicey himself appeared to acknowledged this. Writing to Milner in March 1914:
I have not the least doubt that if the Home Rule Act is passed, defiance of it will 
be crime and probably treason. I can go good way in defending this action on the 
part of the Ulstermen. About the part to be taken by Englishmen after the passing 
of the Home Rule Act, I have my doubts. (5)
Dicey did not elaborate why there should be a difference between obedience to the Act 
on the part of Ulster as opposed to England. If the Act was unconstitutional, and he 
could contemplate defiance of it as legitimate on the part of Ulster, then why not on the 
part of England? Dicey it could be argued, gave a somewhat sounder argument as the
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fundamental principle of English Democracy, which was he argued, 'that a law depends 
at bottom for its enactment on the assent of the nation as represented by the electors'. (6) 
How does this argument stand up to Dicey's concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty?
Parliament's authority is from a legal stand-point limitless:
The Sovereignty of Parliament is (from a legal point of view) the dominant 
characteristic of our political institutions...The principle of Parliamentary 
sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament thus 
defined has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law 
whatsoever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of 
England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. (7)
Moreover, the British political system of Representative Government essentially means 
that the people play no effective part in the decision making process, this becomes the 
responsibility of the members of parliament who are the legitimate representatives of the 
people. As Dicey goes on to argue:
Electors have no legal means of initiating, or sanctioning, or of repealing the 
legislation of Parliament No court will consider for a moment the argument that 
a law is invalid as being opposed to the opinion of the electorate; their opinion 
can be legally expressed through Parliament, and through Parliament alone. (8)
Crucially however, Dicey goes on to qualify this by drawing a distinction between legal 
and political sovereignty:
the essence of representative government is, that the legislature should represent 
or give effect to the will of the political sovereign, i.e. of the electoral body, or of 
the nation. (9)
When therefore, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the House of Commons 
did not represent the will of the Nation, a Government, had an obligation to dissolve and 
seek the verdict of the people. This in essence was Dicey's argument at the time of the 
third Home Rule Bill, that the House of Commons did not represent the will of the
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Nation, or rather there was a reasonable doubt. Following the 1911 Parliament Act, a 
Government could no longer be compelled by the House of Lords to seek the verdict of 
the people, as was the case prior to this time. Although Dicey readily admitted that since 
the Reform Act of 1832 the House of Lords should generally yield to the House of 
Commons:
no man of sense had since 1832 ever supposed that the Upper House could reject 
or ought in fact to reject permanently any Bill passed by the House of Commons 
as the undoubted representative of the Nation. (10)
An effective Second Chamber was still a crucial component of Parliament to guard 
against the tyranny of Government (11) It ensured argued Dicey:
on the one hand that the deliberately formed will of the country shall be carried 
into effect, and on the other hand, that hasty, inconclusive, hesitating wishes of 
the nation shall, at any rate as regards matters of primary importance, not be 
carried into effect. (12)
By this premise, the House of Lords not only had the right to reject any Bill that had not 
been submitted to the electorate, but it had the right to reject Government legislation, 
which has been put before the Nation, if there was an inconclusive result in a General 
Election. Dicey defended this position on the basis that the Lords sometimes represents 
more closely the wishes of the Nation. Citing as an example the Lords rejection of the 
Second Home Rule Bill in 1893, which as has been discussed, was introduced 
immediately after an Election had been fought on that specific issue; Dicey like Salisbury 
claimed that the Liberal Party's defeat in the 1895 election justified the Lords decision to 
reject the Bill. When an appeal was made to the people they rejected the policy, thus 
vindicating the decision of the Lords. Moreover, the refusal of the Liberal Government 
(Gladstone wanted to go the polls, but he colleagues would not allow it) was an 
admission on the part of the Liberals, that ’the Peers and not the majority of the House of
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Commons represented the will of the Country.' (13) In 1911 when Home Rule had once 
again became a live issue, Dicey returned with vigour to this example, since it
was the solemn condemnation by the people of the United Kingdom of the whole 
policy of Home Rule. This condemnation should never be forgotten; it is of 
infinite significance, it means that at a great crisis in the fortunes of England, the 
hereditary House of Lords represented, whilst the elected House of Commons 
misrepresented the will of the nation. (14)
By combining these two issues Dicey was making a case for the need for an effective 
Second Chamber, and also drawing attention to the fact, that when the people had been 
consulted on the question of Home Rule in 1886 and 1895, they had decisively rejected 
it. Unionists argued, Home Rule had not been put before the electorate in 1910, since it 
had been largely ignored by the Liberal Party, in favour of the issue of the Lords, 
therefore, the Liberals could not claim that the Bill was supported by a majority of the 
electors. However, it is worth noting, that Dicey also makes provisions for the rejection 
of a Home Rule Bill, even if it had formed a major part of the Liberal Party's election 
programme. If there was no clear majority in favour of either Party, then by this premise, 
the Lords could once again justify rejecting the measure. This argument would almost 
certainly ensure that the Lords would retain its arbitrary powers, and retain its internal 
veto, even in the face of a Government majority. What would constitute a clear 
majority? This, it could be argued, would be left very much to the discretion of the 
Lords, as it was at the time of the Second Home Rule Bill. As discussed in Chapter three, 
the Lords rejection of the Second Home Rule Bill was on the basis that it did not 
represent the clear wishes of the Nation. But which people? Was it the Predominant 
Partner' which Salisbury and Dicey spoke of England? If so, England was to have the 
final word in determining national policy. But one can disagree with the specific 
argument, whilst recognising that it does raise a valid question, it brings into focus the
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underlying dangers of the British Party system of Government, which relies on a House 
of Commons majority, especially in a country which sets no limits on Government 
authority. As Dicey argued the party system allowed for the:
possibility...which no one can dispute of a fundamental change passing into law 
which the mass of the nation do not desire. (15)
Moreover, as a result of the emergence of this system, the House of Commons was no 
longer 'the deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole', 
which Burke had spoken of, (16) it had by 1890, Dicey reasoned:
ceased to be a body of men to whom the electors confide full authority to legislate 
in accordance with the wisdom or the interests of the members of Parliament. It is 
really a body of persons elected for the purpose of carrying out the policy of the 
predominant party. (17)
And a group, according to Dicey, 'always exists primarily for the attainment of its own 
special object.' (18) Taking as an example a Government which did not have an overall 
independent majority in the Commons, Dicey hypothesized that it could perhaps, agree to 
pass a Bill which was of significance to another party, in exchange for the latter's support 
for the Government's general policy, so allowing the Ministry to remain in office. A 
coalition formed on this basis would not represent the deliberate will of the Nation or 
indeed the House of Commons, but the interests of a faction. (19) Dicey in 1910 
published an article declaring that he believed, that the present [Liberal] Government was 
such a coalition. To remain in office the Liberals had to satisfy the different demands of 
the groups' that made up this coalition. For example, the Budget satisfied the Socialists, 
but was detested by the Irish Parliamentary Party, but the latter was to be appeased by the 
promise of Home Rule. This at times, argued Dicey, came close to corruption. (20) 
Home Rule by this premise was not the deliberate will of the Nation but the deliberate
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will of the Irish Parliamentary Party. The 1911 Parliament Act had allowed for the 
unlimited power of Party, As Lord Selbome argued:
Under the cloak and pretence of the issue of 'the rights of the people versus the 
peers,' the people are being robbed by the House of Commons of their 
Constitutional power to say the last word in great national issues, and the Prime 
Minister of the day is being lifted into the position of a dictator. (21)
The abolition of the Lords power of Veto essentially meant that a Government could 
introduce a policy not supported by the Nation but rather in the interest of a faction. The 
Parliament Act, Dicey argued enabled 'a party or a coalition of parties, to usurp the 
sovereignty of the nation’. (22) There had been, prior to 1911, Dicey argued, one 
effective check on the powers of the Commons:
The legislative authority of the House of Lords meant, and was up to 1911 
understood to mean, that the House had the power, and was under obligation to 
reject any Bill of first rate importance which the House reasonably and Bona fide 
believed to be opposed to the permanent will of the country. (23)
Dicey conceded that in the past the Lords had been partisan, in that it had:
represented not too much, the conservatism of the nation, but quite a different 
thing, the interest as the Conservative Party. (24).
But, argued Dicey, the Liberal Government by its insistence to introduce the Veto, rather 
than implement reforms had removed the last, though admittedly imperfect 
Constitutional safeguard. (25) The 1911 Parliament Act conferred on the present and 
every subsequent House of Commons, 'an absolute legislative dictatorship. England now 
is Governed by one Chamber alone'. (26) Dicey had highlighted the dangers of curtailing 
the Lords power of veto as early as 1895 when he warned against the introduction of 
such a measure, 'because it would make a majority of the House of Commons 
omnipotent.' (27) Drawing a distinction between a proposal to pass a Bill passed by the
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Commons but rejected by the Lords becoming law within the lifetime of a single 
Parliament, and one by which a Bill became law in the next Parliament, Dicey drew 
attention to the vital difference, the one 'increases the power of a party and party 
managers. The other is an attempt, though an unsatisfactory and lame attempt, to 
increase the authority of the Nation.' (28) As discussed, under Dicey's definition of 
representative Government, when there was reasonable doubt as to whether the House of 
Commons represented the will of the people, the Government should dissolve Parliament 
to seek the verdict of the people. There was, Dicey argued, reasonable grounds to 
suspect that Home Rule was not supported by the majority of the Country, therefore, the 
Government had an obligation to submit the Bill to the nation. This Dicey argued the 
present Coalition would not do:
As long as its members stick together, as the expression goes, 'as thick as thieves,' 
they have technically the power to pass the Home Rule Bill. They have been 
offered an appeal to the people and the offer has been refused. What more, I ask 
can we do? (29)
How then was the Government to be forced to adhere to the spirit of the Constitution? 
The solution for Dicey, was that this could be done through the powers of the Crown. 
The King still held the constitutional right to dismiss a ministry that commanded a 
majority in the House of Commons and appoint a different one, thus forcing an appeal to 
the people. (30) It was true that the King should always act on the advice of his 
minsters, but these ministers need not be the present ones. (31) Writing in 1914, Dicey 
contended that:
Unionists believe that this Home Rule does not command the support of the 
electorate. The conduct of the Government leads me to suspect that they share 
this opinion. Many honest Home Rulers, however, believe that the electors are so 
tired with parliamentary intrigues that they give an apathetic assent to Home Rule 
in the hope that they may never hear of it again. There is here a fair difference of
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judgement. Its very existence proves that an appeal to the people is a necessity. 
Let the appeal be made by Mr Asquith, if  he is content to make it...If Mr Asquith 
resists every form of appeal to the people, let it be made through any other 
minister empowered to make it to ascertain the will of the nation. (32)
Dicey was adamant that the King had the right to dissolve Parliament in order to 
ascertain the will of the Nation.
The legal right of the King to dissolve Parliament is absolutely unquestionable... 
Good Parliamentary precedents support my doctrine. (33)
In 1784 and again in 1834 the King had used his prerogative and dismissed a government 
which had the support of the House of Commons. Although the results were different, as 
in 1784 there was a decisive verdict in favour of Pitt, who had been brought into office 
by the King against the will of the House of Commons. Whereas, in 1834 Peel and 
Wellington (who had been brought into office by the wishes of the King against the 
wishes of the House of Commons) suffered a defeat. (34) Crucially however, both these 
examples, according to Dicey, was proof that the King had a right 'to appeal to the nation 
in order to know whether the nation really supported the policy of the Ministers, or in 
other words of a parliamentary majority whose wishes may or may not coincide with the 
opinion of the electorate.' (35) The aim of a dissolution is not to veto any Bill. Its 
proper aim is to make sure that a Bill of importance is really and in truth approved by the 
nation'. (36) In a letter to the Times in 1914, Dicey wrote:
'On this matter I write with some little confidence. My "Law of the Constitution" 
...contains an examination of the constitutional doctrine as to the dissolution of 
Parliament...My opinion as to the occasions on which a dissolution may rightly 
take place has, as far as I know, never been assailed and assuredly has never been 
controverted by any writer of authority.' Moreover, 'One may add that the whole 
current of modem constitutional custom involves the admission that the final 
decision of every grave political question now belongs, not to the House of 
Commons, but to the electors as the representatives of the Nation.' (37)
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Dicey's private correspondence with the Bonar Law highlights his firm belief that this 
was course of action was constitutional:
To my mind we have one course open to us, and one only: that is openly and 
avowedly to agitate for a dissolution, and raise the perfectly legitimate cry of an 
appeal to the people. This may be done by petition and the like. To give real 
effect to such a movement the Unionist leaders should announce that they are 
willing at any moment to take office for the purpose of carrying through a 
Dissolution. (38)
Bonar Law's replied that he also believed that the Sovereign undoubtedly still possessed 
the constitutional right, and indeed had a responsibility to act on it:
in my opinion it ought to be made clear to His Majesty that he has this 
responsibility, and that if his Ministers force him into this position where he has 
to decide between allowing Home Rule to go through, and choosing other 
Ministers and giving them the right of dissolution they will be putting him in an 
absolutely impossible position, for the result will be that whatever course he takes 
half his subjects will think he acted wrongly. (39)
This was the advice that Bonar Law had given his Majesty in May 1912.(40) However 
Asquith, the Prime Minster, whilst conceding that the King still had the right to dismiss 
his ministers and appoint new ones, argued that there was a long and established tradition 
'that in the last resort, the occupant of the Throne accepts and acts upon the advice of his 
ministers. This safeguarded the old maxim - 'the King can do no wrong', it ensured that 
however, objectionable particular Acts may be to a large section of his subjects, they 
cannot hold him in any way accountable, and their loyalty is (or ought to be) unaffected. 
(41) The ambiguity of the British Constitution allowed each side to justify their 
decisions in accordance with its own perception of what was the constitutional position 
of the King, and indeed the legitimate limitation of Governmental authority. In the 
United Kingdom, under the system of Constitutional Monarchy which had evolved since 
the Glorious Revolution, the role of the Monarch has been essentially to 'reign not to
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rule', but yet again this relies on precedent, and can be open to interpretation, as it was at 
the time of the third Home Rule Bill, when some Unionists, including Bonar Law, 
claimed that the King not only had the right to dismiss his existing ministers and appoint 
new ones as a means of forcing a General Election, but the Monarch still had the power 
to Veto a Government Bill. In this instance Dicey was more cautious, writing To Bonar 
Law, he explained:
Your are perfectly right in holding that the so-called ’Veto” of the King is still in 
existence though it has never I believe been really used for more than two 
centuries. But I, as a constitutionalist, most earnestly deprecate its being even 
mentioned at present or referred to. As things stand it would give no advantage, 
not given by a Dissolution, and would involve the King in a controversy which 
would probably lead to the abolition of the prerogative which may on some 
unforeseen occasion save the state from great peril. (42)
This was perhaps a recognition by Dicey, that if the King as the unelected Sovereign 
attempted to Veto a Bill by a Government, which in the last analysis was the elected 
representative of the sovereign body i.e. the Nation, it had better be on an issue more 
fundamental than even the Union itself. For if the Monarch was to lose on the issue of 
Home Rule, then just as the Liberal Government had gone to the country in 1910 on the 
question who governs Peoples or Peers', they could surely do so again with the slogan, 
who governs 'Peoples or King'. The Monarch's prerogative could be curtailed by statute, 
further increasing the power of Party.
It may be argued that Dicey set out a very sound constitutional argument against the 
passing of Home Rule by virtue of the 1911 Parliament Act. In a Representative 
democracy the legislature should be seen to be giving effect to the will of the Nation. 
However, this doctrine only became important to Dicey and the Unionists, when they had 
lost what was in effect their internal veto against such Bills as Irish Home Rule. 
Although Dicey gives a credible argument for a need for Second Chamber to protect the
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Nation against the possible 'tyranny of government', the weakness of the argument in the 
realm of practical politics was that the House of Lords itself was biased in favour of the 
Conservative Party, made evident by its rejection of the Liberal Government Bills 
between 1906 -1910. Although, Dicey conceded this, and advocated reform, the Lords 
by their intransigence had made the Asquith Government determined to introduce the 
Veto. With the effective emasculation of the Upper Chamber, it was argued by Dicey 
and the Unionists at the time of the third Home Rule crisis, that the Crown was now the 
only effective means of ascertaining whether, the legislature represented or gave effect to 
the will of the political sovereign, 'i.e. of the electoral body or of the nation'. (43) Dicey 
maintained that the Liberal Government was usurping the power of the Sovereign body, 
i.e. the people. Dicey's principle was perhaps sound, but the United Kingdom was not as 
yet a democratic state in any real sense, there was still a limited franchise, despite its 
extension during the nineteenth century. Therefore, to speak of the 'will of the people' 
was a relatively new concept within the British Constitution. But it was the age of 
popular politics, and politicians more and more were forced to consult the electorate with 
a view to secure their vote, rather than rely on patronage. This had given rise to the party 
system of Government, and Dicey, it could be argued, raised fundamental questions that 
were and still are of the utmost importance, as regards the lack of constitutional 
safeguards for the people under a Party system of Government. At the time of the third 
Home Rule these lack of safeguards, although not new became evident, when the Ulster 
Unionists challenged the Liberal Government's moral and constitutioal authority to place 
them under the jurisdiction of a Dublin Parliament, which they (the Ulster Unionisits), 
together with the British Unionists claimed was not the deliberate will of the electors, but 
the will of a faction, the Irish Parliamentary Party. And, as Dicey virulently argued: 
Unionists are prepared to bow to the will of the nation: but we are not prepared to 
succumb to the will of a faction.' (44) The crisis surrounding the third Home Rule Bill, 
revealed critical weaknesses in a Constitution that relies heavily on precedents, that can
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on occasion be open to different perceptions. These issues will be discussed in the next 
chapter within the context of the Ulster Crisis', when these differing conceptions of 
democracy tested the British Constitution to its limit.
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CHAPTER FTVE
THE THIRD HOME RITE BILL JUSTICE FOR:
FOR IRELAND OR A BREACH OF THE CONSTITUTION?
\
The this chapter examines how Dicey's constitutional arguments fared in the Party battle 
over Home Rule during the Ulster Crisis' of 1912 -1914. It also explores the Ulster 
Unionists' claims, that the Government of the day did not have the moral or the 
constitutional right to deprive them of their British Citizenship.
THE LIBERALS V UNIONISTS - TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
The British Unionists' constitutional argument at the time of the third Home Rule Bill 
was that the Bill had not been submitted to the electorate as a clear issue in the two 
elections of 1910. The Unionists, therefore contended, that the Liberal Government was 
attempting to pass legislation that would fundamentally alter the fabric of the British 
Constitution without the sanction of the electorate, who were Sovereign. The Unionists 
argued, that before such a change should take place the Government needed a clear 
'mandate' from the people, since there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the Country 
supported Irish Home Rule. In essence, the Liberal Government was exceeding the 
bounds of its legitimate authority. However, the Liberal Government claimed that Home 
Rule had been part of its official party programme since 1891, and as such had indeed 
formed part of its manifesto in the two elections of 1910, therefore, it had been put 
before the Country and received its sanction. As discussed in chapter three, the concept 
of the 'mandate' was, and continues to be an ambiguous one within the British 
Constitution. Although politicians spoke in terms of the 'mandate' of the people, they 
generally felt free to ignore the doctrine when it was deemed expedient to do so. As 
Birch has argued:
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The truth is that Liberal and Conservative leaders have invoked the principle 
when political conditions made this tactically appropriate, but have felt free to 
ignore it in other circumstances. (1)
However, by 1912 the question of the 'mandate' had become somewhat more of an issue 
in British politics. The emergence of the Party system enevitably necessitated a party 
putting its programme before the electorate, therefore, politicians increasingly claimed to 
have received the 'peoples mandate' for their policies. But Unionists claimed, that it was 
not sufficient that a policy which involved an organic change in the British Constitution 
should merely have been included in a list of proposals? Home Rule, the Unionists 
argued, had not formed a major part of the Liberals manifesto of 1910. The data would 
appear to support the Unionists' argument, for as Birch has argued: 'the two elections of 
1910 were dominated by specific issues, that of January by the rejection by the Lords of 
the Government's 1909 budget, and that of December by the proposal to curtail the 
powers of the House of Lords.' (2) Evidently, Home Rule had not been one of the major 
issues of the 1910 elections, but it had formed a part of the Liberal Party's programme, 
therefore, the Liberal Government could claim it had been before the Country, but it 
could not claim that Home Rule had been set before the nation as the one clear issue. On 
the 7th August 1911, when calling for a vote of censure on the Liberal Government as 
regards the creation of peers, Balfour set out what was to become the Unionists argument 
throughout the crisis:
I do not suggest, of course, that the right hon. Gentleman did not read out a 
sentence, prepared in the Cabinet, at the end of 1909, in which Home Rule was 
mentioned...but I do say explicitly in the presence of hon. Gentlemen, all of 
whom are capable of checking and correcting my facts, that it was never brought 
before the constituencies of this country as the great and critical issue. (3)
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To which Asquith replied:
the right hon. Gentleman has chosen to introduce the topic, Home Rule. I will 
undertake to say there was not a single speech made by a single right hon. 
Gentleman on the Front Bench opposite in the course of the general election of 
1910 in which he did not warn the country about Home Rule, and no one in 
clearer terms other than the right hon. Gentleman. (4)
The following day, Bonar Law was contemptuous of Asquith's claim that Home Rule had 
been a major issue in the elections of 1910, and even more furious, at the Prime Minster's 
argument that the Unionists had ensured it was an issue. On What grounds do they make 
that statement? Boner Law asked:
One argument has been used which is so contemptible that I would not have 
referred to it but for the fact that it has been used by the Prime Minister. It was 
that we made admissions in our speeches. I tried to make it an issue over and 
over again, at least a dozen times in Manchester, and I was met by cries: That is 
not the issue that is the bogey (5)
Churchill argued, that he had referred to Home Rule seventeen times in Manchester, to 
which Bonar Law retaliated, 'Yes and the right hon. Gentleman carefully chose to leave it 
out of his election speech.' (6) These statements have been quoted at length, since they 
set the scene for what was to become one of the most bitter constitutional crisis of the 
twentieth century. Asquith's stand was that as the democratically elected Government of 
the day, the Liberals had the perfect constitutional right to introduce a Home Rule Bill. 
Moreover, according to Jalland, the Liberals were acting on a 'fundamental principle, 
which the majority of the party had held since Gladstone's introduction of the first Home 
Rule Bill: Home Rule took its place beside Free Trade as a fundamental item o f faith in 
the Liberal creed. But, the fanatical zeal of Gladstone ancLthe crusading spirit of the 
Liberal converts were replaced by the more stoical spirit of obligation.' (7) Indeed Home 
Rule was introduced as part of a set of secondary proposals in the Liberals' Newcastle
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programme of 1891, therefore, it was reasonable for Asquith to argue, that it was part of 
the Party's official programme. Crucially however, the limitation of the powers of the 
House of Lords was embodied as part of four main principles. (8) However, Asquith 
went to the Country for a second time on this specific issue in the Autumn of 1910, 
although it had been put before the electorate in the previous January election. He 
justified his decision on the basis, that:
The death of King Edward, and the well-intended but abortive parleyings between 
Party leaders which followed, had postponed the decision, but had in no way 
transformed the character, or relaxed the urgency, of the Constitutional issue. 
Since the electors in January, had given us authority to proceed upon the lines of a 
Suspensory Veto, our plan had been definitely formulated in the shape of a Bill. 
It seemed to us to be only fair, both to the country and the Crown, that we should 
be fortified by a fresh verdict of the Electorate before we entered upon the final 
stage of the struggle, with the contingency, even the probability, that it might in 
the last resort, be necessary to invoke the exercise of the Royal Prerogative to 
give effect to the popular will. (9)
If Asquith felt he needed the fresh verdict of the electorate on an issue that had been 
previously put before them some eleven months earlier, which might lead to the 
involvement of the Crown in politics, it is difficult to understand or defend his reluctance 
to put Home Rule before the Country, given the fact that the situation was now more dire 
still, and was sure to involve the Crown, as the British Unionists supported the Ulster 
Unionists threats to resist the Bill by the use of force if it was passed without a General 
Election having taken place. Not since the seventeenth century had Britain faced such a 
constitutional crisis. A contributory factor for Asquith calling an election before 
introducing a Bill curtailing the veto of the Upper Chamber may have been the King's 
indication that he felt unable to agree to use the Royal Prerogative for the creation of 
peers before the Nation had been consulted on the issue. Thus, Asquith was essentially 
forced to put the issue to the people, as the Upper Chambecwould not have agreed to 
curtail its own powers, however, the 1911 Parliament Act essentially meant that the
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Government could no longer be compelled to put Home Rule or any Bill before the 
Nation. As discussed in chapter three, The January election of 1910, returned 275 
Liberals and 273 Unionist candidates, but the former could expect to rely on the support 
of 40 Labour and 82 Irish Nationalists, which was given on certain conditions, such as 
the abolition of the Lords power of veto, which the Irish Parliamentary Party regarded as 
being a prerequisite for the passing of Home Rule. The Unionists from this time onwards 
consistently argued, that Home Rule was part of a 'corrupt parliamentary bargain' 
between the Liberal Government and the Irish Parliamentary Party. Redmond, the 
Unionists claimed, was using his Party's political leverage to secure Home Rule for 
Ireland, as Blake has argued:
From now onwards it was the normal Conservative Party line to declare that the 
Government's actions were wholly dominated by an immoral bargain with 
Redmond, whereby the latter contrary to his true convictions agreed to support 
the Budget in return for a promise by Asquith to destroy the veto of the House of 
Lords and to carry Home Rule. This belief was sincerely held, and it goes far to 
explain the extraordinary bitterness which soon began to mark party politics. (10)
The Unionist Party firmly believed that a Home Rule Bill did not represent the will of the 
nation, rather it represented the interest of the Irish Parliamentary Party. However, the 
Unionist Party was hardly a Party that had been historically concerned with giving effect 
to the will of the nation, so much as securing its own dominance through the unelected 
House of Lords. But, this does not detract from the fact that Asquith could at this point 
have gone to the Country, not so much to quell the Unionists claims, but as a matter of 
principle to ascertain whether Home Rule did indeed have the support of the nation. It 
may not have satisfied the Irish Parliamentary Party, if the Liberals had lost the election, 
or indeed the Ulster Unionists if the Liberals had won, but it could be argued, that in 
1911 or early 1912 an election would have increased the moral authority of the Liberal 
Government to carry Home Rule, if it had been returned to office. It may also have
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contained the issue, and forced each of the Irish parties to accept a compromise. Asquith 
was no doubt right, when he informed the King in September 1913, that if  Home Rule 
(which had been the political attainment of four fifths of the Irish people for over thirty 
years) failed to become law, Nationalist Ireland would resort to physical force, and 
Britain would be forced to resort to employ the same methods to maintain order:
'It is not too much to say that Ireland would become ungovernable - unless by the 
application of the forces and methods which would offend the conscience of 
Great Britain, and arouse the deepest resentment in all the self-governing 
Dominions of the Crown.' And moreover, If 'such an election resulted in a 
majority for the Government, and the consequent passing of the Irish Bill next 
session, the recalcitrance of North-East Ulster would not in any way be affected. 
Sir Edward Carson, and his friends have told the world, with obvious sincerity, 
that their objections to Home Rule have nothing to do with the question whether 
it is approved or disapproved by the British electorate.'(l 1)
By this time the situation had deteriorated, Ulster Unionists had signed the TJlster 
Covenant', pledging to use 'all means necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up 
a Home Rule Parliament for Ireland'. (12) This was followed in January 1913 by the 
uniting of all the Ulster Volunteers into a single paramilitary force to be known as - 'The 
Ulster Volunteer force', under the leadership of the experienced retired army officer, 
George Richardson, with James Craig as staff officer. This physical force movement was 
soon matched by a parallel one in the South, when more militant Nationalist groups such 
as Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Brotherhood, dissatisfied at Redmond moderation, 
formed the National Volunteers' in November 1913, Redmond himself, took control of 
this force the following summer. But it may be suggested, that if Asquith had taken a 
more pro-active approach in 1911, rather than to rely on Redmond and Birrell's claims, 
that Ulster was involved in a game of 'bluff and bluster', then a compromise would have 
been more attainable. It would at least have gone some way to dispelling the Unionists' 
claim that the Liberal Government was using its Parliamentary majority to deprive a loyal
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section of the United Kingdom of their British citizenship' without putting the matter to 
the Country. That the Prime Minister refused to do so, gave the British Unionist Party a 
powerful propaganda weapon which they used to good effect. This is not to say that the 
British Unionist Party was acting wholly without principle, it did sympathise with the 
plight of the Ulster Unionists, but it may be fair to suggest that Ulster was essentially 
regarded as the best means of forcing the Liberal Government to call General Election, or 
convince the King to dissolve Parliament. This in turn would save the Union, which 
would secure Ulster's position within the United Kingdom. Ulster Unionists would most 
certainly not have adhered to the will of the majority, if  a Liberal Government had been 
returned to office, but an election would have isolated them from the British Unionist 
Party, and it was from this Party's support that Ulster's position was strengthened. 
However, Asquith proceeded to introduce a Home Rule Bill, without calling a General 
Election, firmly believing that this would be a fair settlement of the 'Irish Question', but 
fair for whom?
HOME RULE - A FAIR AND FINAL SETTLEMENT?
Asquith introduced the third Home Rule Bill for Ireland on April 11th 1912. The terms of 
the Bill were relatively modest, just as the Bills of 1886 and 1893, it gave the Dublin 
Parliament only limited powers; defence and foreign affairs were to remain under the 
jurisdiction of Westminster, as was customs and excise, moreover, under clause three of 
the Bill, the Irish Parliament was prohibited from making laws to establish or endow 
religion. However, Irish Protestants believed that separation was the ultimate aim of the 
Nationalists Party, with Home Rule merely being the first stage towards Irish 
Independence. Furthermore, Ulster Unionists were convinced that once Ireland would be 
independent, it would without doubt be a Catholic nation. The leader of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party at the time of the third Home Rule crisis was John Redmond, who
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like Pamell before him, seemed to be committed to achieving Home Rule by 
constitutional means. He also appeared to accept the terms of the of the Bill as a final 
settlement. Speaking of an Union of Hearts', declaring at the time of the Bill, that he like 
Pamell before him was no separatist:
'We on these benches stand precisely where Pamell stood. We want peace with 
this country. We deny that we are separatists, and we say we are willing as 
Pamell was willing, to accept a subordinate Parliament created by Statute of this 
Imperial Legislature, as final settlement of Ireland claims.' Moreover, on the 
question of religion, Redmond declared that 'we in Ireland regard no insult as 
grievous as the insult that we, as a Nation are intolerant in matters of 
religion.'(13)
Therefore, on the face of it, a Home Rule Bill posed little threat, either to the status of the 
people of Ireland, who would remain British Citizens, or to their rights, since a Dublin 
Parliament would not in any way challenge the supremacy of Westminster. However, 
like Pamell, Redmond was not above using militant and anti-English rhetoric when it 
was deemed expedient to do so, as is shown in his pamphlet of 1902, disclaiming the:
'moral or legal or constitutional right of the English parliament to legislate for 
Ireland.' Moreover, Fraud, robbery and murder have characterised the English 
usurpation of our country'; and the Irish submitted to this English usurpation of 
the government only because we have no adequate means for successful 
resistance; but we loath English rule, and we will take no part in the jubilation of 
the coronation.' (14)
If Ireland only tolerated English Rule because it was forced to do so, then surely if and 
when the opportunity arose, Ireland would attempt to free itself from the Imperial 
Parliament's jurisdiction? This was the fear of Ulster Unionists, and indeed British 
Unionists, who remained convinced that separation was the ultimate goal of the Irish 
Nationalist Party. That once a Dublin Parliament would be established, independence
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would soon be demanded, after all had not their [the Nationalists] former and revered 
leader Pamell, (who Redmond claimed was no separatist) declared
no man has the right to fix the boundary to the march of a nation. No man has a 
right to say to his country "thus far shalt thou go and no farther", and we never 
attempted to fix the ne plus ultra to the progress of Ireland's nationhood, and we 
never shall.(15)
Moreover Pamell, declared at the time of the 1885 election that the Party was fighting on 
'a platform with one plank, Irish Independence'. (16) Indeed in Ireland at the time of the 
third Home Rule crisis, there were Nationalist groups such as Sinn Fein (Ourselves) 
which openly advocated separatism? Arthur Griffiths' criticism of the terms of the third 
Home Rule Bill illustrates the discontent of more militant Nationalists towards the Irish 
Parliamentary Party's acceptance of such a modest Bill.
The definition of the third Home Rule Bill as a charter of Irish liberty is subject to 
the following corrections: The authority of the proposed Parliament does not 
extend to the armed man or the tax-gatherer. It is checked by the tidal waters and 
bounded by the British Treasury. It cannot alter the settled purposes of the 
Cabinet in London. It may make laws, but it cannot command die power to 
enforce them. It may fill the purse, but it cannot have its purse in its keeping. If 
this be liberty, the lexicographers have deceived us...The measure is no 
arrangement between nations. It recognises no Irish nation. (17)
Arthur Griffiths (who relinquished his membership of the IRB in 1906) advocated a 
policy of 'passive resistance' based on Hungary's struggle against Austrian rule. Irish 
representation at Westminster should be withdrawn, and a parliament set up in Dublin 
where English Acts would be obstructed. Separation was clearly Sinn Fein's ultimate 
goal, whilst the Irish Parliamentary Party may not have officially adopted or 'overtly' 
sanctioned this policy, Ulster Unionists still firmly believed that this was their covert 
policy. Moreover, the Home Rule Party was still associated with 'lawlessness' and
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disloyalty, as the veteran Liberal Unionist, Thomas Andrews declared, when he moved a 
resolution welcoming Carson as their leader, at the Unionists’ mass meeting of 
September 23rd 1911:
We will never never bow the knee to the disloyal factions led by Mr. John 
Redmond...We will never submit to be governed by rebels who acknowledge no 
law but the laws of the Land League and illegal societies. (18)
It may be argued, that Redmond faced the same problem as Pamell before him, that of 
having to appeal to both wings of the Party - constitutional and militant nationalism, he 
also had to appear reasonable to British Politicians. Therefore, his rhetoric had to be 
pitched to whichever audience he was addressing: this dichotomy and ambivalence in 
language as to what Home Rule really meant did little to alleviate the fears of Ulster 
Unionists, that Home Rule would eventually transpire into an Independent Ireland. 
Hence, Ulster Unionists argued, that the Westminster Parliament did not have the right to 
force them under what the perceived to be a future hostile Independent Parliament, 
believing that Home Rule would be an infringement of the civil and religious freedoms. 
It differed from ordinary legislation, since it essentially involved the concept of 
citizenship. As Morris has argued in his analysis of metropolitan union political theory:
The Home Rule Bill in this view was no ordinary piece of legislation. It was fia t 
affecting the very status o f citizenship. The right of insurrection which writers 
like St Loe Strachey invoked had as its premise the Lockean argument that, by 
rejecting the claims of the northern Unionist to the maintenance of their 
constitutional position, the government was severing the bonds of consent which 
linked the Ulstermen to Westminster, so returning them to a pre-political state of 
nature. With termination of Ulster’s constitutional obligation to the sovereign 
power a right of resistance rose against the illegitimate coercion of the 
government. Put simply the argument amounted to this proposition: though I 
must obey the Captain of the Boat while I am on the boat, I think I have a moral 
right to resist being thrown overboard. (19)
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This analysis is supported by Miller, who has argued, that Ulster Unionists believed that 
as loyal citizens they should obey ordinary laws, but Home Rule would be 'no ordinary 
law for it would negate their citizenship.' (20) However, citizenship is a somewhat 
ambiguous concept within the British Constitution; people have no rights codified in law. 
Under the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, the people are essentially dependant on 
Parliament for their rights and liberties including their rights as citizens. Technically 
therefore, Parliament has the right to enact or repeal any law, even if that law involves a 
fundamental change in an individual's or section's citizenship. This graphically 
illustrates one of the major defects of the British Constitution, that in reality under the 
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, there is no concrete safeguards for the people. 
Under the terms of the three Home Rule Bills, however, there would be no change in an 
individual's citizenship as all the people of Ireland would remain British citizens, and 
subjects of the Crown, as indeed they did between 1921 - 1949, when Ireland left the 
Commonwealth and became a Republic. But, in 1949, all the people of Southern Ireland 
became Irish citizens, therefore, the Ulster Unionists perception that Home Rule was 
merely the first step towards an Independent Ireland was substantiated. Had Ulster come 
under the jurisdiction of a Dublin Parliament in 1921 its people would have became Irish 
citizens some twenty eight years later. In this at least, the Ulster Unionists claim, that 
Home Rule did involve the question of citizenship was a correct one. Just as importantly 
in 1914, the Ulster Unionists did not believe that the Westminster Parliament would or 
could offer sufficient protection against the possible curtailment of their civil, economic 
and religious freedoms under a devolved Parliament. As Dicey pointed out, the Irish 
Cabinet would be appointed by an Irish Legislature, with Westminster having no part in 
its selection. Any leader could, therefore, become Prime Minister, provided he enjoyed 
the confidence of the Irish Parliament, and he and his colleagues would have the 
authority which belongs to a Parliamentary Executive. (21) Clearly, given the 
overwhelming majority enjoyed by the Irish Parliamentary Party in Ireland, the Executive
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would be a Nationalist one. Dicey goes on to give examples of the powers which would 
be held by a future Dublin Parliament:
'For the Irish Parliament can, subject to certain Restrictions...' pass any law 
whatever, 'for the peace, order and good government of Ireland, in respect of 
matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof. Moreover, under the 
new constitution, the Irish Parliament may enact a Coercion Act applying say to 
Ulster, or may repeal the existing Crimes Act.' (22)
Evidently, Dicey believed a Dublin Parliament held little safeguards for Ireland's 
minority population, i.e. the Protestants. In his book, 'A Fool's Paradise' published as a 
criticism of the 1912 Home Rule Bill, Dicey made clear the Unionists position:
We detest the Home Rule Bill, moreover, because it inflicts upon Ulster an 
intolerable wrong; for it takes from the Protestants of that part of the United 
Kingdom the right to be really and directly governed by the Imperial Parliament, 
and by the Imperial Parliament alone. (23)
Ulster Unionists truly believed 'that Westminster Sovereignty under the Home Rule Bill 
would be a mere sham which the Irish parliament would dispose of at the earliest 
possible opportunity.' (24) It was, therefore, vital to protect their rights and liberties by 
any means available. Hence, in September 1911 Edward Carson made plain his plan of 
action, when at a meeting in Craigavon he declared:
We must be prepared the morning Home Rule passes, ourselves to become 
responsible for the government of the Protestant province of Ulster. We ask your 
liberty at the meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council to be held on Monday to 
discuss there this matter, and to set to work to take care so that at no time and at 
no intervening space shall we lack a Government in Ulster which shall be a 
Government either by an Imperial Parliament or by ourselves. (25)
Two days later this course of action was essentially ratified by the Ulster Unionist 
Council, which claimed that Home Rule had not been submitted to the judgement of the 
electors as a clear issue, therefore, the Council reasoned, that the country had given no
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mandate for it. If the Government attempted to enact such a measure it would be in the 
Council’s judgement 'a grave if  not criminal breach of constitutional duty.' (26) A 
commission of five was appointed to take immediate action in the case of an emergency, 
and to draw up a Constitution for a Provisional Government, to come into operation if 
Home Rule was enacted, and would remain 'until Ulster shall again resume unimpaired 
her citizenship in the United Kingdom’. (27) It may be evident (with hindsight) that these 
men would resist any attempt to coerce them under a Dublin Parliament, for they firmly 
believed that their rights and freedoms would not be protected whatever safeguards were 
put into the Bill. The Ne Temere Decree of 1908, in which it was ordained that 
marriages between Catholics and Protestants not solemnised by the Catholic Church 
were null and void, was taken as proof that this (their interpretation) was the correct one. 
Under clause 3. of the third Home Rule Bill, included to protect an individual's religious 
freedom, and guard against such decrees as the Ne Temere. the Irish Executive was 
prohibited to make any religious ceremony a condition of the validity of any marriage. 
However, Carson when addressing the House of Commons on the subject of the 
guarantees on religious freedom made the point:
What becomes of your elaborate provision that they are not to be allowed to 
endow any religion? They will tell you that there will be no open persecution. 
Of course not. Nobody suggests that anybody will go and shoot a man because he 
is a Protestant or Catholic or vice versa. That is not the way it is done, and 
nobody is afraid of that...No, Sir it is the working of the institution for political or 
religious purposes and objects, and that no guarantee set up by any Parliament can 
prevent. (28)
The safeguards which the Bill proposed were essentially seen as 'paper ones', Ulster 
Unionists therefore, believed, that a Home Rule Bill would essentially endanger their 
rights and freedoms, and as British Subjects', they had a right to expect the British State 
to protect those rights. From the Ulster Unionists perspective, therefore, it was the
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Liberal Government that was acting disloyally by their attempt to deprived loyal British 
citizens of their birthright, and all the protection that went with it. Moreover, under the 
British Constitution, people are not only citizens of parliament, they are subjects of the 
Crown. As Carson informed Asquith some time after the crisis, if  he had been arrested 
he would have pleaded guilty, and stated:
My Lord Judge and gentlemen of the jury: I was bom under the British flag, a 
loyal subject of His Majesty the King. So much do I value this birthright that I 
was even prepared to rebel in order to defend it. If to fight, so as to remain, like 
yourselves, a loyal subject of His Majesty, be a crime, my Lord and gentlemen of 
the juiy, I plead guilty. (29)
Ian Paisley expressed traditional Unionists thinking succinctly in 1975, when he 
declared:
If the Crown in Parliament decreed to put Ulster into an United Ireland, we would 
be disloyal to Her Majesty if we did not resist such a surrender to our enemies. 
(30)
This was essentially the argument put forward by the Ulster Unionists at the time of the 
third Home Rule Bill. This argument was made possible because of the ambiguity of a 
person's status within the United Kingdom. Historically British people were regarded as 
subjects of the monarchy, however, as the absolutism of monarchy was superseded by 
constitutional monarchy, the people became subject to the laws of Parliament as 
opposed to the dictates of the Crown. Hence, the argument put forward by Ulster 
Unionists that they are subjects of the Crown, not citizens of Parliament is an antiquated 
one, but it is nevertheless a somewhat reasonable one, given the ambiguous position of 
the Crown within the British Constitution. Ultimately however, citizens or subjects have 
a duty to obey the laws of Parliament, but Parliament also has a duty to protect the rights 
of its citizens. The Liberal Government of 1912 was, according to Ulster Unionists, 
failing to secure their fundamental rights which, they believed, would be violated under a
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Nationalist Government. Therefore, why did Asquith choose to dismiss their very real 
fears, and indeed their threats of resistance rather than seek a compromise? According to 
Spender, Asquith, believed that Home Rule for the whole of Ireland was the ideal to be 
aimed for, and 'though circumstances might require it to be modified or compromised, 
the Government should not start by admitting it to be impossible.’ (31) In early 1912 the 
Liberal Cabinet had discussed the Ulster Question, and the possibility of allowing Ulster 
counties to contract out of the Bill should they wish to do so. Indeed both Lloyd George 
and Winston Churchill favoured some kind of 'special treatment' for Ulster, but were 
unable to persuade Asquith and their Cabinet colleagues who were committed to the 
Gladstonian concept of Home Rule for all-Ireland. As Asquith wrote to the King:
the Government held themselves free to make changes, if it became clear that 
special treatment must be provided for the Ulster Counties, and that in this case 
the Government will be ready to recognise the necessity either by amendment or 
by not pressing it (the Bill) on under the provision of the Parliament Act. (32)
This letter would indicate that the Government recognised that the Ulster Unionists had a 
case for 'special treatment', but were not prepared to address their grievances unless 
forced to do so. As Churchill recalled: 'We had been met by the baffling argument that 
such a concession might well be made as the final means of securing a settlement, but 
would be fruitless till then.’ (33) To quote Spender again:
Asquith's view was that the solution would be found in the characteristic British 
way of compromise after debate and argument. In this he undoubtedly failed to 
reckon with the Irish temperament, whether in the north or south, which regarded 
settlements of the British type as either surrenders or betrayal. (34)
The historical relationship between the Catholic and Protestant people of Ireland did not 
lend itself easily to compromise through dialogue. Compromise, it may be suggested is 
possible in a society where there is a high degree of social consensus among the people,
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as in mainland Britain. In Ireland, it may be suggested, that this consensus was in 
evidence only among each group i.e. Irish Nationalists or Unionists, it was not present 
throughout society. This made finding a fair and final settlement that would be accepted 
by each group a very difficult one, since it was not a question of compromise, rather what 
was seen as victory for one was regarded as a death-knell for the other. John Dillion 
quoted a pamphlet written by James Craig, in which the latter stated:
'In dealing with the Catholic Church, two things must be remembered - first there 
can be no such thing as equality, for if  you are not top dog she will be' Dillon 
added 'This is the spirit of Ulster Unionism. They want to be top dog.' (35)
This perhaps lends support to the theory that there was not one 'Irish Nation' rather there 
was two. Redmond for the Irish Nationalists would not countenance such a possibility. 
Declaring that:
Ireland for us is one entity. It is one land...Our ideal in this movement is a self 
governing Ireland in the future, when all her sons of all races and creeds within 
her shores will bring their tribute, great or small, to the great total of national 
enterprise and national statesmanship and national happiness. Men may deny 
deride that ideal; they may say it is a futile and unreliable ideal, but they cannot 
call it an ignoble one. (36)
Ulster Unionists dismissed claims that Ireland was one Nation, neither did they claim, 
that Ulster represented a separate nation, for as Buckland has argued, they had 'a very 
hazy sense of nationality', they neither felt themselves to be truly British or Irish, but he 
goes on to argue, Ulster Unionists were absolutely certain that they were different from 
the Catholic majority of Ireland.' (37) Therefore, Asquith's decision to adopt the 
Gladstonian line of Home Rule for all of Ireland was perhaps done with the best of 
intentions, but veiy little understanding of the deep divisions and suspicions that existed 
in Ireland. Ulster Unionists regarded a Dublin Parliament as a threat to their very basic 
rights of citizenship. Irish Nationalists on the other hand, perceived Home Rule without
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the inclusion of Ulster as a mutilation of the one ’Irish Nation', and a betrayal of all its 
(the Nationalists) past struggles to attain justice for its people. Birch has written of 
Asquith:
His approach to government was marked, on the one hand, by a belief that 
discussion and negotiation would eventually produce a solution that would be 
accepted by all parties and, on the other, by an intense dislike of any violent or 
unconstitutional actioa..He had little understanding of the position of a minority 
which felt so strongly about an issue that it was prepared to break the rules in its 
campaign for what it considered to be its rights. (38)
This approach did not lend itself well to accommodating the differing demands of two 
militant groups, each of which was convinced it had justice on its side. Asquith, could 
not comprehend that a minority would use force against constitutional Government, he 
therefore did not believe in possibility of civil war.(39) Perhaps Asquith himself came to 
realise his limitations too late, when he remarked in July 1914: 'Aren't they a remarkable 
people? And the folly of thinking that we can ever understand, let alone govern them!' 
(40) In the realm of practical politics alone, it was not a shrewed move to underestimate 
the problems of Ulster. It may be suggested that had Asquith offered Ulster some form of 
exclusion at the outset, this would most definitely have gone some way to thwarting the 
British Unionist argument about the injustice coercing Ulster out of the Westminster 
Parliament, without at least appealing to the electorate, who were, theoretically at least, 
Sovereign. However, at this time, Asquith refused to believe that 'loyal British subjects' 
would resist the will of Parliament, by force of arms. It was even more inconceivable 
that the British Unionist Party - the Party of law and order would support them in this 
course of action. Irish Nationalists had a history of violence, but talk of civil war from a 
'loyal' section of the United Kingdom was altogether a different matter. Therefore, 
Asquith may have reasoned that eventually the Ulster Unionists would have accepted the 
terms of the third Home Rule Bill if the Government kept its resolve. However, the
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support of the British Unionist Party for Ulster's campaign of resistance, if Home Rule 
passed without a General Election made that an improbability.
BRITISH UNIONISTS - GUARDIANS OF THE CONSTITUTION?
Following the passing of the Parliament Bill in August 1911, the Conservative Party, 
especially the 'die - hards' had become dissatisfied with the Party's leadership. They 
could not forgive Balfour and Lansdowne for allowing the Bill to become law. It was 
this group that was most vocal in calling for Balfour's resignation, with Leo Marxse, the 
Editor o f the National Review' coining the phrase BMG (Balfour must go). (41) Balfour 
resigned in November of 1911, resulting in a leadership contest between Walter Long 
and Austin Chamberlain, the success of either would have split the party, Bonar Law 
emerged as a 'unifying' candidate. Bonar Law's more combative 'new style' appealed to 
the more militant right wing of the Party, frustrated by the passing of the 1911 
Parliament Act, they had already began to turn their attention towards resisting Home 
Rule by force if needs be. Bonar Law made his position clear:
We can imagine nothing which Unionists in Ireland can do which will not be 
justified against a trick of this kind...you will not carry this Bill without 
submitting it to the people of this country and if  you make an attempt you will 
succeed only in breaking our parliamentary machine. (42)
Therefore, from the outset Bonar Law's commitment to supporting Ulster in its threat as 
regards the use of force to defeat Home Rule, was made on condition that the Bill would 
become law without a General Election taking place. As Robert Sanders wrote in his 
diary '[Bonar Law] has said both publicly and privately that in...case [of an election] he 
would not support resistance. There he differs from Carson'.(43) Blake supports this 
view, 'Bonar Law's appeal to force was made only on the assumption that the Liberals 
were going to impose Home Rule without holding another General Election.' (44) This
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highlights the fact, that Bonar Law's main aim throughout his campaign of resistance was 
to force the Liberal Government to hold a General Election. This is not to say, that Bonar 
Law did not sympathise with the people of Ulster, as his correspondence reveals:
These people look upon their being subject to an executive Government taken out 
of the Parliament in Dublin with as much horror, I believe, with more horror, than 
the people of Poland ever regarded their being put under subjection by Russia: 
they say they will not submit except by force. (45)
But his over-riding aim was to secure a General Election, as he told the House of 
Commons On January 1st 1913, if the Government sought and received a mandate from 
the people, then as leader of the Unionist Party he would no longer encourage the people 
of Ulster in their policy of resistance, but:
if  you attempt to enforce this Bill, and the people of Ulster believe, and have a 
right to believe, that you are doing it against the will of the people of this country, 
then I shall assist them in resisting it. But if you put it before the people of this 
country as a clear issue, then it is a problem for Ulster, and not for me...So far as I 
am concerned, if it is submitted to the people of this county as a clear issue, so 
long as I speak for the Unionist Party I shall do nothing to encourage them in 
resisting the law. (46)
The strategy of the threat of armed resistance as a legitimate means to defeat Home Rule 
was a dangerous course of action, but Bonar Law adopted it in an attempt to convince the 
Liberal Government that a General Election was preferable to civil war. As he wrote to 
Dicey:
I need not say to you how fully I realise the seriousness of the position, and no 
one is more conscious than I that it is very easy to get up cheers of party followers 
by extreme speeches, but that in the long run we will be judged by the wisdom of 
the course we take. In my deliberate opinion, however, the best chance of 
avoiding civil war, or something very like it, is to convince the Ministers that we 
are in earnest, and that if they attempt to carry this through under present
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conditions they will find themselves face to face with the resistance of more than 
half a nation. (47)
George Dangerfield, in what has become one of the most influential books on the period, 
has described the actions of the Conservative Party as a rebellion, ’and the most 
disagreeable thing about this rebellion was that it was set on foot in the name of Loyalty.’ 
(48) Whilst it is accepted that there was a good deal of expediency in the actions of 
Bonar Law, as the party he inherited was essentially divided on the issue of tariff reform 
v free trade and also contained a militant right wing spoiling for a fight: Bonar Law may 
well have regarded the defence of the Union as the best means of uniting the Party, as 
the British Unionist Party was firmly committed to the maintenance of the Union, after 
all that is why it had been formulated in 1886. (49) However, the Unionists held strong 
ideological convictions as well. The United Kingdom for Unionists, was seen as an 
organic whole, a 'seamless garment' with the supremacy of the Westminster Parliament 
pivotal to maintaining Britain's powerful position within the Empire. At a time when the 
British Empire's powerful position seemed to be challenged, an Independent Ireland, with 
a 'disloyal' Nationalist Government was a strategic nightmare should an European War 
break out. (50) Crucially Unionists argued, that if Britain lost control of Ireland it would 
be the first step to the break up of the Empire. As Carson later argued:
If you tell your Empire in India, in Egypt and all over the world that you have not 
got the men, the money, the pluck, the inclination and the backing to restore order 
in a country within twenty miles of your shore, you may as well begin to abandon 
the attempt to make British rule prevail throughout the Empire at all. (51)
As Asquith however, pointed out when introducing the third Home Rule Bill, some 
countries in the Empire had already received self government, therefore, the granting of 
Irish Hqme Rule as such was: 'a process in strict accordance with the spirit and tendency 
of our Imperial development.' (52) As has been discussed however, Ireland was viewed
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differently: Unionists virulently distrusted the Irish Nationalists, and Ireland's proximity 
to mainland Britain made it strategically important. Moreover, they (the Unionists) firmly 
believed that the Liberal Government was in collusion with the Irish Parliamentary Party, 
and. this 'corrupt bargain' not only threatened the dismemberment of the Union but it had 
already destroyed the balance of the Constitution. Therefore, they (the Unionists) 
believed they had no other recourse against the tyranny of Government, other than to 
resort to unconstitutional action to defend the Constitution, and save the Union. One 
such measure, which the Unionists considered, reveals how far the Party was prepared to 
go to secure an election was the proposal to tamper with the Annual Army Act, regarded 
as 'one of the cornerstones of the constitution'. (53) The Annual Army Act dated back to 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, (54) its purpose was to prevent an arbitrary executive - 
in those days the King from using the Army to destroy the liberties of the Nation. Each 
year the Bill was put before Parliament to legalise the existence of the Armed forces for 
the coming twelve months. If Parliament refused to pass the Act it would in effect 
nullify the legal status of the Army. (55) As Blake succinct put it: 'The entire basis of 
military discipline would disappear if the Army Act was rejected'. (56) Crucially 
however, the Act like any other could be rejected or amended by Parliament, since the 
Constitution rests on Parliamentary supremacy. The 'die hards' had discussed this 
measure as a possible future strategy (should the Parliament Bill become law) in the 
summer of 1911. As Edward Goulding informed Garvin: I t  is quite forgotten', but must 
be kept secret that the Expiring Laws, which have to be renewed each year are not 
subject to the Veto. Nor the Army Annual'. (57) However, it was Bonar Law himself 
which brought the matter to the public's attention, when anxious that the 'die-hards' 
should not block the passing of the Parliament Bill, believing that swamping the Upper 
House with Liberal Peers would be more injurious than the Passing of the Bill, as the 
latter offered the possibility of delaying contentious legislation for two years, this at least, 
preserved a glimmer of hope. He wrote in the 'Times' on July 26th 1911:
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[The Lords] can delay for instance the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill or the 
Army Annual Act, and such action on their part would undoubtedly make the 
continuance of the Government impossible and compel an election...It might or 
might not be wise to use this power, but if  I am right in thinking that the House of 
Lords would have the means of compelling an election before Home Rule became 
law, that surely is not a power which ought to be lightly abandoned. (58)
Lord Selbome brought the matter up again when he suggested to Bonar Law in July 1912 
that the Government might be brought down, if  the Lords refused to pass the Annual 
Army Act. (59) Evidently the possible rejection or amendment of the Act was not 
something that Unionists considered in the heat of the moment or lightly, it had clearly 
been contemplated as an option for some time. However, it was only seriously
considered by Bonar Law when all other avenues (save civil war) were rapidly closing. 
Bonar Law's intention was to amend the Army Act in the House of Lords to prevent the 
use of troops in Ulster should the Government try to coerce the Ulster Unionists. Adams 
argues, that Bonar Law never intended to veto the Act. (60) However, as Blake has 
pointed out, Unionist leaders were aware that should the Government refuse to accept the 
amendment, the Lords could refuse to pass the Act, thus depriving the present 
Government use of the Army for two years. No Government could carry on under those 
circumstances, and therefore, a general election would have to be called. (61) Evidently 
this was the Unionists aim, frustrated at the Government's continual refusal to consent to 
call a general election, on the issue of Home Rule. Thus at a shadow cabinet meeting on 
February 2nd 1914, Bonar Law proposed that should the Home Rule Bill be passed 
under the terms of the Parliament Act, the Army Act should be amended in the House of 
Lords to prevent the Army being used in Ulster to suppress resistance to the Bill. This 
was a grave measure, but one which was supported by Dicey:
Every one can of course see the objections to which this course is open, still I 
confess that the legal power either of the Crown or the House of Lords may in my
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judgement be rightly and in that sense be constitutionally used for the purpose of 
forcing an appeal to the electors. (62)
This measure, however, did not enjoy unanimous support amongst Unionists. As Sanders 
noted in his diary:
most of the whips are against it, and on the whole the feeling in the party is 
against it. The Scotchmen say it would be fatal to Unionist hopes in Scotland. 
Curiously enough Ronald McNeill says it would be most unpopular with the 
Orangemen who say they have no quarrel with the Army. The one strong point is 
that it must force an election, and it is rather hard to see how to enforce one 
otherwise. (63)
Although Sanders notes the disadvantages, it is clear that the one over-riding advantage 
of tampering with this Act, would be the forcing of a General Election. However, Bonar 
Law was throughout anxious to retain an United Party, therefore, this may have made 
him reluctant to initiate such an action without the support of the whole Party. Stewart 
has argued, that this is why Bonar Law dropped the plan in March 1914. (64) But its very 
contemplation reveals that by 1914, Bonar Law was looking for any avenue to avoid civil 
war, perhaps, although not openly admitting it, realising that if such a situation arose, the 
British Unionist Party would not be totally absolved. It had actively encouraged Ulster in 
its campaign of armed resistance, but had qualified its support by asserting that if an 
election took place, which revealed that a majority of the country was in favour o f Home 
Rule, they would not give 'active' support' to Ulster in their campaign of resistance. It is 
suggested that this course of action was not only a dangerous one, but a reckless one on 
the part of the leader of the British Unionist Party. Asquith was quite correct when he 
wrote to the King:
It is true that the Unionist Leaders in Great Britain have intimated that, in such an 
event, they would not give 'active countenance' (whatever that may mean) to the 
defiance of the law. But what effect can that have on men who have been 
encouraged to believe, and many of do believe, that under Home Rule their 
liberties and their religion would be in jeopardy? (65)
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It has been written, that Bonar Law had little knowledge of Ireland, but Ulster he knew 
well. (66) It may be suggested therefore, that Bonar Law should have considered more 
carefully the course he embarked on in 1912. If he knew the character of the Ulster 
people, then he surely should have realised, even if an election was called, and the 
Liberals were returned to office, the Ulster Unionists would not have abided by its 
results. Asquith may have been at fault in refusing to put Home Rule before the 
electorate in 1911-12, but Bonar Law should also take some of the responsibility for the 
events that occurred thereafter. To ignite the already inflamed passions of the Ulster 
Unionists with rhetoric which referred to the Liberal Government as:
a revolutionary committee which has seized by fraud upon despotic power. In our 
opposition to them we shall not be guided by the considerations, we not be 
restrained by the bonds, which would influence us in ordinary political struggle...I 
can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster will go, in which I shall not 
be ready to support them, and in which they will not be supported by the 
overwhelming majority of the British people. (67)
was irresponsible to say the least. To the Ulster Unionists it was not a matter of violating 
the 'spirit of the constitution' it was a question of citizenship, they were hardly going to 
adhere to the spirit of a constitution that they were being driven out of. Therefore, to 
speak in terms of no longer actively supporting Ulster in its campaign of resistance if an 
election was called offered little safeguard against the possibility of Civil War. Bonar 
Law and the 'die-hards' active agitation without doubt strengthened the Ulster Unionists 
resolve and belief in the early stages of the crisis at least, that Home Rule could be 
defeated by the threat of direct action.
THE ROLE OF THE KING IN THE THIRD HOME RULE CRISIS
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In chapter four, Dicey's argument as to the Constitutional powers still possessed by the 
Crown were discussed - namely that the King still had the right to dismiss his ministers 
and appoint new ones, and also, although Dicey did not support the use of the King's use 
of the veto at the time of the Ulster Crisis', he nevertheless believed the Crown still 
possessed this right, and might on some future occasion be called upon use it. Evidently, 
dismissal of his ministry, was a more temperate course than the refusal of the Royal 
Assent, since the latter would in essence be a veto, by the unelected Sovereign against 
the elected representatives of the Nation. Unionists however, considered both in an 
attempt to force the Liberal Government to dissolve Parliament and put Home Rule 
before the Country. The preamble of the 1911 Parliament Act stated that:
it is intended to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a Second 
Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis, but such 
substitution cannot be immediately brought into operation (68)
The Constitution was therefore, according to Unionists in suspense, since it 
lacked its customary checks and balances. Hence, the King was seen as being the 
sole surviving check on the powers of the Executive until the Reform of the 
Upper House was carried through. Sir William Anson, in a letter to 'The Times' 
put the point succinctly:
The Government have taken advantage of a combination of groups in the House 
of Commons to deprive the Second Chamber of its constitutional right to bring an 
appeal to the people on measures of high importance which have never been 
submitted to the consideration of the electorate. While this part of our 
constitution is in abeyance they are passing legislation which will shortly lead to 
civil war. Our only safeguard against such a disaster is to be found in the exercise 
of the prerogative of the Crown...It really comes to this, that if  the King should 
determine, in the interests of the people, to take a course which his Ministers 
disapprove, he must either convert his Ministers to his point of view, or, before 
taking action, must find other Ministers who agree with him. (69)
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The King himself, according to Nicholas, agreed in principle that a General Election 
should be called before Home Rule became law, but he also realised the Prime Minister 
'would not agree to a dissolution, and would tender his Government's resignation, and 
that at the ensuing election many Liberal Candidates would seek to divert attention from 
the threatened coercion of Ulster by accusing the Crown of interfering in party issues.' 
(70) Moreover, the King believed that the 1911 Parliament Act had affected the position 
of the Crown,as he wrote to Asquith:
As I regard it, the King alone can compel a Government to refer to the Country 
any measure which hitherto would have been so referred by the action of the 
Lords. (71)
But Asquith was adamant that the Parliament Act had affected only the relationship 
between the two Houses, and the King's position had been unaltered, claiming that:
The Parliament Act was not intended in any way to affect, and it is submitted has 
not affected, the Constitutional position of the Sovereign. It deals only with 
differences between the two Houses. When the two Houses are in agreement (as 
is always the case when there is a Conservative majority in the House of 
Commons), the Act is a dead letter. When they differ, it provides that, after a 
considerable interval, the thrice repeated decision of the Commons shall prevail, 
without the necessity for a dissolution of Parliament. The possibility of abuse is 
guarded against by the curtailment of the maximum life of any given House of 
Commons to five years. (72)
However, these were the very terms that Unionists, such as Dicey objected to, since, a 
Bill any Bill would become the Law of the Land within the lifetime of a single 
Parliament. In real terms, the considerable interval, Asquith spoke of was largely 
immaterial: a Bill would become law, as was now the case with Home Rule, without the 
Government being compelled to call a General Election. Was it, therefore, 
constitutionally or more important perhaps, morally acceptable that the King, should 
remain neutral as his people drifted towards civil war? Asquith maintained that it was,
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since as it guarded against the old maxim 'the King can do no wrong'. However 
objectionable a policy might be, the people could not hold the King responsible. (73) The 
King replied that he accepted Asquith's proposition that the Sovereign should act on the 
advice of his ministers, but he felt that in this particular instance:
the people will, rightly or wrongly associate me with whatever policy is adopted 
by my advisers, dispensing praise or blame according as that policy is in 
agreement or antagonistic to their own opinions. (74)
Moreover, as the King told Asquith in February 1914, that in his opinion, Ulster would 
never, no matter what guarantees were given, consent to be placed under a Dublin 
Parliament, and if negotiations failed civil war might be the outcome. A General 
Election would reveal whether the Government did have a mandate for Home Rule, and 
thus relieve both the Prime Minister and himself of responsibility for what followed. 
Asquith replied again that an Election would settle nothing, and 'the responsibility would 
rest, not with the King, but with his Ministers.' The answer the King gave was both 
profound and astute: :
that, although constitutionally he might not be responsible, still he could not 
allow bloodshed among his loyal subjects in any part of his Dominions without 
exerting every means in his power to avert it. Although at the present stage of the 
proceedings he could not rightly intervene he should feel it his duty to do what in 
his own judgement was best for his people generally. (75)
Asquith, stated that he hoped this did not imply that the King intended to refuse his 
assent to the Bill, this had not been done since the reign of Queen Ann, and would 
'inevitably be disastrous to the Monarchy.' He conceded that the King still had the power 
to dismiss his ministers, but if this was to be done, it should be done, quickly before the 
new Session had began. The King told him that he had no intention of dismissing his 
ministers 'although his future action must be guided by circumstances.' (76) The King
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evidently felt that the Crown still possessed the Constitutional right to refuse the Royal 
assent and also the power to dismiss his Ministers. Quoting Bagehote, the King had 
written to Asquith in the previous September:
The Sovereign too possess a power according to theory for extreme use on a 
critical occasion, but which in law he can use on any occasion. He can 
dissolve.(77)
One can only speculate as to whether the King would have used either of these powers at 
the time of the third Home Rule Bill, since the outbreak of the First World War 
intervened. However, it may be suggested that the crisis surrounding the third Home 
Rule Bill reveals the Crown still possessed these prerogatives, and indeed he considered 
using them. Asquith's claim that the Monarch by acting on the advice of his Ministers 
absolved him of responsibility was, constitutionally correct, but was it morally 
acceptable? Would the King have been justified in passing into law a Bill which might 
have plunged the United Kingdom into civil war, without ascertaining positive proof that 
this Bill was supported by the country? The King at the time of the third Home Rule 
crisis was faced by a dilemma. The Ulster Unionists did not ask for a separate 
parliament as did the Irish Nationalists, they merely asked to remain subjects of the 
Crown. They asked to remain within the British Constitution, and claimed that the 
suspension of the Constitution allowed a transient Government to remove their British 
Citizenship, did Parliament now mean the Government? It is suggested that after the 
1911 Parliament Act de-facto it did, but what constitutional check was there against the 
excesses of this now omnipotent body? Was it reasonable to argue, that the King whom 
the Unionists now claimed, was the sole guardian of the constitution, could avoid 
responsibility by acting on the advice of his ministers, who flatly refused to put a 
contentious Bill to the Country? As has been argued, under the British Constitution, the 
people are subjects of the Crown, as well as citizens of Parliament. It could be argued,
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therefore, that there is a duty on the part of the Crown to protect its subjects. And even 
though under constitutional monarchy, Parliament is supreme, the Crown still retains its 
Royal prerogatives to be used in very grave circumstances. Their execution would 
perhaps be detrimental to the Crown, but nonetheless, under Dicey's definition of 
representative democracy, if  there is reasonable doubt as to whether the House of 
Commons, or rather the Government represents the will of the people, and it will not 
dissolve to put the matter to the judgement of the country, then the King has the 
constitutional right indeed the duty to force his ministers to do so. As Dicey argued in 
1914, 'a Dissolution or an appeal to the nation may constitutionally and rightly in some 
cases be carried out in opposition to the will of a powerful Minister supported by a large 
majority of the House of Commons.' (78) 'If you say that this is not a good law then you 
in fact lay down the monstrous proposition that from the House of Commons, and from a 
Ministry supported by the House of Commons, the King has no means of appealing to the 
nation.'(79) This according to Dicey, was a political error in the time of George HI. 
Now in the time of George V, it was 'an odious political heresy.' (80)
We each and all of us now admit that, though the House of Commons may 
represent or may misrepresent the people, the political sovereignty of the country 
belongs to the electors. (81)
Jennings has argued very much against this principle:
'It is neither practical nor desirable that an election should be held whenever it is 
suspected that a particular decision is not approved. The electorate is asked to 
approve not a particular decision but a course of policy.' And speaking more 
specifically about the crisis under discussion, he states: 'even if a fundamental 
change of policy is made without a mandate, all the considerations urged by Mr 
Asquith suggests that it is not for the King to intervene, except by warnings and 
protests. It is inevitable that a Sovereign who dismisses ministers or compels 
them to resign should be regarded as the ally of the Opposition, and as such made 
the subject of attack.' (82)
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Jennings, it may be argued, gives a reasonable constitutional argument in that he 
highlights the supremacy of the House of Commons as the elected representative of the 
people. His argument also protects the impartiality of the Crown in the realm of politics. 
However as discussed above, King George V lent more towards Dicey's analysis of the 
Crown's Prerogative, and more importantly to its duty to protect its subjects. The King, it 
is suggested also appeared to support Dicey's view as regards the use of the Royal Veto. 
This is revealed by a letter he drafted to Asquith on July 31st 1914, although never sent, 
due to the imminence of the First World War. The King stated:
Much has been said and written in favour of the proposition that the Assent of the 
Crown should be withheld from the measure. On the other hand, the King feels 
strongly that extreme course should not be adopted in this case unless there is 
convincing evidence that it would avert a national disaster, or at least have a 
tranquillizing effect on the distracting conditions of the time. There is no such 
evidence. (83)
Clearly the King himself held that the Crown still possessed the power to dismiss his 
ministers and also in very extreme circumstances to withhold the Royal Assent. This 
study supports such a view, in a Country which sets no limits to Parliamentary authority, 
there are little enough safeguards against the excesses of Government, especially since 
the passing of the 1911 Parliament Act. The right to dismiss a ministry must if ever only 
be used in very grave circumstances, and the use of the veto must be even more 
circumspect. However, these conventions are perhaps a small if imperfect political 
safeguard against the dominance of a powerful Executive, which may misrepresent the 
will of the electors, and refuse an appeal to the Sovereign body i.e. the Nation. There is 
no doubt that the King's mediation went some way in persuading the parties that it was 
vital to seek a 'settlement by consent'. The King reasoned that civil war might be averted 
if Ulster was excluded from the Bill. In the autumn of 1913, therefore, Asquith finally
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seemed to realise that the threats of resistance on the part of Ulster Unionists could no 
longer be dismissed as 'bluff and bluster', despite Redmond's assurances (as late as 
October 1913) that: 'all their extravagant action, all the bombastic threats, are but 
indications that the battle is over'. (84) Bonar Law and Carson also moderated their 
position somewhat by their acceptance at least to consider Ulster exclusion rather than 
the defeat of the Home Rule Bill in its entirety. It is evident that the intervention of the 
King was instrumental in persuading the parties to modify their intransigent positions.
ULSTER EXCLUSION
For British Unionists, Ulster exclusion was not the goal, Ulster was the means of securing 
a General Election, the mere fact that Bonar Law contemplated a settlement on the lines 
of exclusion, was therefore, not greeted by unanimous approval. The British Unionists 
had concentrated on the grievances of Ulster, not because they really wanted separate 
treatment for Ulster, but because they wished to stop Home Rule entirely.' (85) Bonar 
Law's secret talks with Asquith had already made the more militant wing of the Party 
suspicious, Willoughby de Broke, expressed his mistrust of a leadership that had 'already 
given away the Constitution and countenanced the Parliament Act.' (86) But generally 
British Unionists were moderating their position. More importantly perhaps was 
Carson's disclosure, to Bonar Law, that 'he believed that a settlement on the lines of 
excluding Ulster would not be seriously opposed by the Southern Unionists'. (87) As 
Bonar Law told Lansdowne:
If this really represents the position... it seems to me obvious that we are not 
justified in risking civil war for the sake of people who will take no risks, even of 
a financial kind for themselves. I must say therefore, that I am more hopeful than 
I was of a settlement of that kind, [exclusion of Ulster] (88)
Lansdowne did not like this idea much: 'We may be driven to the kind of settlement you 
have in view but I cordially dislike the idea and I feel sure that it would be a bad
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settlement and one that would be pregnant with trouble.' (89) But according to Dutton, 
Carson's revelation as to the position of Southern Unionist convinced Bonar Law of the 
imperative of at least trying to find a 'settlement by consent.' (90) 'From an electoral 
point of view, moreover, nothing could be worse for the party than being put in the 
position of refusing an offer which the electorate would regard as fair and reasonable.' 
(91) Hence the British Unionists moved towards compromise. But compromise was not 
going to be easy, since Ulster was not the homogeneous Protestant province that Ulster 
and British Unionists liked to portray:
The real reason why in my opinion the Ulster question should be kept to the front 
is that, whether the cause be religious (or not), and I do not think it greatly 
matters, the population there is homogenous and determined to be treated in the 
same way as the citizens of the United Kingdom.. In my opinion, from every point 
of view, they have the right to take that attitude. (92)
This was a powerful image of an homogeneous community being driven out of the 
Constitution, but it was not an accurate description of the province of Ulster. Only in 
the four counties of Antrim, Armagh, Londonderry and Down was there a Protestant 
majority: Antrim, Armagh, Londonderry and Down was there a Protestant majority: 
Tyrone and Fermanagh were mixed, whilst Catholics were in the majority in the counties 
of Cravan, Monaghan and Donegal. Indeed following the by-election in Londonderry 
City in January 1913, the Parliamentary representation of Ulster was Nationalists 17 MP's 
and Unionists 16.Ulster was not therefore, a homogenous community, it was a divided 
one. Therefore, the portrayal of Ulster as a Protestant preserve was somewhat 
misleading. As Asquith pointed out to the King:
The total population of the area concerned is little over 1.000.000. It is divided 
between Protestants and Roman Catholics - and in that part of the world political 
and religious differences roughly coincide - in the proportion of seven to three 
(Protestants 729.624. and Roman Catholics 316.406). In two of the four counties 
(Armagh and Londonderry) the Protestant preponderance is not greater than six to
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five. It is not, therefore, the case of a homogeneous people resisting change to 
which they are unitedly opposed. On the contrary, there will be a considerable 
and militant minority strongly in favour of the new state of things, and ready to 
render active assistance to the forces of the executive. In the remainder of Ulster, 
and in the three other provinces of Ireland, there will be an overwhelming 
majority of the population on that side of the law. (93)
This indeed was the real problem, Ulster was a mixed community, and it was this, that 
eventually prevented a solution, since the area of exclusion could not be agreed upon. As 
Churchill remarked following the break down of the Buckingham Palace conference in 
July 1914: 'the Conference lost itself in the muddy by-ways of Fermanagh and Tyrone'. 
(94) In November 1913, Lloyd George proposed the temporary exclusion of Ulster with 
automatic inclusion at the end of a fixed term. This argued Lloyd George would prevent 
immediate violence, since Ulster Unionists were unlikely to rebel against a change which 
would not affect the status of Ulster for several years. Moreover, the time limit would 
ensure that two general elections would be held before Ulster inclusion, therefore, the 
matter could be put before the electorate. (95) This is essentially the scheme which was 
put before Parliament on March 9th 1914, when Asquith moved the Second Reading of 
the Home Rule Bill, and announced his intention to bring in an amendment bill for the 
exclusion of those Ulster counties that wished to 'opt out' of Home Rule for six years. The 
opt out clause would, argued Asquith allow 'the various areas of Ulster to determine for 
themselves whether or not they will come into the operation of the Bill.. Moreover, the 
six year period would allow sufficient time :
'to test by experience the actual working of the Irish Parliament'... Moreover, 'to 
ensure, also, that before that period of exclusion comes to end there shall be a 
full and certain opportunity for the electors of the whole of the United Kingdom, 
both Great Britain and Ireland, with experience to pronounce whether or not that 
exclusion shall come to an end. (96)
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Bonar Law asked whether: 'at the end of six years the counties which have the option 
now are not to have it for themselves?' (97) Asquith made it clear that after a period of 
six years, unless the Imperial Parliament decided otherwise, the counties would be 
included. (98) Carson would not, indeed could not, accept such a proposal. As he told 
the Commons:
I know very well that the motto of every Government...is: 'peace in our time, O 
Lord.' But you do not get rid of the difficulty by [delaying] it to-day or tomorrow, 
or a year hence, or be it six years hence. The difficulty will remain, and Ulster 
will be a geographical and physical fact, and the feelings of loathing and horror of 
your Bill, the feelings of your threats to these men which have driven them to 
combine themselves together in a federation to try and stay in this Parliament and 
under this Parliament, that feeling will grow and be taught to their children from 
generation to generation. Do not tell me and the North of Ireland that they readily 
forget these things. No, Sir, the difficulty will be not be less after six years, but it 
will be greater... Take away the time limit, and instead put the limit of Parliament 
as elected by the people whenever they may determine, having rgard (sic) to the 
feeling of Ulster itself, and then I shall go to Ulster and I make that offer to the 
right hon. Gentleman. (99)
Redmond for the Nationalists accepted Ulster exclusion reluctantly, stating that: 'The 
Prime Minster promised on the first night of the Session that he would make new 
proposals with the object, if possible of conciliating Ulster opposition. To-night he has 
fulfilled that promise, and in my view he has gone to the very extremest limits of 
concession'. (100) However, O'Brien took a more militant stand, claiming that, Bonar 
Law should be a little more jubilant 'over his victory to-night in the official recognition 
of his new Orange Free State.' (101) That afternoon Carson left the House of Commons 
and headed for Belfast, there were many who believed that he intended to set up a 
Provisional Government. Compromise in the traditional British way did not seem 
attainable, and this tried the patience of the more radical members of the Liberal 
Government. Winston Churchill, frustrated by the Unionists' rejection of the
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Government's exclusion proposal gave an inflammatory speech at Bradford on March 
14th,stating:
If Ulster is to become a tool in party calculations; if the civil and parliamentary 
system under which we have dwelt so long, and our fathers before us, are to be 
brought to the rude challenge of force; if the Government and Parliament of this 
great country and greater Empire are to be exposed to menace and brutality; if  all 
the loose, wanton, and reckless chatter we have been forced to listen to these 
many months is in the end to disclose a sinister and revolutionary purpose; then I 
can only say to you: Tet us go forward together and put these grave matters to the 
proof!' (102)
The Cabinet three days earlier (March 11th) had decided to take what were described as 
preventative measures, should the U V F attempt a coup. As Asquith informed the King:
Some considerable time was given to a discussion of the military situation in 
Ulster, suggested by the latest series of police reports, which indicate the 
possibility of attempts on the part of the 'Volunteers' to seize by coups de main, 
police and military barracks, and depots of arms and ammunition. (103)
However, Unionist leaders took these measures together with Churchill's speech as signs 
that the Government meant to coerce Ulster. Whether or not there was a 'plot' to coerce 
Ulster is still a matter of debate, but the crucial thing to bear in mind is that the Ulster 
Unionists at the time genuinely believed there was one. Newspaper reports indicated that 
arrest warrants were to be issued. Stewart gives one such an example: The Observer' on 
the 19th March 1914, stated that the Government were determined to issue about 200 
warrants for the arrest of the leaders in Ulster, but the warrants were not to be executed 
by the police until the receipt of a codeword, which was to changed every Sunday. (104) 
He goes on to give further examples of how the idea of a 'plot' was fuelled. (105) The 
actual details, it may be argued, are less important than the fact that the Ulster Unionists 
and indeed many of the Right in Britain were convinced that the Government meant to 
use the Army to coerce Ulster. Crucially this was the impression gleaned by many Army
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officers in Ireland. The controversy surrounding the actual events of the Curragh which 
began on March 21st 1914, when Brigadier-General Gough and fellow officers of 3rd 
Cavalry Brigade threatened to resign rather than move against Ulster, and actually 
extracted a written assurance from the Cabinet that the Army would not be used to 
enforce Home Rule on Ulster are well documented elsewhere (and will not be gone into 
detail here) (106), other than to contend, that the Unionists rhetoric throughout the Ulster 
Crisis', that the Army would not obey the Government, if  it was ordered to use force 
against the Ulster Unionist must inevitably have contributed to the decisions taken by the 
Army officers at the time of the Curragh incident. Perhaps the most important being the 
British Covenant of March 1914, which stated:
We hereby solemnly declare that, if the Bill is so passed, we shall hold ourselves 
justified in taking or supporting any action that may be effective to prevent it 
being put into operation, and in more particularly to prevent the aimed forces of 
the Crown being used to deprive the people of Ulster of their rights as citizens of 
the United Kingdom. (107)
Dicey expressed his concerns as to the claims of some British Unionists, such as Amery, 
who believed and stated that officers in the army had a legal right to resign their posts as 
a protest against an attempt which they condemn, to coerce Ulster:
This I believe is a mistake. There are certainly cases which seem to me strongly 
to imply that an officer in the army has no right of resignation whatever. This I 
believe to be common law, and I feel to be common sense. (108)
Quoting Carson's letter to the ’Times’ on December 4th 1913, ’The plain truth is that the 
English nation will never stand tampering with the Army’. (109) However, the Unionists' 
rhetoric throughout the campaign, that the Army would not shoot 'loyal' citizens together 
with the their contemplation of tampering with the Annual Army Act, the latter measure, 
even gaining the support of Dicey without doubt ffom the Officers perspective, lent 
support to their course of action to resign rather than march on Ulster. The actual events
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surrounding the Curragh incident, lasted probably until March 30th, when Asquith took 
on the office of Secretary of State for War, and the following Saturday, April 4th, 
addressed a meeting at Ladybank' and uttered the famous phrase, 'The Army shall hear 
nothing of politics from me, and in return I expect to hear nothing of politics from the 
Army'. (110) The ramifications of this incident were profound for the Government. It 
essentially meant that the Government could no longer contemplate using the military to 
force Home Rule upon Ulster, despite Asquith's negation of the 'peccant paragraphs' on 
March 25th. Prior to the Curragh incident the Government could claim that as a last 
resort it could use the Army to impose Home Rule in Ulster, however, following the 
debacle it could no longer make this claim. ( I l l )  Asquith himself stated this as early as 
March 22nd:
The military situation has developed...and there is no doubt if we were to order a 
march upon Ulster that about half the officers in the Army-Navy is more 
uncertain-would strike. The immediate difficulty in the Curragh can, I think, be 
arranged, but this is the permanent situation, and it is not a pleasant one. Winston 
is all for creating a temporary army ad hoc-but that of course is nonsense. (112)
The use of the Army would most certainly have been a last resort for the Liberal 
Government, the image of Home Rule being forced on 'loyal' British subjects at the point 
of a gun was hardly likely to appeal to British public opinion, (113) moreover, by 
contemplating using the Army to coerce Ulster, whilst refusing to put Home Rule before 
the Country, the Liberal Government to a large extent forfeited its moral authority. It 
gave the advantage back to the Unionists, who could claim that the Government was 
prepared to use the Army rather than the ballot box to enforce its policy of Home Rule on 
a reluctant section of the United Kingdom. The question of coercing 'loyal' citizens out 
of the British Constitution poses a moral and emotive question: and very much depends 
on whether the Liberal Government accepted in good faith the assurances of the Irish 
Parliamentary Party that Home Rule would be a final settlement. If that was so, then it
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could defend itself on the basis that Home Rule would not in effect change the Ulster 
Unionist status, they would still be British citizens, irrespective of the fact, that 
subsequently the Ulster Unionists perception was the correct one. However, from the 
perspective of the Ulster Unionists it was a question of citizenship, and it may be 
suggested, that it was not acceptable that the Liberal Government should have used its 
Parliamentary majority to impose Home Rule on Ulster. As the King asked Asquith:
Is there any precedent in our Country for such a change [Home Rule] to be made
without submitting it to the Electorate? (114)
Dicey may have been an ardent Unionist, but he gave a sound constitutional argument 
against the passing of the third Home Rule Bill by virtue of the 1911 Parliament Act, that 
when there is reasonable grounds to suspect that the House of Commons does not 
represent the will of the electorate, is should dissolve to seek the verdict of nation, 
Therefore, it is argued, that the Government did indeed exceed it legitimate authority, by 
not submitting Home Rule to the Country. The crisis surrounding the third Home Rule 
reveals weaknesses in the British Constitution, the main one being that the Party in power 
has the potential to pass a Bill which fundamentally changes the fabric of the 
Constitution and even an individual's citizenship without submitting the issue to the 
nation. However this raises an equally important point, does the nation have the right to 
determine the fate of a minority? Mill warned against the 'tyranny of the majority', 
therefore, should Ulster's citizenship be determined by the majority? The Ulster Crisis' 
raises more fundamental issues than the granting of a devolved Parliament to Ireland, it 
reveals clearly the lack of safeguards in a Constitution that does not fundamentally 
protect the rights of minorities, or even provides safeguards for any of its citizens. The 
third Home Rule Bill revealed that the British Constitutional 'system lacks a concept of 
entrenched rights beyond the reach of the current parliament' (115). The doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty was thus shown to be a dangerous one, in that it did not
163
sufficiently safeguard the rights of British citizens, that individuals or groups essentially 
depended on Parliament for their rights and liberties. Westminster learnt very few lessons 
from the ’Ulster Crisis', from 1921 onwards the Ulster Unionists once again took up their 
position of Protestant Ascendancy, as Ulster essentially became a one party state, the 
Westminster Parliament could have intervened, but it chose not to. Thus reinforcing the 
Catholic/Nationalists historical perception that Protestant Ascendancy and the British 
State were the twin pillars of injustice. Today in Ulster, each side is still seeking its own 
perception of 'justice' and Westminster is still being called upon to act as impartial 
arbiter, a role it is still seemingly ill-equipped for. In the last analysis the Ulster 
Question' will probably be settled not by compromise, but by the numbers thesis, if the 
demographic trends continue, there will be a Republican majority in Ulster in the not too 
distant future. Under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, a change in 
the constitutional position of Ulster can only be attained with the assent of the majority, 
this will most certainly lead to the unification of the one 'Irish Nation', as the Catholic 
population vote to end what they perceive to be an unjust State. Will a then minority 
Unionist population abide by the decision of the majority? This is doubtful to say the 
least, given Ireland's history of sectarian conflict and its tradition of direct action, 
together Ulster's present culture of paramilitarism. This culture of sectarian violence is 
graphically set out by the Sunday Telegraph's correspondent, Jenny McCartney:
The paramilitary beatings continue, but no one really talks much about them now. 
They go unclaimed and largely unremarked. The days when a vicious beating 
from a gang of men in balaclavas could draw a condemnation from President 
Clinton are long gone: today, it might not even make the domestic lunchtime 
news. (116)
This is the legacy of partition, it is also the legacy of Westminster's indifference to its 
'Irish Question'. Whether, a solution can be found to the Ulster Question' is yet to be seen
164
as the resonances of not only the 'Ulster Crisis', but of Ireland's history are felt today, as 
Westminster continues to try to find a solution to what is effectively its 'British Question'.
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CONCLUSION
It is evident that any regime finds it difficult to successfully accommodate the differing 
and opposing demands of a divided society; conflict resolution is never an easy, and often 
a thankless task. The 'Irish Question' is one such example, which has tested the British 
Constitution since it has called on the Westminster Parliament to satisfy the differing 
ideals and aspirations of two conflicting groups, the Irish Nationalists and the Ulster 
Unionists. In essence it has tested the British theory that all political issues can be 
resolved by Parliament through debate and compromise. This theory has not lent itself 
well to finding a solution to the 'Irish Question', or what is now referred to as the Ulster 
Question'. Both Gladstone and Asquith held the belief that Ireland's minority population 
- the Ulster Unionists would obey the supremacy of Parliament. Prior to 1911 at least, it 
seemed incomprehensible, despite all the violent rhetoric and practical preparations from 
as early as 1882 (1) that the Ulster Unionists would carry out their threat of armed 
resistance against the forces of the State. Gladstone and Asquith, were convinced that a 
solution would be found by constitutional means; in this they failed to comprehend that 
when dealing with a divided society, compromise is not easily attainable. The historical 
relationship between the Protestant and Catholic people of Ireland meant that victory for 
one was seen as the destruction of the other. A Dublin Parliament, from the perspective 
of the Ulster Unionists, would be controlled by the Irish Parliamentary Party, and as has 
been shown, this Party was associated with 'revolutionary' and separatist groups. 
Moreover, its links with the Catholic Church, was seen as evidence that Home Rule 
would to all intents and purposes mean rule by Rome. It is suggested that from 1886 
onwards the Ulster Unionists built up a strong moral case against being essentially forced 
out of the British Constitution and under a Dublin Parliament. They based their case on 
the rights of citizenship. Although as has been argued, Home Rule would not have 
changed their status as British citizens and subjects of the Crown, citizenship is more or 
less valueless, unless Parliament is able to adequately protect an individual's rights and
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freedoms. The Ulster Unionists believed that the safeguards contained in the Home Rule 
Bills, such as the provision that a Dublin Parliament would not be allowed to endow any 
religion would not be sufficient protection against the possibility of discrimination. (2) 
As Dicey argued, under direct rule Westminster, as the supreme legislative body could 
pass or repeal any law throughout the United Kingdom, however, the granting of an Irish 
Parliament, albeit on purely Irish affairs, would in Ireland, abolish ’the actual and 
effective control and authority of the Imperial Parliament.' (3) Irish Protestants could, 
therefore, argue, that whatever safeguards were put into a Home Rule Bill, it would not 
be sufficient to protect their rights and freedoms. Indeed, this is was the argument put 
forward by Carson at the time of the third Home Rule Bill:
What becomes of your elaborate provision... it is the working of the institution for 
political or religious purposes and objects, and that no guarantee set up by any 
Parliament can prevent. (4)
Indeed as Dicey argued:
The positive characteristic [of the British Constitution] is the absolute and 
effective authority of the Imperial Parliament throughout the length and breadth 
of the United Kingdom....Any law affecting the United Kingdom not only 
lawfully may, but can in fact, be changed by the Imperial Parliament. (5)
Under a unitary State, Parliament had the authority to pass laws in all parts of the United 
Kingdom, but a Home Rule Bill, if passed would establish 'a dual control in Ireland.' (6) 
This the Ulster Unionists believed would be detrimental to their rights. The British 
Constitution relied on a tacit agreement to respect the rights of minorities therefore by 
forcing the them under a Dublin Parliament, the Liberal Government was, according to 
Unionists, ignoring this principle. (7) The Liberals could however, make the counter 
claim, that by denying the Nationalist population in Ireland (which were four fifths of 
the population) its devolved Parliament, which had been their unwavering goal since at
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least 1885, the Unionists were ignoring the rights and aspirations of the majority of the 
'Irish Nation.' It is evident that both the Irish Nationalists and the Ulster Unionists from 
their own perspectives, could claim that morally each had a strong case for and against 
the granting of Home Rule. The weakness of their argument lay in the fact, that neither 
essentially recognised, or more accurately would acknowledge the just claims of the 
other. Ireland for the Nationalists was one entity one Nation, of which Ulster was an 
integral part, whilst for Ulster Unionists, there was a denial that Ireland had ever been a 
separate Nation: it was perceived or at least promoted as an integral part of the United 
Kingdom, codified in the Act of Union. Gladstone and Asquith's decision therefore, to 
introduce Home Rule, from the Ulster Unionists perspective, was the negation of their 
Birthright. During the time of the first and second Home Rule Bills, Ulster Unionists 
could feel secure that even if the House of Commons abandoned 'loyal subjects of the 
Crown', the Upper Chamber would protect their rights. However, the passing of the 1911 
Parliament Bill changed the political landscape, and highlighted how little concrete 
safeguards the British Constitution holds for its citizens. The third Home Rule Bill 
revealed that the British Constitutional 'system lacks a concept of entrenched rights 
beyond the reach of the current parliament'. (8) Moreover, Miller goes on to argue that, 
the Lords power of veto forestalled for a time, but its abolition revealed:
the stark reality of modem British politics that a citizen's sense of security in his 
fundamental rights depends totally on his sense of co-nationality with the whole 
people who constitute the body politic. That the system has worked so well 
within Great Britain itself is testimony to the self- perceived homogeneity of the 
people of that island. (9)
The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty works well in a society that perceives itself as 
socially homogenous. This is not to say that British society itself was homogenous, there 
were cultural and regional differences, but there was a sufficient social consensus among
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the people to ensure a stable political system. As discussed in chapter two, Balfour put 
the point well, when he stated that our:
whole political machinery pre-supposes a people so fundamentally at one that 
they can safely afford to bicker, and so sure of their moderation that they are not 
dangerously disturbed by the never-ending din of conflict (10)
The Ulster Unionists may not have identified fully with the British people, but it is 
suggested that they perceived themselves better protected under a British Protestant 
constitution, rather than as a minority in a future Catholic State. Essentially, at the time 
of the third Home Rule Bill, the reality of the difficulties of dealing with a divided 
society was laid bare, as the Liberal Government pushed ahead with its determination to 
introduce Home Rule in the face of the threat of armed resistance, not only from the 
Ulster Unionists, but also from a faction of the British Unionist Party, which claimed that 
the Government was exceeding the bounds of its legitimate authority. Gladstone's 
decision to introduce a Home Rule Bill in 1886, without having submitted the policy to 
the electorate in the recent General Election split the Liberal Party, when Hartington 
accused him of exceeding his moral authority, by introducing a Home Rule Bill, which 
had not been referred to the people. Charging Gladstone with introducing a Bill which 
would involve an organic change in the Constitution without a 'mandate' from the people. 
Gladstone referred to the 'peoples' mandate' as an 'extraordinary doctrine, not laid down 
by any constitutional expert'. (11 ) Under the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 
Parliament, can enact or repeal any law, since it is the supreme governing body, and an 
examination of the Constitution during the nineteenth century reveals that generally, 
politicians did not feel obliged to submit to or adhere to a set of election policies. This 
was not the role of Parliament, its members were representatives of the whole Nation, 
rather than the representatives of their constituents. But the electoral reforms that 
occurred during the nineteenth century, such as the extension of the franchise and the
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redistribution of seats, was accompanied by the emergence of mass disciplined parties, 
which were obliged to seek the support of the electorate to gain office. This is not to say, 
that the United Kingdom was in any real sense a democratic state, there was still a 
limited franchise, but the move from oligarchic to popular politics had began . It became 
more prevalent for politicians to speak in terms of 'the peoples mandate'. This doctrine 
assumed more importance following the passing of the 1911 Parliament Act which 
curtailed the House of Lords power of veto. Prior to this Act, for a Bill to become law it 
needed the consent of both Houses of Parliament, however, thereafter, a Bill would 
become law, after two years, even if rejected by the Upper Chamber, the crucial point 
being that a Bill would become law within the lifetime of a single parliament. This in 
essence, meant that a Government could not be compelled to put a Bill, any Bill before 
the electorate. The danger of this was articulated by Balfour, when he argued, at the time 
of this debate in February 1910:
take care that whatever changes are introduced into the constitution to see that it
is not the sport of a chance majority. (12)
The reality was however, the Constitution offered little concrete safeguards for its 
citizens, the Lords may have portrayed themselves as guardians of the electorate, but they 
had been culpable in ignoring those rights. Traditionally, Unionists legislation passed the 
Lords with very little difficulty, but this partisanship reached new heights between 1906 
and 1910, as the leader of the Conservative Party in the Commons, Balfour fulfilled his 
pledge that the Unionists should govern Britain and the Empire, even out o f office. 
Government Bills were blocked, despite the fact that the Liberal Party had received an 
unequivocal mandate for their policy of social reforms in 1906. The Unionists' argument 
in 1912 that the Liberal Government did not have a 'mandate' from the people, since 
Home Rule as clear issue had not formed a major part of the Liberals' election
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programme in the two elections of 1910 had a somewhat hollow ring to it. However, it 
did raise the fundamentals issues as to what was or at least should be the limitation of 
Governmental authority. The Liberals could indeed claim that Home Rule had formed 
part of its official programme since 1891, but as has been argued, so to had the 
curtailment of the House of Lords powers. Asquith however, went to the Country for a 
second time on this issue in 1910, the Liberals fought the election on the question of who 
governs, ’peoples or peers'. The Liberals could claim, that as the democratically elected 
Government of the people, it had the right to pass a Home Rule Bill. However, Dicey's 
argument, that when there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the House of Commons 
represents the deliberate will of the electorate, a Government should dissolve to seek the 
verdict of the nation is a powerful one. The crisis surrounding the Third Home Rule Bill, 
brought into focus the possibility that Parliament could give effect not to the will of the 
electorate, but to the determined will of a faction, that might hold the balance of power at 
Westminster. This was the Unionists' contention, that Home Rule did not represent the 
will of the nation, rather the interests of the Parliamentary Party. The pre-World War 
One Constitutional crises revealed that Parliament essentially meant the Government of 
the day. Not the revered balanced constitution Dicey spoke of:
the Queen, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons; these three bodies 
acing together may be aptly described as "the Queen in Parliament", and 
constitute Parliament. (13)
These three interlinking parts are what made up a balanced Constitution, but as Freeman 
wrote in 1872:
I may mark a change of language which has happened within my memory...We 
now familiarly speak...of the body of Ministers actually in power, the body known 
to the Constitution but wholly unknown to the law, by the name of 'the 
Government'. We speak of M r Gladstone's Government' or Mr Disraeli's 
Government'. I can myself remember the time when such a form of words was
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unknown, when ’Government' still meant 'Government' by King, Lords and 
Commons. (14)
This change in language was representative of powerful changes in the British 
Constitution. The balanced Constitution was replaced by the domination of Government, 
which essentially meant the dominance of a Party. The Liberal Government insistence 
on introducing a Home Rule Bill without consulting the nation, was the affirmation of 
this change. Should Asquith therefore, have submitted Home Rule to the verdict of the 
people? This study has argued, that yes the Liberal Government should have dissolved 
Parliament and put the Bill to the people. It is not suggested, that the Ulster Unionists 
would have adhered to the verdict of the electors, for the Ulster Unionist Council made it 
plain, that:
it is incompetent for any authority, party or people to appoint as our rulers a 
government dominated by men disloyal to the Empire and to whom our faith and 
traditions are hateful (15)
However, by refusing to put the Bill before the Country Asquith to a large extent 
forfeited the Government's moral authority, it is accepted that technically, under the 
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty the Government had the power to pass the third 
Home Rule Bill without reference to the people. But this very power reveals critical 
weaknesses in a flexible constitution that sets no limit on the authority of Parliament, 
which after 1911 meant the Government of the day. Essentially, the British Constitution 
with its doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty allows the Party in power to largely 
determine what is constitutional. That is the danger of a flexible constitution that sets no 
limits to the authority of Government. The unassailable power of the Executive has been 
a recent subject of much debate, as both under the Thatcher and the Blair Government, 
the House of Commons has almost become irrelevant. Moreover, Blair has been 
accused of adopting a presidential style of leadership. The resonances of the 1911
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Parliament Act are still felt today aptly captured in the words of Selbome, written at the 
time of the crisis:
Under to cloak and pretence of the issue of the rights of the people versus the 
peers, the people are being robbed by the House of Commons of the 
Constitutional power to say the last word in great constitutional issues, and the 
Prime Minister of the day is being lifted into the position of a dictator. (16)
Tony Blair today continues to persue his 'moral crusade' against the 'forces of terrorism', 
Parliament was recently recalled to discuss the matter, and there is an attempt outwardly 
at least to build up a consensus. It is argued, that in the end, Blair will follow his own 
preferred course of action, irrespective of the opposition of some MP's or the public, but 
the fact that Blair did recall Parliament, even if only to debate the matter, and he is 
attempting to gain public support for his action, shows that there is a limitation to 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, or more accurately today, Governmental authority. The 
Prime Minister would not wish for mass demonstrations against the Government's policy, 
if it can be avoided. To quote Dicey, sovereignty: 'is limited on eveiy side by popular 
resistance'. (17) It is argued, that the third Home Rule Bill reveals in one sense the 
limitless authority of Government, but it also highlights its limitation. The Ulster plan of 
campaign, the threat of active resistance, was partially successful, since it did gain 
special treatment for Ulster. Today, the British State is still limited in its ability to deal 
effectively with what has now become known as 'The Ulster Question'. It is still limited 
by the threat of popular resistance, this is the difficulty of finding a solution to a divided 
society. However, Westminster learned little form the Ulster Crisis of 1912 - 1914, for 
after 1921, it retreated to its historical position of non-intervention in Irish Affairs. As 
early as 1922 the Craig Government abolished PR at local Government level, this was 
followed at National level in 1929, and ensured that the Unionist Party won every 
election between 1920 -1969. The Catholic population was discriminated against in 
spheres such as housing, and employment. As McGarry and O'Leary have argued:
180
'Hegemonic domination was cemented by systematic discrimination'. (18) Carson's 
words at the time of the third Home Rule Bill, echoed not against the Protestant people of 
Ulster, but against the Catholic minority:
What becomes of your elaborate provision...it is the working of the institution for 
political or religious purposes and objects, and that no guarantee set up by any 
Parliament can prevent. (19)
Westminster could have intervened, it had the legislative powers to do so, but successive 
Governments chose to ignore 'The Ulster Question' it was conveniently left out of British 
politics, until media coverage in the 1960's forced the Government to address the issue. 
By then it was largely too late, each side had retreated into their entrenched historical 
positions, the Nationalists believed that they would never attain justice under the British 
Constitution, whilst the Unionists clung on to their rights of British citizenship. Today 
the British Government is still attempting to find a solution to its 'Ulster' or rather its 
British Question', and it is still limited in its options by the threat of resistance from 
either community.
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